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Abstract
The thesis applies a variety of DSGE models to a set of problems whose common link is 
the analysis of economic fluctuations.
The DSGE methodology is applied first to the analysis of economic fluctuations in Italy. 
After documenting the crucial features of economic fluctuations in Italy  (high volatility of 
hours worked and low volatility of employment), the thesis explains why the standard RBC 
model cannot reproduce them. Therefore, a modified RBC model with labour adjustment 
costs and an underground sector is introduced, and its performance analysed.
Then, the thesis utilizes DSGE theory to study how fluctuations are transm itted within 
and between countries. Using a two-country general equilibrium model with monopolistic 
competition and sticky prices, it examines first the relative effects of a wide range (money, 
supply and demand) of shocks, and then the aggregate effects separately.
The relative effects are the consequences of shocks for the relative price and quantities 
of domestic tradeables versus nontradeables. The main finding is th a t not only sector- 
specific shocks affect these relative prices and allocations, bu t also aggregate monetary 
shocks, thus contributing to  explain why money has sectoral effects, as in the empirical 
literature.
The aggregate effects are the consequences of shocks for the main macroeconomic 
variables. The analysis of the aggregate effects differs from the most recent literature 
because: 1) the role of critical param eters in the transmission is analysed simultaneously; 
2) the analysis is not confined to  m onetary shocks; 3) supply and demand shocks are 
disaggregated by sector; 4) the assumptions tha t the marginal productivity of labour may 
be decreasing, and th a t individuals cannot work in both sectors, are introduced.
The aggregate effects of the shocks depend on the choice of parameters. The assump­
tion th a t individuals cannot work in both sectors leads to a lower elasticity of marginal 
costs with respect to output.
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Dynamic Stochastic General Equilibrium (DSGE) models have now become a standard 
tool for macroeconomic analysis and macroeconomic policy evaluation. Because they 
fully specify a dynamic optimisation problem for agents under uncertainty, they are char­
acterised by analytical rigour, but at the same time they have proven to be very flexible, 
as they are able to  accommodate a wide class of macroeconomic problems, for exam­
ple business cycles, monetary and fiscal policy, welfare analysis, wealth distribution and 
inequality.
As a tool, the DSGE methodology can or should be judged by its ability to give 
answers, increase understanding or generate a new perspective or viewpoint. Since the 
seminal works of Kydland and E.C. Prescott (1982), and Long and Plosser (1983), the 
literature th a t uses DSGE models has expanded enormously, therefore it is not possible 
to provide here a comprehensive appraisal based on all the problems th a t have been dealt 
using the DSGE methodology. However, it is possible to  reach perhaps a tentative, yet 
deeper understanding by applying this method to a smaller set of problems, which is what 
this thesis sets out to do.
In the forthcoming chapters, a variety of DSGE models are introduced and applied 
to  a set of problems, all of them related to the analysis of economic fluctuations. Some 
of the models are used to study real fluctuations, others to study nominal fluctuations; 
some models are for closed economies and others are for open economies; some models 
are standard  and others possess innovative features. There is some variety also in the 
set of questions th a t are analysed in the thesis, providing an overall perspective on the 
method. In fact, Chapters 2 and 3 are applications of the DSGE methodology to a special
8
case (the analysis of economic fluctuations in Italy), and Chapters 4 and 5 use the DSGE 
methodology to  study how fluctuations are transm itted within and between countries. In 
particular, Chapter 2 documents the fluctuations occurring in the Italian economy, and 
then tries to quantify how much they can be explained by standard RBC theory. Chapter
3 presents a DSGE model with labour adjustment costs and the underground sector, in
/
order to explain why in Italy hours of work fluctuate more than  employment. Chapter 4 
investigates how shocks are transm itted to relative quantities and relative prices within 
a country. Chapter 5 investigates the domestic and international transmission of shocks 
to the main macroeconomic variables. Finally, the Conclusion chapter puts forward a 
“specific” or “particular” appraisal of DSGE models, specifically limited to the analysis of 
economic fluctuations, and from the particular viewpoint of the set of questions th a t are 
analysed in the thesis.
The DSGE methodology is the fruit of the intellectual effort of several scholars. By 
looking at the “landm ark” or key papers, the next Section illustrates how the method 
came gradually into being, and the advances made at each step.
The first contribution th a t has proved to be fundamental for the development of DSGE 
modelling was made by M uth in 1961, but the first fully-formed DSGE models appeared 
only in the early eighties, with the seminal works of Kydland and Prescott (1982), and 
Long and Plosser (1983), who introduced the first Real Business Cycle (RBC) models. In 
between these dates, a clearly-identifiable set of papers provided the conceptualizations 
and the techniques th a t are now routinely used in DSGE modelling. These conceptu­
alizations and techniques, rather than the specific theories th a t have been put forward 
with them , are the focus of this introductory chapter. In fact, while the first DSGE or 
RBC models were neoclassical in nature, the recent literature has accommodated a va­
riety of theories or explanations of business cycle fluctuations, proving tha t the DSGE 
methodology can be dissociated from particular theories or schools of thoughts.
1.1 T h e foundations o f the D SG E  m eth od ology
M uth (1961): Rational Expectations and the Theory of Price Movements
“Rational Expectations and the Theory of Price Movements” by John M uth was not the 
first paper th a t introduced a notion of rationality, but it is im portant because it contains 
a notion of rationality  for the agents’ expectations. Rationality is often assumed, for
example, in modelling consumer’s behaviour: if a preference relation is both  transitive 
and complete, then it is a rational preference relation. M uth was the first to introduce 
a notion of rationality for the expectations of the agents, and he also showed how this 
concept can be applied to dynamic models.
Consider, as a simple setting, an isolated market, with a single commodity tha t cannot 
be stored, and with the assumption th a t production lags behind supply. The market 
equations are:
Ct =  -fip t  , 
Pt =  7 Pt +  iH , 
Pt =  Ct ,
where Pt is the number of units produced, Ct is the amount consumed, pt is the market 
price, pi  is the expected market price on the basis of the information available up to period 
t — 1, and ut is an error term. The first equation represents demand, the second equation 
supply, and the last equation represents the market equilibrium.
Solving for the equilibrium price gives us the equation:
Then, if the errors have no serial correlation and Eut  =  0, the m odel’s prediction for 
the price is:
Ept =  — Pt •
If the prediction of the theory was different from the expectations of the firms, then 
there would be opportunities to profit from this knowledge, by inventory speculation, or 
by operating a firm, or by selling a price forecasting service to a firm. Assuming rationality 
means th a t the  expectations of the firms are the same as the prediction of the theory, that 
is:
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P t =  E p t
Then, if 7 /(3 ^  —1 the rationality assumption implies th a t pf =  0, or th a t the expected 
price is equal to the equilibrium price. It is im portant to point out th a t the equalisation 
of the expected pfice with the equilibrium price is not a necessary implication of the 
assumption of rational expectations. In this particular case, this result is due to the 
shocks being completely unpredictable, i.e. Eut =  0. For example, if the shock could be 
predicted on the basis of prior information, then:
P&t =  ~ J + ^ EUt '
How desirable is the assumption of rational expectations? The advantages of rational 
expectations, at least from a purely theoretical point of view, are many. First, the notion 
is meant to be applied to all the different markets and systems, ensuring consistency. 
Secondly, if expectations were not rational, there would be opportunities for economists 
(the people who know the model) in commodity speculation, running a firm, or selling the 
information. And thirdly, rationality is an assumption th a t can be modified. Systematic 
biases, incomplete or incorrect information, poor memory, etc., can be examined with the 
same analytical methods based on rationality.
Lucas and Rapping (1969): Real Wages, Employment and Inflation
The first piece of research by Lucas into the territory of business cycles is “Real Wages, 
Employment and Inflation” , w ritten in collaboration with Leonard Rapping. The main 
purpose of the paper is to  provide an account of the behaviour of U.S. wages and employ­
ment th a t could be directly brought to the data and estimated.
The model th a t Lucas and Rapping put forward possessed several innovative features. 
They wanted a model th a t reconciled the assumptions th a t the  labour supply does not 
respond to real-wage changes in the long run (as is normally the case in growth theory), 
but it is infinitely elastic (as in a Keynesian theory with rigid wages), or positively-sloped, 
in the short run.
As Lucas and R apping’s model was meant to provide an account of both the long 
and the short-run elasticities, it could not be a static model. It was an innovation then 
to introduce two periods in the model, and to assume th a t households do not simply
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choose between consumption and leisure in the current period, but also between those and 
consumption and leisure in the future. For example, a worker th a t expects an increase 
in the future real wage may find it advantageous to increase leisure (work less hours) 
today, while a t the same time increasing today’s consumption by dissaving. On the other
hand, expected future increases in prices reduce the attractiveness of working today for the/
purpose of consuming tomorrow, because in this case the real interest rate  falls, therefore 
the returns of saving today for tomorrow are reduced.
W ith their model, Lucas and Rapping also show th a t it is possible to  conceive a role 
for money in the labour market. If the household expectations about future real wages 
and prices are adaptive, as illustrated by the following equations:
ln u ^  =  A inwt +  (1 — A ) ln u ^ j  +  X! ,
In P* =  A In Pt +  (1 -  A) In Pt*_x +  A" ,
where wf  and P f  are expected future real wages and prices, wt and Pt are current real 
wages and prices, and X' and X" are trend terms, then labour supply increases after an 
increase in money and prices, th a t is, there is “money illusion” . This happens because 
workers with adaptive expectations expect th a t the economy will return  to  higher wages 
and prices, therefore it is optimal for them  to increase their current supply of labour.
The result of money illusion also hinges on the fact th a t increases in money are followed 
by falling expected real interest rates, as nominal interest rates fail to adjust fully to the 
increase in prices. Lower interest rates reduce the attractiveness of working today and 
saving in order to  work less tomorrow. Lucas and Rapping refer to the fall in real interest 
rates simply as an empirical fact, which they leave unexplained, as they work at the 
partial equilibrium level. However, this unexplained issue, plus the thought of modelling 
expectations “consistently” (expectations in one sector of the economy must be compatible 
with those in another sector), provided the incentive for casting the issue of the effects of 
money in general-equilibrium terms, and lead to the 1972 paper.
Lucas and Rapping estimate their model with US data  and find elasticities for the 
short and the long-run labour supply that are consistent with the theories, but in addition 
to this result there are some other extras in their model. The param eters A' and A" are 
expected trends, which the agents revise whenever they are given “sufficient cause” . The
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government cannot rely on stable private-sector forecasts A' and A", and therefore it has 
no possibility of raising output indefinitely with a policy of system atic inflation.
Lucas and Rapping’s is not a general equilibrium model, it is not stochastic and the 
dynamics in it is limited to  two periods, so a t first glance, no m atter his noticeable merits, 
it seems out of place in this survey of DSGE models. However, it is im portant to s tart 
this survey with it because it influenced Lucas’ thinking for years afterwards1. In fact, it 
is easy to see th a t the ideas th a t intertem poral maximization m atters for labour supply, 
and th a t agents adapt their decision rules to changes in policy, are already there.
But even more importantly, in this model all labour supply changes happen in equilib­
rium, a view th a t it is central in the DSGE literature started  later in the 1980s. Accord­
ing to  Lucas (1981), working hours actually supplied to  the m arket are what individuals 
choose. Social conventions and institutions may affect individual decisions, but Lucas 
thought th a t institutions cannot ultim ately serve other purposes than  to aid the matching 
of preferences with opportunities. _
However, it is possible to argue th a t at least some of the features in the actual labour 
market prevent households, as a m atter of fact, from adjusting optimally their labour 
supply. This is the  case, for example, of fixed working hours, or set contractual arrange­
ments, tying both  employers and employees. Nevertheless, the most rigorous, “scientific” , 
approach would be to  construct models where these features are themselves explained, as 
institutions can be chosen or changed, instead of simply delivering models with specific 
institutional features in the set of assumption. Such models might be too complex, and 
even possibly out of reach with the tools available now. But the strategy of adding ad 
hoc institutional features to explain behaviour does not seem to be in line with Lucas’ 
approach to  macroeconomic modelling.
Lucas (1972): Expectations and the Neutrality of M oney
It is difficult to underestim ate the influence exerted by “Expectations and the Neutral­
ity of Money” , as it contains all the foundation-stones of the DSGE methodology, and 
innovations which now are routinely used by economists in their models.
The core message of this paper is that money can have an effect on output, even when 
all prices are market-clearing and agents behave optimally. The only assumption th a t is
*As recognised by Lucas (1995) and (1981).
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necessary to obtain this result is tha t traders only know the price in the market in which 
they operate, bu t they do not have information on the aggregate price level. In this way, 
the real effects of money can be explained without resorting to  any device tha t assumes 
that agents do not do what they are capable of (adjusting prices), or what they want 
(behave optimally).
It is possible to argue th a t the m ethod of solving an economic model by finding the 
(possibly unique) equilibrium solution is probably as old as economics itself. It requires 
of course a definition of equilibrium, which can be defined as a situation where agents do 
not have an incentive to change their behaviour, and all markets clear2. In many models 
money can only affect prices but not allocations, so being able to imagine a situation where 
money can have real effects because of imperfect information but without any compromise 
or departure from the equilibrium method is certainly a big step, bu t there is even more 
in Lucas’ paper.
If somebody asked why a solution to an economic model must be an “equilibrium” 
(after all, solutions which are not at the equilibrium defined above can also be hypothe­
sized) , the best answer is th a t this is a requirement for consistency. Individuals can always 
correct their behaviour and formulate their choices optimally, markets clear if they are free 
to operate.
But Lucas’ contribution to this line of thought is an additional requirement for consis­
tency, th a t is, the requirement th a t agents use the correct conditional distribution of future 
variables when calculating their expectations. This “rational expectations” hypothesis is 
derived from M uth (1961), but now let us see how Lucas made it operational in his model.
At each point in time, there are two generations in the model, the young and the 
old3. Each individual lives for two periods only, and there is no population growth. 
O utput is a function of labour input only. In each period the young must decide their 
labour supply and therefore output, and their level of money holdings. O utput cannot be 
stored, bu t money holdings can be carried to the next period in order to buy output for 
future consumption. T hat is, in each period the young and the old generations exchange 
output for money, bu t trade can only occur in two physically separate markets, to which 
individuals are allocated. Uncertainty arises because the individuals’ allocation is in part
2This m ethod thus excludes looking for “disequilibrium” solutions, for example situations with 
unemployment.
3 Many essentials of the model are due to Samuelson (1958).
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stochastic, and because the money supply is subject to  shocks.
The decision problem faced by a member of the young generation is then:
V (~P^) ’
subject to: '
p{n  — c) — A > 0 .
where c is consumption, n  is labour supply, A are nominal balances, augmented by next 
period’s transfers x', p  is the price level, and m  is money supply. In the above equation, 
current period variables are related to the future unknown variables x'  and p'. Because of 
the uncertainty in the economy, individuals need to take the expectation of V,  using the 
conditional distribution F. Expectations are formed rationally because the evaluation of F  
is part of the solution to  the problem above, or alternatively F  must be consistent with the 
solution. W hen solving the model individuals are able to write prices as a function of all 
possible states of the economy. Since the distribution of future stochastic shocks is known 
to them, they are able to  calculate the correct probability of the future p conditional on 
state of the economy today.
The assum ption th a t agents use the correct conditional distribution in forming ex­
pectations is M uth’s rational expectations hypothesis. In this way, we have a notion of 
equilibrium th a t not only requires th a t decisions are optimal and markets clear, but also 
th a t agents evaluate expectations in a way tha t is consistent w ith the model they are 
using.
Brock and M irman (1972): Optimal Economic Growth and Uncertainty 
- The Discounted Case
The introduction of uncertainty about technological progress was one of the fundamental 
steps in the development of DSGE models. The paper by Brock and Mirman (1972) does 
so in the context of the Cass-Koopmans optimal growth model. Because of its discrete­
time dimension, and because the random shock to technology enters in a very general 
form4, the paper has become a classic in modern macroeconomics, so th a t most DSGE
4 The formulation of the model is quite general in the sense that no specific assumptions are made on 
the form of the production function.
max < U (c, n) +  / 
c,n,A 1 J
models are actually built on the foundations laid by Brock and Mirman.
In the Cass-Koopmans model the optimal consumption policy is the stable branch of 
the saddle point solution of the system of equations, which govern the dynamics of the 
model. However, the stable branch solution is a knife-edge policy, because any pertur­
bation results in instability and eventual annihilation. This potential problem is what 
motivates Brock and M irman to  extend the optimal growth model to uncertainty. In fact, 
if the qualitative results of the theory are not changed after the introduction of uncer­
tainty, then the deterministic growth model can be justified as the approximation of a 
more general model.
The type of uncertainty th a t Brock and Mirman consider is an error in observating 
output or an error in aggregation. This is done by introducing a random element in 
the production function /(& , r), where k is the capital-labour ratio  and r is the random 
variable. The variable r might also be thought of as an observation error on the capital 
stock. Because production is a random variable, consumption streams are random as well, 
and therefore the criterion of maximising the sum of discounted utilities is no longer valid 
and must be updated. Brock and M irman choose the criterion function according to the 
theory of optim al decisions under uncertainty, thus assuming th a t individuals maximise 
the sum of discounted expected utilities. In this framework the maximization problem 
becomes:
oo
max E  E ** u{ct ) ,
t=0
subject to:
ct +  h  = f ( k t- i , r t- i )  .
The theory of dynamic programming can then be invoked to show th a t there exists a 
unique optim al consumption policy ct , which at any time £ is a function of the state of 
the economy:
ct = g ( f  ( k t - u n - i ) )  .
The function g and the assumptions on r  determine the properties of the stochastic 
process for the optim al capital-labour ratio k. In particular, k  follows a Markov process.
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The distribution function of the optimal k is obtained from the transition function of the 
Markov process. Brock and M irm an’s contribution is fundamental because they show how 
to extend the notion of steady state to the stochastic case. In the deterministic case the 
steady-state capital stock remains constant from period to period. In the stochastic case, 
the distribution of capital stocks remains constant from period to period.
Lucas and Prescott (1974): Equilibrium Search and Unemployment
“Expectations and the Neutrality of Money” was the first paper th a t situated the problem 
of expectation-formation in a general equilibrium setting. In thia way, the expectations of 
future prices th a t agents form when, for example, deciding between labour and leisure are 
consistent with the expectations formed when buying or selling bonds, because they are 
the same. Aggregate variables are the result of decisions th a t are mutually consistent.
In “Expectations and the Neutrality of Money” money has real effects because of price- 
misperception, but the model cannot deliver a supply function th a t can be integrated with 
an IS-LM-type aggregate-demand theory. W hat it offered was an entirely new paradigm: 
one where the behaviour of one sector cannot be worked out without reference to that 
sector’s interactions with the rest of the economy. It also constituted an example of a 
macroeconomic model where aggregative relationships come from the explicit modelling 
of microeconomic behaviour.
The general equilibrium approach, and the postulate th a t a macroeconomic model 
must be the aggregation of a microeconomic model can also be found in “Equilibrium 
Search and Unemployment” (1974), written with Edward C. Prescott.
The economy is constituted by a large number of spatially distinct markets or “is­
lands” . P roduct demand in each market shifts stochastically, driven by shocks tha t are 
independent across markets, but autocorrelated in each market. Labour in the only input 
used in production, and to tal labour force, allocated across markets, is constant. In each 
market, a worker may either work at the wage rate tha t is offered in that market, or leave. 
If she leaves, she earns nothing in the current period but enters a pool of unemployed 
workers th a t are distributed across the “islands” .
At the beginning of the period, each market has a fixed workforce y. Define A as the 
expected present value of job search, the same for all islands. New workers will arrive next 
period up until:
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where (3 is the discount factor, v is the value of the expected future wage stream, s, s' E 5
are the current and expected future demand shocks in the market, with joint density / ,  
and a are the new arrivals.
The equation above constitutes an equilibrium condition, from which is possible to 
derive the distribution of workers ip for a given s, y and A. Unemployment is then given 
by aggregating across markets:
Lucas (1976): Econometric Policy Evaluation: A Critique
General equilibrium models, with explicit micro-foundations are often used as a framework 
to conduct macroeconomic policy evaluation. Being optimising models, they carry with
nesian models lack. Moreover, they only have structural param eters which are invariant 
to policy changes5.
The problem of param eter instability was famously made clear by Lucas in “Econo­
metric Policy Evaluation: A Critique” (1976). At the time of writing it, quantitative 
macroeconomic policy discussions were conducted within a framework entirely specified 
by econometricians. For example, one could write tha t the behaviour of the economy was 
described by the following system of difference equations:
where yt is the vector of endogenous variables, x t is the vector of exogenous forcing vari­
ables, and £t is a vector of independent, identically distributed shocks. The task of the 
econometrician was then to estimate F  and the parameters 6 from past data, while econo­
mists suggested forms for the individual equations, in the absence of any theory that 
aggregated the decisions of the individuals.
them the evaluation criterion (welfare maximisation) for policy th a t aggregative or Key-
Vt+i =  F ( y t , x t , 9 , et)
5 Lucas observes that the assumption that preference and technology parameters are invariant seems 
reasonable, but not beyond all doubt, and thus must itself be verified empirically.
W ith the knowledge of F  and #, policy evaluation consisted of simulating the behaviour 
of the economy under alternative specifications for policy x t , and then evaluating the 
desirability of the outcomes according to some criterion. However, Lucas notes tha t F  
and 9 must come from optim al individual behaviour under a given policy, and there is no 
guarantee th a t they will remain unchanged under some alternative policy x t .
Does the Lucas critique close the possibility of conducting any meaningful policy eval­
uation exercise? Consider the policies tha t can be expressed as functions of the state of 
the system: a Taylor rule may belong to this category. Assume th a t they can be written 
as:
x t =  G (yt . A, rit ) ,
where G  is known, A is a fixed param eter vector, and r]t is a vector of disturbances. Then 
the remainder of the economy follows:
Vt+i =  F ( y t , x u 0 ( \ )  ,e t ) ,
th a t is, the param eters 9 vary systematically with the structural param eters A. The task 
of the econometrician is then to estimate the function F  and the relationship between 9 
and A.
However, in a DSGE model F  and the relationship between 9 and A are obtained by 
aggregating the individuals’ decisions according to the model. In this case A are not just 
param eters describing policy but also preferences or technology. Estim ates of A can be 
obtained by various methods, but notice that parameters are structural (and the evaluation 
exercise meaningful) only if they are invariant to policy. This is hardly the case of, for 
example, the frequency a t which prices are adjusted, since it is reasonable to expect 
th a t price-setters would want to increase the frequency of price adjustm ents in periods 
of high inflation. The DSGE methodology could accommodate this scenario by treating 
the frequency of price adjustm ent as an endogenous variable, which in equilibrium would 
depend, among the other things, on the parameters of the Taylor rule.
Lucas (1977): Understanding Business Cycles
In his introduction to  “Studies in Business-Cycle Theory” (1981), Lucas wrote: “My own 
research has been concerned almost exclusively with the attem pt to discover a useful theo­
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retical explanation of business cycles” . Moreover, again according to  Lucas, to understand 
business cycles means to  construct “a fully articulated artificial economy which behaves 
through time so as to  im itate closely the time series behavior of actual economies” 6.
However, economics is characterized by the coexistence of several theories, originally 
formed to illuminate different aspects of economic behaviour. The simultaneous existence 
of several theories and models shows by itself tha t the selection criterion of “imitating 
closely” the da ta  is not followed by all, as economics is also a normative science. As a 
result, the “attem pt to  discover a useful theoretical explanation of business cycles” is a 
rather vague research proposal as it does not indicate by itself a specific methodology or 
theory. Which model then can best explain business cycles, and which are the facts to 
be replicated? Moreover, given th a t our understanding of the economy is limited, do we 
want to select models th a t explain how the economy works or how it should work?
One could go back to the models th a t have been summarised above, and try  to infer 
Lucas’ proposed methodology for business cycle modelling from his most influential papers 
published between 1969 and 1977, summarised above. The dominant feature tha t they 
have in common is th a t prices and quantities are determined in equilibrium, thus agents do 
not have an incentive to  change their behaviour. The papers summarised above illustrate 
Lucas’ point of view th a t there is no serious alternative to the equilibrium method. To be 
precise, while “Rational Expectations and the Theory of Price Movements” is a contribu­
tion to Keynesian macroeconomics, the remaining ones illustrate Lucas’ shift towards a 
general equilibrium point of view, and his final critique of Keynesian macroeconomics. In 
Lucas’ view, the formulation of economic theories in explicit aggregate terms had not been 
beneficial, because it diverted the research effort away from the sources of institutional 
instability, favouring policies targeted at achieving a given level of output.
Lucas concludes th a t the empirical evidence points to the conclusion tha t business 
cycles are all alike, th a t is, the qualitative features of business cycles are the same for all 
countries. Therefore, Lucas argues, there exists the possibility of a unified explanation 
of business cycles, grounded in the general laws governing market economies, and not 
depending on the institutional features specific to particular countries. Moreover, if the 
features of business cycles are the same also across time, then the assumption that agents 
form their expectations rationally is not unreasonable, because there must exist stable
eLucas (1977).
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arrangements for processing the information and reacting optimally, without systematic 
biases.
Lucas argues th a t money might have a prominent role among the possible causes of 
business cycles. Real effects of money may arise because of price misperception, since 
monetary shocks generate stochastic price variability, and the agents cannot distinguish 
with certainty between perm anent and transitory movements in prices, as well as general 
and relative price movements.
This approach to modelling business cycles is subsequently applied by Lucas in “An 
Equilibrium Model of the Business Cycle” (1979). However, in th a t paper agents’ demands 
are not explicitly derived from utility maximization, that is, the link between preferences 
and demand functions is not made explicit.
Kydland and Prescott (1982): Time to Build and Aggregate Fluctuations
The model by Kydland and E.C. Prescott (1982), is, then, the first general equilibrium, 
micro-founded model of the business cycle. It could be seen as the first DSGE model, 
the point of arrival of a theory th a t gradually came into being from Lucas’ drive towards 
an equilibrium theory of the business cycle, and was made possible by the concepts and 
modelling advances introduced by M uth (rational expectations) and Brock and Mirman 
(uncertainty).
Kydland and E.C. Prescott narrow the problem of explaining business cycles down to 
the one of accounting for the volatility and the co-movements of selected macroeconomic 
variables. Their approach integrates growth and business cycle theory, and focuses on a 
“real” or “nonm onetary” explanation of the business cycle. The crucial features of the 
model are the assum ption th a t more than one time period is required for the construction of 
new productive capital, and the assumption that the utility function is non-time-separable, 
so th a t the intertem poral elasticity of substitution of leisure is higher than in the time- 
separable case. These assumptions increase the size and the persistence of the responses 
to the exogenous shocks.
The representative household solves the following problem:
O O
max E  E
t=o
where f3 is the discount factor, c is consumption, I is leisure, L  the lag operator, and
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a (L) — Yli^Loa iL l- Current utility depends not only on current leisure, but also on past 
leisure choices.
Total resources are constrained as follows:
ct +  it <  /  (At , k t , n t ,y t) ,
where i is to tal investment, /  is the production function, A is a shock to technology, k 
is the capital stock, n  is labour input and y are inventories. The capital stock evolves 
according to:
kt+i =  (1 — S )  kt + s u  ,
=  Sj+l,t ;
where Sj+i tt is the amount allocated at time t to the investment project in the j th  stage 
from the last, since it is assumed that J  > 1 periods are required to build new capital. It 
must be stressed th a t the ad hoc assumption of time-to-build and non-time-separability 
of preferences are not indispensable. As shown by Long and Plosser (1983), it is possible 
to obtain persistence and co-movements in the responses with more general assumptions.
Kydland and Prescott build on the foundations laid by M uth, Lucas and Brock and 
Mirman, bu t most im portantly, they put forward a general equilibrium model and make it 
fully operational, generating predictions that can be compared with the empirical evidence. 
Having obtained a numerical solution by means of approximation, Kydland and Prescott 
estim ate as many param eters as possible from microeconomic evidence. For example, the 
observation th a t investment projects take approximately two years to complete is used to 
pin down the param eter J . Having then restricted as much as possible the number of free 
param eters, Kydland and Prescott test the model’s ability to m atch the variance of a set 
of variables, the covariances with real output, and the autocovariance of output.
Kydland and P resco tt’s decision not to test the model versus a VAR (page 1360) 
is m otivated by the existence of measurement problems, and by the abstract, stylized 
nature of the model. They do not provide the “true” model, bu t an approximation that 
can be used to  answer a limited set of questions. They decide to focus on moments 
such as variances, covariances and autocovariances, for which the noise introduced by
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approximation and measurement errors is likely to be relatively small. The ability to 
match the actual moments with the ones generated by the model constitutes the test of 
the theory.
Another pioneering work in the field of DSGE models is the one from Long and Plosser 
(1983), published a year after Kydland and Prescott’s work. Similarly to Kydland and 
Prescott, Long and Plosser show th a t the growth model can be modified to produce 
fluctuations th a t resemble the ones in the real economy, but they explore a different way. 
In order to replicate the  moments in the data, Kydland and Prescott relied on the high 
intertem poral substitutability  of leisure (which generates strong responses of labour and 
output) and on the assum ption th a t capital requires “time to build” i.e. investment is 
not immediately productive (which introduces persistence in the model). Instead, Long 
and Plosser highlight the interactions among sectors. They dem onstrate tha t the same 
properties can be obtained by assuming th a t consumers value a variety of goods, and 
they want to spread any unanticipated wealth increment over both time and commodities 
(including leisure). At the same time, Long and Plosser show th a t the large range of 
substitution opportunities limits the size of relative price changes, so tha t a shock in one 
sector moves current and future outputs in all sectors. In this way, the shock is propagated 
forward in tim e (generating persistence) and across commodities (generating co-movement 
in the time series).
Recents advances
In recent years, the DSGE methodology has proved to be a rigorous yet flexible tool, 
capable of bo th  generating a better understanding of “old” problems, and of introducing 
new questions for research. As a result, the literature on DSGE models has witnessed an 
enormous expansion7, so the following list of references is only indicative.
DSGE models have been built to analyse economic policy and time consistency issues 
(Kydland and Prescott 1977), asset prices (Lucas 1978), welfare and the cost of business 
cycles (Lucas 1987), and the analysis of business cycles has also been extended to open 
economies (Backus, Kehoe and Kydland, 1995), and the household sector (Benhabib,
7 Apparently, the acronym DSGE was decided in a poll initiated by David Backus (1999). At the time, 
it was noted that the RBC acronym was too often used for a methodology that was “applied to models 
that have nothing real and may not even be about real business cycles” . A brief history of the poll is 
available online at http://dge.repec.org/vote.htm l.
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Rogerson, and W right 1991, and Greenwood and Hercowitz 1991).
Moreover, w ith the introduction of heterogeneous agents (Imrohoroglu 1989), DSGE 
models became capable of addressing questions tha t range from wealth distribution to 
the size of precautionary savings (Aiyagari 1993). There are also models th a t include 
non-Walrasian features such as efficiency wages or non-market clearing wages (Danthine 
and Donaldson 1995), and models with imperfect competition (Rotemberg and Wood­
ford 1995). By considering quasi-geometric discounting, the DSGE literature has also 
incorporated some recent advances in behavioural studies (Krusell and Smith 2003).
While the earlier models focused on “real” explanations of business cycle fluctuations, 
much of the modern DSGE literature focuses on short-run fluctuations caused by mone­
tary shocks. Money has been introduced in the models, both without nominal frictions 
(Cooley and Hansen, 1995), and with nominal frictions (Chari, Kehoe and M cGrattan, 
2000). DSGE models with monopolistic competition and nominal frictions have become 
the standard  tool for the analysis of monetary policy, leading to a new approach, called 
the “New Keynesian science of m onetary policy” (Clarida, Gall and Gertler 1999), which 
has replaced the IS/LM  or AS/AD constructs.
All these recent advances extend the basic framework, either by including many sectors 
or several sources of shocks, or by introducing market imperfections or heterogeneity, "or 
by enlarging the set of variables among which agents optimize. However, we can see that 
none of these recent advances would have been possible without the methodology that 
emerged from the seminal papers th a t have been individually discussed in this Section.
1.2 M ain  features o f th e D SG E  m ethod ology
The use of the DSGE methodology to obtain quantitative results and analyse a wide range 
of macroeconomic problems is now widespread, therefore the literature is continuously 
growing, and it is possible to gain still more insights by applying the methodology to a 
larger set questions. However, although the DSGE methodology has demonstrated to be 
very flexible, capable of incorporating a variety of assumptions, it remains unique, as its 
key features have remained constant.
The equilibrium method is one of these features. In fact, some of the recent DSGE 
models accommodate elements of the Keynesian approach (such as price rigidity), therefore 
they do not rely on the intertemporal substitution of leisure (as in Lucas and Rapping
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1969) or on price-misperception (as in Lucas 1972) to generate fluctuations, but they share 
with these two papers the assumption tha t all markets clear. Another key feature of the 
DSGE methodology is th a t it specifies the individuals’ dynamic optim isation problem(s) 
under uncertainty, moreover, being general equilibrium, it considers all sectors and all 
transactions between different kinds of individuals.
The literature has relied heavily on both the assumption th a t agents form their ex­
pectations rationally and on M uth’s notion of rationality, but it seems prudent not to 
proclaim them  as one of the key features of the DSGE methodology. On the one hand, 
it is difficult to say what “rationality” means, whether the meaning attributed to it by 
M uth is unique, and if not, whether other notions of rationality may be used in DSGE 
models. On the other hand, the very recent developments in behavioural sciences, which 
find tha t individuals use some personal heuristics rather th a t “rational optimization” in 
their decision-making, will probably influence macroeconomic research. However, draw­
ing from the spirit of the Lucas’ critique, it is hard to see a role in macroeconomics for 
models in which agents are systematically biased, at least until the relationship between 
decision-making and external influences or policies is fully understood.
In any case, as these future developments have yet to materialise, the DSGE method­
ology still remains a unique way to formulate and solve macroeconomic problems, a way 
th a t is very different from the aggregative models tha t dom inated macroeconomics until 
two decades ago. A complete evaluation of DSGE modelling, based on its adaptability to 
solve all possible problems, would require more than a thesis. However, the experience 
gained by applying several DSGE models to the study of fluctuations can be useful to 
attem pt an evaluation of this unique methodology. Although this exercise is limited to 
the analysis of economic fluctuations, and it considers only the particular viewpoint of 
the questions th a t are analysed in the thesis, it can give valuable insights because of its 
applied nature.
Economic phenomena are very complex because, generally speaking, they are caused 
by numerous factors, moreover, the factors that determine the observed events are not 
always directly observable and measurable. As a result, the criterion of comparing a 
model’s predictions with the data  typically leaves economists with not just one, but several 
theories to choose from. In this situation, the DSGE methodology has provided a guide to 
organize thoughts (and it has itself generated new questions for research). Certainly this 
“value added” can be appreciated by applying the methodology directly to some problems.
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As mentioned in the introduction, the forthcoming chapters consider several issues 
related to the analysis of economic fluctuations, and in doing so they consider several 
modelling approaches. In fact, while the models in Chapters 2 and 3 are within the RBC 
theory, the models of Chapters 4 and 5 are DSGE models with monopolistic competition 
and sticky prices, close to the recent “New Keynesian” approach, which was cited before. 
This change in the  modelling approach, or in the theory used, is helpful to get an overall 
perspective for a “ten tative” or provisional evaluation of the DSGE methodology, which 
will be finally given in the Conclusion chapter of the thesis.
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Chapter 2
Business Cycles in Italy: Facts 
and M odels
2.1 In trodu ction
Since the early 1980s, one of the main challenges of modern macroeconomic research has 
been understanding and reproducing in a model economy the cyclical fluctuations of the 
main macroeconomic variables. The real business cycle theory (RBC) hinges on both 
neoclassical theory and dynamic general equilibrium theory to accomplish this task b 
However, the cyclical behaviour of the main macroeconomic variables can be different 
across countries. This chapter documents first the business cycle facts for the Italian 
economy, and then tries to quantify how much they can be explained by standard RBC 
theory.
Most of the time, the RBC literature has focused on the US, and the cyclical properties 
of the US economy have provided the yardstick for the evaluation of RBC theory. However, 
the relevance of RBC theory could be strengthened by showing th a t it is also able to explain 
other countries’ cyclical fluctuations, even when fluctuations are very different from the 
US. Italy  is an interesting “test” case because fluctuations in labour input are strikingly 
different from the US. In Italy, hours fluctuate much more than employment, while in the 
US the opposite is true.
'Since the early work of Kydland and Prescott (1982) the framework has been considerably expanded 
to account for monetary shocks as well as real shocks, in models with or without Keynesian features such 
as wage or price rigidities. As a result, to account for both real and monetary models, many people now 
prefer to refer to this approach as dynamic stochastic general equilibrium modelling (DSGE).
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Little research has been conducted on explaining business cycles in Italy. Apparently, 
there are only two papers tha t calibrate a RBC model for Italy: Censolo and Onofri (1993), 
and Maffezzoli (2001).
Censolo and Onofri’s paper is an application to Italy of the model of King, Plosser 
and Rebelo (1988). They find tha t the model cannot replicate the high volatility of hours 
and the negative or null correlation of hours and wages in the da ta2. The paper estimates 
hours of work by extending to all sectors the hours worked in the industry sector, subject 
to an adjustm ent for employment and the contractual workweek in each sector3. Censolo 
and Onofri do not consider, however, hours and employment da ta  separately, and their 
measure of the labour input is likely to be a combination of hours and employment ratios.
Maffezzoli develops a DSGE model with endogenous growth and equilibrium unem­
ployment, generated respectively by learning-by-doing and monopolistic unions, and he 
calibrates it to reproduce several long-run features of the Italian economy. Compared 
to the indivisible labour model4, Maffezzoli’s model with monopolistic unions is better 
suited to explain the Italian business cycle. Although both models have only a limited 
ability to reproduce the cyclical fluctuations in the Italian economy, the correlation co­
efficients between the observed and simulated series are higher for the monopoly union 
model. Moreover, because it includes a human, not only physical, capital stock, Maffez­
zoli’s monopoly union model generates responses to productivity shocks tha t are more 
persistent.
However, Maffezzoli does not explicitly consider labour adjustm ent along the intensive 
margin, th a t is, in his model the labour input is measured only by the employment rate. 
As a result, in his model it is not possible to ascertain whether the RBC theory can explain 
the high volatility of hours in the Italian data. Moreover, the omission of hours from the 
production function is likely to introduce a bias in the estimation of the Solow residuals.
This chapter collects detailed information on the cyclical fluctuations of the Italian 
economy, and then tries to quantify how much these can be explained by standard RBC 
models. First, Italy  is modelled as a closed economy, and then, by introducing the possi­
bility of borrowing and lending from the rest of the world at an exogenous interest rate, 
as a small open economy. In both models, utility is separable in consumption and leisure,
2 More on this problem can be found in Hansen and Wright (1992).
3 Censolo and Onofri further adjust their measure of hours worked by regressing it on a constant plus 
agricoltural employment, in order to filter out seasonality.
4 Hansen (1985).
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with different param eters for the intertemporal elasticities of substitution. As a result, 
Hansen’s (1985) indivisible labour model becomes a special case.
To begin with, the focus of the investigation is primarily to assess the ability of the 
model to replicate the high volatility of hours in Italy. In both the open and the closed 
economy models of this chapter, households adjust their labour supply along the intensive, 
not the extensive, margin. In the next chapter, households adjust labour supply along both 
margins.
In both  the closed and open economy versions, the standard  RBC models are not 
able to generate a standard  deviation of hours worked approximately twice as large as the 
standard deviation of output. As the information on hours worked in Italy is unfortunately 
limited to large industrial firms, this benchmark value must be taken with some care, but 
it cannot be ignored altogether. Thus the trouble for the standard  RBC model is that, 
for sensible param etrizations, within the range of values found in the literature, it cannot 
generate a standard  deviation of hours relative to output higher than  70%, as this chapter 
will explain. As a result, the standard RBC model is of limited applicability to the Italian 
case. However, the standard  model was designed for the US, and it is therefore possible 
tha t a RBC model modified to take into account the institutional features of the Italian 
economy may generate the required volatility of hours.
This chapter is organised as follows. Section 2.2 reports the main facts of the Italian 
business cycles, presenting a set of statistics extensively used in the RBC literature, with 
the aim to have a definite benchmark for comparison. Section 2.3 presents and evaluates 
a standard  closed-economy RBC model, and Section 2.4 models Italy as a small open 
economy. Section 2.5 concludes.
2.2 T h e M ain  Facts o f  B usiness C ycles in Ita ly  and th e  U S
The RBC literature has focused on the aggregate fluctuations of the US economy, so it 
comes as no surprise th a t there are extensive accounts of the cyclical properties of the US0. 
Such accounts can also be found for other countries, but statistics for the Italian economy 
are not as abundant as for the US. In particular, while the main macroeconomic time 
series are available for the Italian economy, there is limited information on hours worked
5 A very detailed account is provided, among others, by Stock and Watson (1999).
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in Italy. However, information on hours is crucial to calibrate and test RBC models6.
After the work of Kydland and Prescott (1990), a standard procedure for defining the 
empirical regularities of business cycle fluctuations tha t the RBC theory tries to  replicate 
has taken hold in the literature. Kydland and Prescott emphasized th a t the choice of facts 
to report should be guided by neoclassical theory, and they advocated the provision of the 
following information for each variable: amplitude of fluctuations (standard deviation), 
degree of co-movement with GDP (contemporaneous cross correlation), and phase shift 
(cross correlation at different lags and leads). Another im portant feature is the degree 
of persistence (first-order autocorrelation) in a series. In short, RBC theory is interested 
in second-order m oments only, leaving aside the issue of identifying the underlying trend 
along which the series fluctuate7.
This chapter tries to fill the informational gap for the Italian economy8. It is also nec­
essary to make an explicit comparison with the US, since models th a t proved successful in 
dealing with American fluctuations might not produce desirable results when the economy 
under scrutiny is a different one.
Except for employment and hours worked, all the statistics for Italy  are calculated 
using OECD d ata  for the period 1970(1) to 1998(III)9. Hours worked in Italy come from 
Ista t10 and refer to  blue-collar workers in industrial firms with more than  500 employees11. 
Given th a t those are the only data  on hours worked in Italy, they are taken as indicative of 
hours worked by all employed people. Wages and productivity calculations are therefore 
not entirely based on OECD data. In addition to this, employment da ta  for Italy does not 
come from the OECD but from the Bank of Italy12. The US statistics are calculated using 
OECD data  for the  same period, 1970(1) to 1998(111), in order to ensure comparability
6 This is because the transmission of shocks in a RBC model depends decisively on the intertemporal 
substitution of labour. The RBC transmission mechanism is explained, for example, in Lucas (1987) pp. 
41-42. The idea that workers substitute labour intertemporally was originally due to Lucas and Rapping 
(1969), before appearing in RBC theory.
7 The sort of decomposition used is not an irrelevant issue, as it can naturally affect the results obtained. 
A common choice is the Hodrick-Prescott (HP) filter. The HP filter is a two-sided linear filter that 
minimizes the variance of the series around the calculated trend. One of the advantages of the HP filter is 
comparability with other RBC studies.
8 Accounts of business cycle regularities for other countries can be found in Blackburn and Ravn (1992), 
and Christodoulakis, Dimelis and Kollintzas (1994), and especially in Ravn (1997) for business cycles at 
the international level.
gEarlier data for Italy are not available from the OECD.
10 They are published first in the Indicatori Mensili series, then in the Bollettino Mensile di Statistica. 
Data available and fit for use are from 1973(1) to 1995(IV) only.
11 According to Istat, the firms in the sample employ the 21.9% of the workforce in their sector, which 
corresponds to the 85.9% of the workforce in large industrial firms.
12 Employment data from the OECD displayed a disproportionately high volatility.
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between the two countries. Since data on hours worked is not published by the OECD, 
hours worked in the US come from the Bureau of Labor Statistics and are based on the 
Establishment Survey. A description of the definitions used and the source of the data  is 
in Table 2.12.
All statistics refer to  seasonally adjusted13 quarterly data  (in logs), expressed in con­
stant 1990 prices whenever necessary, and detrended using the Hodrick-Prescott (1997) 
filter, with a smoothing param eter equal to 1,600. Except for the current account and 
inventory investments, which are expressed as ratios to GDP, data  used are in logarithms. 
For the sake of clarity of the exposition, data  on aggregate variables are grouped into 
two broad categories: those referring to production and those referring to expenditure or 
demand components.
Production inputs
Tables 2.1 and 2.2 report the main statistics tha t describe the cyclical properties of pro­
duction inputs: standard  deviations in percentage and relative to  output, first-order auto­
correlations, and cross-correlations with output at different lags and leads. A positive sign 
indicates th a t the series is procyclical, a negative sign indicates th a t the series is counter­
cyclical, a num ber close to zero indicates tha t the series has no correlation with the cycle. 
If the maximum correlation is reached at time t +  i (t - i), the cyclical component of the 
series tends to  lag (lead) the cycle by i quarters.
The series for capital is constructed using a variant of the perpetual inventory method 
described in Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1995), page 348 14. D ata on labour productivity 
and wages at quarterly  frequencies are not available from the OECD, therefore they have 
been derived using, respectively, the series for GDP and compensation of employees, both 
in the national accounts. Compensation of employees is adjusted to  take into account the 
earnings of self-employed workers, considered as entrepreneurial income10 by the OECD. 
Only an approxim ate adjustm ent method can be adopted, and the explanation is in Table 
2 . 12 .
By looking at cross-correlations at different leads and lags, it can be inferred that cycles
13 Difference from moving average, additive.
14The main difference is that it does not assume a constant depreciation rate. Instead, depreciation is 
measured using the series Consumption of Fixed Capital, from the OECD National Accounts.
15 Since Italy has a large proportion of self-employed workforce, if this adjustment was not made then 
the resulting profit share in total GDP would become much higher than in the US.
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Table 2.1: Italy - Production inputs
% St Rel st 1-st Cross-correlation of output at time t with
dev dev AC x(t-3) x(t-2) x (t-l) x(t) x ( t + l) (t+ 2) x ( t+ 3)
GDP 1.44 1.00 0.84 0.23 0.56 0.84 1.00 0.84 0.56 0.23
Capital Stock 0.38 0.26 0.91 -0.57 -0.44 -0.19 0.12 0.39 0.56 0.61
Labour input:
Employment 0.81 0.56 0.74 -0.29 -0.08 0.13 0.32 0.46 0.50 0.49
Per capita hours 2.94 2.04 0.54 0.22 0.38 0.56 0.67 0.41 0.13 -0.07
Earnings:
Wages per capita 1.82 1.26 0.33 0.12 0.24 0.32 0.33 0.22 0.09 -0.01
Wages per hour 2.95 2.05 0.50 -0.15 -0.21 -0.33 -0.44 -0.27 -0.08 0.08
Labour productivity: 
Output per capita 1.40 0.97 0.78 0.40 0.62 0.78 0.84 0.60 0.28 -0.05
Output per hour 2.51 1.74 0.39 -0.04 -0.12 -0.25 -0.35 -0.14 0.04 0.11
in the US have longer duration than in Italy. The volatility of output is bigger in the US 
than in Italy, and the first-order autocorrelation is not very different. As it is a stock 
variable, capital is characterised by the lowest volatility and the highest autocorrelation. 
The cross correlations of output and capital in the two countries have similar patterns.
Employment is much more volatile, less persistent and more procyclical in the US than 
in Italy. Employment lags the cycle in both countries. The behaviour of hours also differs 
a lot between the two countries, however it has been already pointed out th a t employment 
and hours da ta  do not come from a common source16. Hours are a lot more volatile, 
less persistent and less procyclical in Italy than in the US. Not surprisingly, since data 
on earnings and average labour productivity are derived from data  on employment and 
hours, statistics on earnings and average labour productivity also differ a lot between the 
two countries. Wages per hour and output per hour are countercyclical in Italy, but wages 
and ou tput per employed are not.
In order to  understand whether the volatility of hours worked in Italy is high also in 
comparison with other countries, Table 2.3 reports some international statistics. Except
16 The high volatility of hours in Italy may be due to the sample, because the only data available is for 
industrial firms with more than 500 employees. Overall, hours worked in Italy may be more or less volatile 
than the data shown in Table 2.2. For example in the US, while the standard deviation of hours worked 
by production workers is 0.39%, but the standard deviation of hours worked in industry is 0.91%.
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Table 2.2: USA - Production inputs
% st Rel st 1-st Cross-correlation of output at time t with
dev dev AC x(t-3) x(t-2) x (t - l) x(t) x ( t + l)  X(t+2) x (t+ 3)
GDP 1.70 1.00 0.87 0.48 0.69 0.87 1.00 0.87 0.69 0.48






































































for Canada, all the d a ta  is from a common source, Eurostat, and it is collected under the 
European Union Labour Force Survey (EU LFS). Because the concepts and guidelines used 
under the EU LFS are the same for all countries, there are little comparability problems, 
but unfortunately the E urostat da ta  has two main limitations. Firstly, Eurostat quarterly 
series are available only from the mid or late nineties17. Secondly, the survey is conducted 
at the household, not at the firm, level, and it has been noted th a t households who are 
interviewed do not often make a distinction between actual and usual hours of work. 
Thirdly, the series for Italy are characterised by two abrupt falls in hours worked, which 
may be due to breaks in the series. For these reasons, it is better to use the information 
on Italy  given by Table 2.3 not as a substitute, but as a way to  understand better the 
data  reported on Table 2.1.
However, one advantage of the Eurostat statistics is th a t the series on hours are dis­
aggregated by economic activity18 and by type of occupation. This level of detail may 
conduct to a be tter understanding of the high volatility of hours worked in Italy reported 
by Table 2.1. The da ta  on hours of Table 2.1 is obtained from Ista t, and it relates to blue 
collar workers in large industrial firms, which may or may not be representative of the
17 Therefore, it was possible to find long series only, for Canada, from 1987 onwards.
18NACE, Classification of Economic Activities in the European Community.
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Table 2.3: International comparisons - Per capita hours
% standard deviation
Employment, total Employment, industry Employees, Plant &: machine 
operators and assemblers
Belgium 0.57 0.70 1.04
Canada 1.79
Denmark 0.96 1.12 1.57
Finland 0.77 0.98 1.04
Greece 0.94 0.95 0.75
Italy 1.09 (2) 1.14 (2) 0.96 (2)
Spain 1.01 1.22 1.15
United Kingdom 0.39 0.44 0.55
Source: all Eurostat, except Canada (Statistics Canada). All data is quarterly, seasonally adjusted and 
detrended using the HP filter.
: calculated by dividing the total number of actual hours worked by the total number of employed 
persons.
(2) : excludes the second quarter of 2002 and the first quarter of 2003. 
whole economy.
The aim of Table 2.3 is to compare the volatility of hours in other countries, both in 
the aggregate and a t the same level of sectoral and occupational disaggregation as in the 
Italian data. If this comparison is possible, then we could infer by analogy whether the 
high volatility of hours is characteristic of the whole Italian economy or of the sectoral 
and occupational disaggregation, although this sort of exercise can increase understanding 
only in a very intuitive manner, since an analogy cannot be a substitu te for the missing 
facts.
The most interesting result th a t emerges from Table 2.3 is th a t the UK is the only 
country where the volatility of hours is similar to the US, while in all the other countries 
the volatility is a lot higher, although not as much as in Italy.
Unfortunately, for the other countries it was not possible to find data  on blue col­
lar workers in large industrial firms, since the Eurostat da ta  is disaggregated by either 
economic activity or type of occupation, but not by both combined. However, it seems 
reasonable to  assume th a t many of the occupations which can be classified under “Em­
ployees, P lan t and machine operators and assemblers” are peculiar only to the industry 
sector, so the last column of Table 2.3 is probably the closest, for the level of detail, to 
the available Italian data.
34
In 4 countries19 out of 7, per capita hours of plant and machine workers fluctuate more 
than industry hours, which themselves are more volatile than  in the aggregate economy. 
However, w ithin the same country the increase in the standard deviation at the disaggre­
gated level is sizeable, but not huge. So, the intuition th a t can be drawn from Table 2.3 
is th a t the 2.94% standard  deviation of hours in Italy is likely to overestimate the true 
aggregate volatility, bu t even if we had data on the whole economy we would probably 
find a standard  deviation of hours a lot higher than in the US.
Expenditure com ponents
Private consumption is more volatile in the US, and a little less persistent than in Italy. 
Consumption leads the cycle in the US, while in Italy the highest autocorrelation is the 
contemporaneous one.
The behaviour of government consumption is remarkably different in the two countries. 
Government consum ption is far more volatile, and less persistent, in the US than in 
Italy, moreover, government consumption leads the cycle in Italy  and exhibit negative 
correlations at t  +  i, while in the US there is almost no significant relation with the cycle 
except a t the higher leads. These differences may be due to  the political-economic cycle, 
which could differ between the two countries.
Total investment is the expenditure component with the highest degree of volatility in 
the two countries. Much of the volatility comes from inventories, since total investment 
(tha t is given by fixed investment plus inventories, see data  definitions in Table 2.12) is 
a lot more volatile than  fixed investment20. Both total and fixed investment are strongly 
procyclical in the two countries, but in Italy the tendency of investment to affect positively 
future deviations from trend output lasts only for two-three periods.
Current account to  GDP is a lot more volatile in Italy than in the US, but about as 
persistent. It is countercyclical in both countries and also at different lags and leads, but 
in Italy  it tends to affect positively future deviations of output from trend. By contrast, 
exports and im ports are procyclical. Both have higher volatility and persistence in the 
US than  in Italy. The movement of exports and imports with the cycle differs in the two 
countries. In the US exports lag positively the cycle, and the correlations of imports with
19Belgium, Denmark, Finland and the UK.
20If this seems less apparent in the statistics of inventory investment in Tables 3 and 4, it is because 
those statistics are not for logarithms but for ratios on GDP, since the logarithmic transformation is not 
feasible for data with negative values.
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Table 2.4: Italy - Expenditure components
% st Rel st 1-st Cross-correlation of output at time t with
dev dev AC x(t-3) x(t-2) x (t - l) x(t) x ( t + l) (t+ 2) x (t+ 3 )
GDP 1.44 1.00 0.84 0.23 0.56 0.84 1.00 0.84 0.56 0.23
Consumption:
Private consumption 1.25 0.87 0.90 0.28 0.52 0.71 0.80 0.77 0.62 0.41
Government cons. 0.54 0.37 0.75 0.23 0.10 0.01 -0.06 -0.09 -0.12 -0.12
Total consumption 0.97 0.68 0.91 0.31 0.52 0.69 0.78 0.74 0.59 0.39
Investment:
Total investment 6.92 4.81 0.76 0.10 0.43 0.73 0.89 0.76 0.52 0.20
Fixed investment 3.66 2.55 0.90 0.17 0.40 0.63 0.78 0.78 0.68 0.50
Inventory inv. /  GDP 1.18 0.82 0.66 0.00 0.32 0.61 0.73 0.56 0.28 -0.06
Trade:
Current account /  GDP 1.20 0.83 0.77 0.05 -0.21 -0.45 -0.58 -0.60 -0.54 -0.37
Exports 3.94 2.74 0.53 0.23 0.28 0.33 0.32 0.17 -0.07 -0.24
Imports 4.80 3.34 0.67 0.31 0.49 0.67 0.73 0.63 0.40 0.13
output stay high a t different lags and leads. Also, in the US exports lead negatively the 
cycle, while in Italy  they tend to affect positively future output, and this may be due to 
higher degree of openness of the Italian economy21. The different cycle length may explain 
why in Italy the correlations of imports with output are quite short-lived, if compared with 
those in the US.
2.3 A  C losed  E conom y M odel
In this section a standard  RBC model is presented and calibrated for Italy, in order to 
test its ability to capture the business cycle statistics shown in the previous section.
The economy is populated by a large number of identical agents, households and firms. 
Utility is separable in consumption and leisure, and it is possible to check if the model 
can reproduce Italian  business cycles under different values for the intertemporal elasticity 
of substitu tion of leisure. The latter parameter can generate very different values for the 
standard  deviations of hours and output.
21 The log transformation implies that all cyclical deviations from trend are in percentage terms, and 
not in absolute terms.
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Table 2.5: USA - Expenditure components
% st Rel st 1-st Cross-correlation of output at time t with
dev dev AC x(t-3) X <7+ to x (t- l) x(t) x ( t + l) (t+2) x (t+ 3)
GDP 1.70 1.00 0.87 0.48 0.69 0.87 1.00 0.87 0.69 0.48
Consumption:
Private consumption 1.37 0.81 0.88 0.68 0.81 0.89 0.87 0.69 0.51 0.30
Government cons. 0.82 0.48 0.58 -0.09 -0.12 -0.14 -0.07 0.00 0.09 0.19
Total consumption 1.07 0.63 0.87 0.66 0.79 0.86 0.86 0.69 0.52 0.33
Investment:
Total investment 6.65 3.92 0.83 0.45 0.63 0.79 0.93 0.81 0.60 0.37
Fixed investment 4.73 2.79 0.90 0.48 0.68 0.85 0.95 0.87 0.71 0.52
Inventory inv. /  GDP 0.56 0.33 0.48 0.26 0.34 0.46 0.61 0.46 0.24 0.01
Trade:
Current account /  GDP 0.45 0.27 0.78 -0.48 -0.46 -0.46 -0.44 -0.38 -0.22 -0.06
Exports 4.39 2.59 0.78 -0.30 -0.12 0.10 0.33 0.45 0.52 0.53
Imports 5.34 3.15 0.81 0.54 0.63 0.74 0.80 0.72 0.52 0.30
The m odel
All variables are in per capita terms, and there is no population growth. Each household 
seeks to maximise her expected utility over infinite sequences of consumption {q } ^  and 
leisure pairs:




1 A " 1 - 1-  +  A-
1 7
Households allocate their time between productive activities and leisure, and the total 
amount of tim e available to them is normalised to 1: ht +  It ~  1- They own the capital 
stock and rent it to  the firms. The household budget constraint is:
ct + it = wtht +  (S +  rfykt .
Firms produce output yt according to a Cobb-Douglas production function, which 
exhibits constant returns to scale in capital kt and hours ht :
yt = z tk fh \  a .
U ncertainty comes from the exogenous stochastic process zt . It is assumed that z t
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follows an AR(1) process:
zt+1 =  pzt +  et+i ,
with £t  i.i.d N  (0, <j2) .
The law of m otion for capital is:
k t+ i  =  (1 — 6) kt +  i t  ,
where 8 is the depreciation rate. Capital at time zero, ko, is given, The resource constraint 
for the economy as a whole is:
ct +  it = ztk^h \~ a .
As there are neither taxes nor other distortions, the allocations in a decentralised
economy with perfect com petition are the same as those resulting from the solution to the
optim isation problem faced by a social planner.
Factor dem and comes from the firms, which maximise profits. The rental rates of 
labour and capital are given by, respectively:
u;t =  ( l - a )  z t k ? K Q , (2.1)
r$ =  a z tk%-l h \ - a -  5 . (2 .2)
Households own all factors of production and choose optimally their supply of labour 
and capital. Optim ality implies th a t these two efficiency conditions must hold:
^  =  A ( l - M “ 7 , (2.3)
4
These two conditions, together with the laws of motion of capital and the shock, the 
wage and interest rate  equations, and the resource constraint of the household, determine 
the equilibrium path  followed by the model economy. The model cannot be solved analyti­
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cally. The behaviour of the model economy in response to the exogenous shocks is obtained 
using an approxim ated solution, based on the log-linearisation of all the equations around 
the determ inistic steady state  of the model.
Calibration
The choice of param eter values is made so that a set of values from the steady state equa­
tions m atch the corresponding time-series averages for the Italian economy. The same data 
set used for the statistics of Section 2.2 is used for calibrating the param eters, using real 
per capita variables. Nevertheless, some preference param eters cannot be estimated in this 
way because they do not enter the steady state equations, and there are no microecono­
metric studies for Italy  th a t estim ate them. Therefore, param eters are chosen according to 
the steady sta te  equations whenever possible, otherwise a sensitivity analysis is preferred, 
in order to check how the model results change across different param etrizations.
The preference param eters tha t are considered for the sensitivity analysis are the co­
efficient of relative risk aversion 6 , and the inverse of the intertem poral elasticity of sub­
stitution of labour 7 . Both the values 1 and 2 are common choices for 6 , so it is better to 
check the performance of the model, in terms of second-order moments, for both values. 
For the param eter 7 , three cases are considered: 7 equal to 1, 0 (infinite intertemporal 
elasticity of substitution, as in the indivisible labour model), and the intermediate case 
0.5.
The rem aining param eters are calibrated as follows. The depreciation rate S is calcu­
lated by taking the average ratio of capital consumption over net stock of capital, which 
gives a quarterly  value of 0.0088 for Italy22. The labour share of output 1 — a  is calculated 
as the ratio  adjusted compensation of employees over GDP, which gives a value for 1 — a 
equal to  0.67.
The discount ra te  (3 is calibrated from the steady state equation /3 (l +  r^) =  1. The 
interest rate  r k can be calculated (once values for a  and 6 are given) from the out­
pu t/cap ita l ratio  in the data, but this procedure is affected by measurement errors in the 
capital stock. However, without capital adjustment costs, and abstracting from risk, the 
return  on physical capital (net of depreciation) must be equal to the return on financial 
assets. Therefore, the steady state interest rate is estimated using an average real inter­
22Data definitions and sources as in Table 7. According to the OECD, Consumption of fixed capital is 
the decline in value due to physical deterioration and obsolescence.
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est rate from the financial markets. To ensure consistency with the next chapter (small 
open economy model, w ith an exogenous return on financial assets), I choose the German 
3-month fibor. This financial rate, adjusted for the growth in consumer price index and 
averaged over tim e, gives a value for the steady state r k equal to 0.0078. This gives a 
value for (3 equal to  0.99, in line with the literature.
The param eter A  is given by the steady state equation:
which can be rew ritten as
A =  ( l - h y ( l - S ^ j  \ l - a )  h - e ( ^ y ~ e ,
where y and k  are ou tpu t and capital per person. The capital-output ratio and the ratio 
of output on hours are already given by the steady state equations:
These equations allow to calibrate A, once 7 , a  and h are given. The quantity h is 
the steady-state fraction of time tha t the individual devotes to  market activities, which 
is calibrated at 0.12, given data  on hours worked23. Table 2.6 summarizes the calibrated 
param eter and steady state  values.
A consistent estim ate of the exogenous process for technology could be obtained from 
the production function as follows:
log zt =  log yt -  a  log kt -  (1 -  a) log ht , (2.5)
provided the information on output and factor inputs is free from measurement errors. 
However, as noted in Section 2.2, the only information on quarterly hours worked in Italy is
23The average hours worked in a week (35.53), divided by total time available (16 hours times 7 days a 
week), and multiplied by the fraction of the Italian population that works (0.37). In this way, the leisure 
enjoyed by the people who do not work is included in the leisure enjoyed by the representative agent of 
the model economy.
40
from industrial firms w ith more than 500 employees, which is an imperfect measure of hours 
worked in all sectors of the economy. A consistent estimate of the exogenous process 2 and 
the shock e is im portan t because the technology shock determines the stochastic properties 
of the series generated by the model. Therefore, in the absence of more information on 
hours worked in I^aly, it is better to resort to Kydland and P resco tt’s (1982) strategy of 
choosing the standard  deviation of the shock e so tha t the model reproduces the standard 
deviation of ou tpu t in the da ta24. Then, following this strategy, the test of the theory is 
whether there is a set of param eters for which the model’s implied standard deviations 
measured in relative term s, with respect to the standard deviation of output, match the 
data. This approach is followed also by Baxter and Crucini (1993), and Correia, Neves 
and Rebelo (1995), among others.
Maffezzoli (2001) calibrates the Solow residuals z for the Italian economy by using 
standard units of labour from Ista t, as an approximate measure of the labour input. 
According to ISTAT25, a standard unit of labour represents the amount of labour that 
is supplied by a person th a t works full time. The labour supplied by an individual may 
therefore be more (for example, because the individual works only part-tim e), or less 
than  a standard  unit of labour (for example, because the individual has more than one 
job). Therefore, standard  units of labour measure fulltime equivalent employment. In 
particular, measured standard  units of labour in Italy include both regular and irregular 
(underground economy) workers, but they do not consider overtime hours and leaves of 
absence. Therefore, standard  units of labour cannot constitute a measure of per capita 
hours of the same quality as survey data. W hat is lacking for Italy  is information on hours 
for all workers, obtained at the microeconomic (individual or firm) level.
The transm ission of shocks in a RBC model depends on the agents’ choice of substitu t­
ing labour intertemporally. This implies tha t information on hours is crucial to calibrate 
and test RBC models. The absence of information at the micro level on hours worked in 
Italy lim its the possibility of understanding the Italian business cycle, and Kydland and 
P resco tt’s (1982) strategy of matching relative standard deviations seems to be the only 
viable choice. However, our approach will not discard the only information available for 
Italy, namely hours worked in industrial firms with more than 500 employees. As noted in
24 The autoregressive coefficient of the AR process for z  is chosen so as to match as close as possible the 
autocorrrelation of output. This implies a value for p of 0.99.
25Sistema europeo dei conti, SEC 95.
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Table 2.6: Calibrated parameter and steady state values
5 a P /? h
0.0088 0.33 0.99 0.99 0.12
Section 2.2, according to  th a t series the standard deviation of hours in Italy is 7-8 times 
more than  in the  US. We believe tha t high volatility may characterise the behavior of 
hours of work in Italy. In fact, it is entirely probable th a t the rigidities in the Italian 
labour m arket prevent the adjustm ent of the labour input along the extensive margin, 
thus leaving the burden of adjustm ent to hours only. This view of the Italian labour 
market is pu t forward by other authors. For example, M archetti and Nucci (2001) justify 
their empirical findings on the behavior of work effort over the Italian business cycle by a 
theoretical model where firms face hiring costs.
Since the high standard  deviation of hours in Italy may be due to the rigidities in 
its labour m arket, the  statistics shown in Table 2.1 are taken as a fact th a t we want to 
replicate. Moreover, the ability of the RBC model to generate simulated hours which 
have high volatility can be put to  test. If the models succeed in this challenge, then 
their applicability to  countries other than  the US, where hours fluctuate much less than 
employment, can greatly increase.
Evaluation o f the m odel for different parameter values
All the statistics for the closed economy were computed on logarithms of HP-detrended 
data, generated by simulating the model for 225 periods, throwing away the first 25 obser­
vations, repeating 100 times, and then computing moments as averages over repetitions26.
The calibration of the model based only on the steady sta te  equations leaves some 
crucial param eters free to be set at different values. Those param eters are the intertem­
poral elasticities of substitution of consumption and hours, which greatly affect the model 
performance in term s of the second-order moments and the response of the variables to a 
technology shock. Table 2.7 describes the effects of different choices of the parameters on 
the most im portan t moments. In this way a sensitivity analysis is carried out, but instead 
of finely varying the param eters around a chosen value, a set of values is chosen, which
26 R elative-volatility statistics may change in different simulations. Because of the certainty-equivalence 
property of the log-linear approximations, they do not depend on the variance of the innovations of the 
technology shock.
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Table 2.7: Cross country correlations
Relative volatility with 
respect to output
First-order autocorrelation Contemporaneous correla­
tion with output
Ct W wt Ct ht wt ct ht wt
9 = 1
7  =  0 0.33 0.68 0.33 0.72 0.69 0.72 0.97 0.99 0.98
100II 0.33 0.62 0.38 0.73 0.70 0.72 0.97 0.99 0.98
II 0.35 0.58 0.42 0.73 0.70 0.72 0.98 0.99 0.99
9 = 2
7  =  0 0.33 0.37 0.65 0.72 0.71 0.72 0.99 0.96 0.99
7  =  0.5 0.34 0.31 0.71 0.70 0.70 0.70 - 0.99 0.96 0.99
7  =  1 0.35 0.27 0.75 0.72 0.72 0.71 0.99 0.95 0.99
reflects some param eter choices made in other RBC studies.
The case 7  — 0 corresponds to the indivisible labour model of Hansen (1985) and 
it implies an infinite intertem poral elasticity of substitution of the labour input. When 
7 = 1  the intertem poral elasticity of substitution of labour is equal to 1, and 7 =  0.5 
is the interm ediate case. W hen 7 increases, the volatility of hours relatively to output 
decreases because households are less willing to substitu te hours over time in response to 
the exogenous shock, and they become relatively more willing to substitu te consumption 
instead of hours, so the volatility of consumption increases slightly27. The explanation of 
the increase in the relative volatility of wages when 7 grows comes from the labour supply 
curve. A higher value of 7 makes the labour supply curve steeper, and this implies larger 
volatility of wages bu t lower volatility of hours.
A higher level of 9 should imply a decrease in the volatility of consumption. However, 
Table 2.7 reports volatilities with respect to output, and not in absolute terms. When 9 is 
higher households are less eager to substitute consumption over time, and as a result their 
labour supply moves less after a shock28. This implies th a t the volatility of hours decreases, 
while the  volatility of wages increases. Moreover, output follows closely the shock, with 
lower amplification due to  labour adjustment, and, by equation (2.3), consumption follows 
more closely wages and therefore output. Since the labour supply moves less after a shock 
when 0 is higher, hours have higher first-order autocorrelation and lower correlation with
27Consumption sm oothing and “leisure smoothing” depend on two separate parameters, but also on the 
relative im portance of one parameter with respect to the other.
28Equation (2.3) gives the supply of hours of labour ht as a function of the real wage wt.
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output.
Figures 1 to  3 show the responses of output, hours, consumption and wages to a 1% 
positive technology shock. Responses are plotted for different values of 7 , while 6 stays 
fixed at 1. It is possible to see th a t different values of 7 do not affect or affect only slightly 
the responses of consumption and wages. For 9 — 2 the responses (not shown) of output, 
consumption and wages are dampened, and the impact of the shock on hours becomes 
very small.
As it is known already, the indivisible labour model is the one tha t delivers the max­
imum contem poraneous impact of the shock on labour and output. However the above 
discussion about relative volatilities suggests th a t the impact on hours depends also on 
the relative im portance of the intertem poral substitutability of consumption, with respect 
to the substitu tability  of hours.
Results
Values of 9 between 1 and 2 are the most commonly used in the literature, and in practice 
there is some degree of freedom in the choice of the intertem poral elasticity of consump­
tion. However, when 7  is equal to  zero all the fluctuation in the  labour input can be 
a ttribu ted  to  employment instead of hours. This has the advantage of abstracting from 
hours. Therefore, w ith 7 =  0 the param eter 9 is chosen so as to generate an exact match 
of the employment volatility in the data.
Table 2.8 reports the second order moments generated by the model with 9 equal to 
1.33 and 7 equal to  zero, and all the other param eters chosen as described above. It can 
be seen th a t, having chosen 9 so as to match the employment volatility, the model gen­
erates a relative standard  deviations for investment close to  the one in the data. All the 
variables are procyclical, and first-order autocorrelations are satisfactory for output, con­
sumption, investment and employment29. Cross-correlations with output are satisfactory 
for consumption and investment. However, the model generates too low volatility for all 
the variables except employment and investment, and too high correlations with output 
for employment and wages.
The ability of this RBC model to match real-world statistics may be limited by the
29 The value for p  was chosen in order to reproduce as closely as possible the first-order autocorrelation 
of output. However, even with the very high value p =  0.99, the first-order autocorrelation of output is 
lower than in the data.
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Table 2.8: Standard deviations and correlations with output
9 = 1.33, 7  — 0 Cross-correlation of output at time t with
St. dev. rel. 
to  output
1-st ord AC
x (t-l) x(t) x ( t+ l)
Output 1.00 0.71 0.71 1.00 0.71
Consumption 0.33 0.72 0.65 0.97 0.74
Investment 4.39 0.70 0.71 0.99 0.68
Employment 0.56 0.70 0.73 0.99 0.66
Wages 0.46 0.72 0.66 0.98 0.74
Interest rate 0.02 0.70 0.73 0.99 0.66
assumption th a t there is only one source of fluctuation, the shock to technology. It is 
therefore interesting to  see what happens if the stochastic structure of the model is enriched 
by introducing another shock. In order to try  to do so, in the next section Italy is modelled 
as a small open economy, where uncertainty comes from both a technology shock and a 
shock in the world ra te  of return  on bonds.
2.4 T h e O pen  E conom y M odel
The model presented in this section is the extension to the open economy of the same closed 
economy model of the  preceding section. There is a single asset, an internationally traded 
bond, the  ra te  of retu rn  on which is exogenous. Models of this sort are used to model 
small open economies, because the return on the asset cannot be influenced endogenously. 
I t ’s reasonable to  assume th a t Italy is a small, open country, since the ability to control 
the interest ra te  has been limited by the exchange rate mechanism first, and more recently 
by the introduction of the single currency30.
The m odel
The same assum ptions on the agents, the productive sector, and the institutional setting 
continue to hold, b u t we need two more assumptions: the first is tha t labour is inter­
nationally immobile, and the second is tha t there are adjustm ent costs for the stock of 
capital. Moreover, whenever the agents’ holdings of the internationally traded bond are
30 Italy had been a member of the ERM since its inception in 1978, first with a fluctuation band of ±6%, 
and then, from 1990 to 1993, with a fluctuation band of ±2.25%. The European Single Currency aws 
introduced in January 1999.
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different from the long run or steady state level, agents face a portfolio adjustm ent cost.
consistent31.
As in the previous section, households maximise their expected utility over infinite 
sequences of consum ption {ctj^Li an(  ^ leisure { / t } ^  pairs:
Households can consume more or less of what they earn in each period because they 
can sell or buy bonds in the international capital market at the exogenous real interest 
rate r. Their budget constraint satisfies:
where b is the stock of traded bonds, r  is the return on bonds, (•) is a convex function and 
ip is a constant param eter of the portfolio adjustm ent cost function. The total amount of 
time available to  the agents is normalised to 1. Adjustm ent costs for capital are introduced 
in order to  prevent the equalisation in every period of the rate  of return  on physical
As before, the production function is Cobb-Douglas with constant returns to scale, 
and firms and households act as price-takers. Only one good is produced, which can 
be consumed, transform ed into capital or traded for foreign assets. The international
consumption over time. The equilibrium rental prices for labour and capital are given as 
before by (2.1) and (2.2). The law of motion for capital is:
kt+1 =  (1 -  5)kt +  it ■
The log-deviations of the exogenous process for technology zt and the return on bond 
rt are assumed to  follow an AR(1) process:
In this way, the  equilibrium dynamics is stationary and the log-linearization procedure is
t=o
Q +  it  +  ^  (k t+ i — k t) +  — (bt+i — b) +  bt+i — Ztk\ a h(p +  bt (1 +  rt)
capital and the  re tu rn  on bonds, by arbitrage. The function $  (•) is assumed to satisfy 
(0) =  4? (0) =  0 , so th a t in the steady state there are no capital adjustm ent costs.
capital m arket is therefore another channel (together with capital accumulation) to smooth
Zt+i = pzZt +  £Zt+l
31 See Schm itt-Grohe and Uribe (2003).
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n +1 =  P r h  +  £ t + i  ,
with the shocks ef i.i.d N  (0,<rl) and el i.i.d N [ 0, <7^ ). Shocks to technology and the 
exogenous interest ra te  have only tem porary effects. It is therefore assumed that short- 
run fluctuations can be modelled independently from long-run growth.
The current account of this economy, which is savings minus investments, plus net 
interest paym ents from the international bond, is given by:
C A t = bt+i — bt ,
which is equal to  minus the capital account of the economy. The variable bt is the amount 
of credit of the domestic economy at time t.
The optim ality conditions of the household maximisation problem are:
ct ewt = A  (1 -  ht ) - 7 (2 .6 )
PEk ( —  ) (1 +  r m )
\ ct+i
— E t[  1 +  V’ (bt+i — ^)] , (2.7)
Et  [l +  (kt+i — kt )] — (3 E t {c t+i r t+1 +  1 — <5 +  ^  (kt+2 — kt+i) |  . (2-8)
The first condition is an intratem poral efficiency condition, relating hours of work 
with consum ption choices, as in Section 2.3. The other two conditions are arbitrage con­
ditions, relating the retu rn  on physical capital and the international bond to the optimal 
intertem poral allocation of consumption.
Calibration
The performance of the model for a few significant values of 9 and 7 is checked, as in 
Section 2.3, and where possible, parameters are calibrated at the same values given in 
Section 2.3.
For example, the param eters <5 and a  are set at the same values used in the closed 
economy model. The calibration of A  is done as in the closed economy, once the parameters
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Table 2.9: Parameter and steady state values
8 a h P - ry P z P r CJ f
0.0088 0.33 0.12 0.99 - 0.005 0.028 0.99 0.37 0.006
6 and 7  are decided, so as to  ensure that in the steady state h is equal to  0.12. The equation 
is modified to  take into account the steady-state share of the current account on output:
A = (1 -  h f  ( l  + b- r  -  $  (1 -  a) h~° [ I f  6) .
The extension to  the open economy requires the calibration of some additional para­
meters and steady sta te  values. The average of the ratio current account/output in Italy 
for the period 1970(1) to 1998(111) is -0.005. This is the value used in the calibration of 
the steady sta te  level of the internationally traded bond. The param eter ^  is taken from 
Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2003), while the capital adjustm ent cost function $  (•) does not 
enter the log-linearized equations, therefore its calibration is not necessary.
The autoregressive process for the interest rate is estim ated using data on short-term 
real rates in Germany, given th a t this is the country whose policy is more likely to affect 
Italian rates of re tu rn  on bonds. The discount factor @ is calibrated so tha t /3 (1 +  r) =  1, 
given the steady sta te  or average value of the rate of return  on bonds, so it is set at the 
same value as in the closed economy. The variance of the innovations in the process for 
technology is again chosen so as to match the volatility of ou tput in the data, while the 
autoregressive coefficient is set equal to 0.99.
To summ arise this Section, Table 2.9 reports the calibrated param eter and steady state 
values.
Short-run dynam ics
Figures 4 to  9 show the response of the main economic variables to 1% positive shocks in 
technology and the interest rate. However, before analysing the responses and explain­
ing the model results, it is possible to predict, intuitively, the main consequences of the 
openness assum ption. Since households have an additional channel to smooth consump­
tion over tim e, the volatility of consumption will probably be lower than in the closed 
economy. Furtherm ore, to take fully advantage of the productivity gains, households will
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increase their labour supply more after a positive technology shock, knowing that they can 
enjoy the associated ou tput surge also in the future via lending. Therefore, the volatility of 
hours will increase in the open economy. Finally, the presence of an additional endogenous 
predeterm ined variable (bt) will increase the persistence of the other variables.
Now, in order to  illustrate the short-run dynamics, let us consider the technology shock 
first. The technology shock increases output and wages, consumption and investment. 
Because of the convex portfolio adjustment costs, agents do not fully use the international 
bonds m arket to  sm ooth their consumption in the first period, therefore consumption 
continues to grow, even if the discount factor (3 and the real interest rate  r are at the same 
level as before. The indivisible labour model amplifies the response of hours and output 
to the technology shock. Responses are not plotted for a different intertemporal elasticity 
of consumption. This is because 0 — 2 does not affect the shape and magnitude of the 
responses.
Now let us consider the interest rate  shock. If households have a negative 6, the shock 
in the interest ra te  increases the cost of the debt, therefore households reduce their bond 
holdings. If they had a positive 6, an increase in bond holdings would take place. Physical 
investment decreases because foreign assets are more rewarding than  physical capital.
The impulse response of investment to both the technology and the interest rate shocks 
is kinked because bo th  shocks drive a wedge between the expected and the realized return 
on capital and the international bond, respectively. The kink in the response of invest­
ments arises because the conditional expectation of the shock is equal to  0 in period t =  1, 
bu t from t =  2 onwards the shock is correctly predicted. So, when t =  2 investment 
suddenly changes to  re-equalise the returns on capital and the international bonds (minus 
adjustm ent costs). From th a t moment onwards agents do not need to revise their expec­
tations and the response of investment is gradual. Because of the sudden change in the 
response of investm ent in period t =  2, output, wages and hours also display a kink in the 
response to  the  shocks.
R esults
Instead of assessing the model performance under different values for the intertemporal 
elasticities of substitution, it is perhaps more interesting to  compare the results with the 
closed economy, for a given parametrization. I compare the results for the two economies
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Table 2.10: Open economy: Standard deviations and correlations with output
0 = 1, '7 =  0.5 Cross-correlation of output at time t with
St. dev. rel. 
to output
1-st ord AC
x (t-l) x(t) x ( t+ l)
Output 1.00 0.74 0.74 1 0.74
Consumption 0.34 0.74 0.68 0.98 0.76
Investment 6.99 0.19 0.63 0.78 0.16
Hours 0.63 0.75 0.76 1 0.72
Table 2.11: Closed economy: Standard deviations and correlations with output
6 = 1, 7 =  0.5 Cross-correlation of output at time t with
St. dev. rel. 
to output
1-st ord AC
x (t- l) x(t) x ( t+ l)
Output 1.00 0.71 0.71 1.00 0.71
Consumption 0.33 0.73 0.64 0.97 0.74
Investment 4.42 0.70 0.71 0.99 0.67
Hours 0.62 0.70 0.72 0.99 0.67
when 6 = 1  and 7  =  0.5. The effect of different elasticities is quite predictable: when 
9 = 2 the volatility of consumption goes down, and because households are less eager to 
substitu te consum ption over time, their labour supply moves less after a shock, and the 
volatility of hours is diminished (see Section 2.3 and the footnote on page 43). When 7 is 
equal to  1 labour supply is steeper and the volatility of hours is lower, therefore 7 =  0.5 
gives a be tte r perform ance in term s of the volatility of hours. Values of 7 below 0.5 would 
increase the volatility of hours, however, on the one hand the high intertem poral elasticity 
of substitu tion  of leisure may not be confirmed by the empirical research, and on the other 
hand it is interesting in itself to see whether it is possible to increase the volatility of hours 
by the openness assum ption.
Tables 2.10 and 2.11 report the second moments for the open and the closed economy. 
As it can be seen from the tables, openness does not necessarily reduce the volatility 
of consumption. This unexpected result can be explained by the presence of portfolio 
adjustm ent costs, since they reduce the agents’ ability to smooth consumption through 
the international bonds market. As a result, the volatility of consumption does not always 
fall in the  open economy. Moreover, the sudden change in the response of investment to 
both  shocks explains the high volatility and the low autocorrelation of investments.
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There is a m oderate increase in the volatility of hours in the open economy. This 
can be explained by the availability of an additional channel to  smooth consumption over 
time. After a technology shock, households can enjoy more consumption today by means 
of tem porarily increasing the foreign debt, which will be brought back to the equilibrium 
level by m eans of future higher output. Since a high level of output is required in the 
future, the  responses of hours and investment are quite strong. Therefore, in the open 
economy the volatility of hours is increased, bu t at the expense of an increase in the 
volatility of investments.
In conclusion, the analysis shows th a t the open economy model is mildly success­
ful in generating an increased volatility of hours without the need to assume that the 
intertem poral elasticity of substitution of leisure is large, which may not be supported 
by microeconometric evidence. However, with respect to investment, the open economy 
model generates a too high volatility.
As was stressed before, these results depend on the param etrization chosen and on the 
form of the  utility  function. It is generally true, however, th a t the introduction of more 
than  one shock can improve the performance of a RBC model along many dimensions.
In spite of these successes, there are also some drawbacks. F irst, the model still was 
not able to  replicate the very large volatility of hours observed in the data. Second, the 
increased volatility of hours was obtained at the cost of an increase in the volatility of 
investment to  a level th a t is too high to match the data.
2.5 C on clu sion
This chapter applies several RBC models to the Italian economy to  see whether they can 
explain the aggregate fluctuations observed in the data. The performance of these models 
depends crucially on the param etrization chosen and on the form of the utility function, in 
particular, the in tertem poral elasticities of substitution of labour and consumption both 
affect the short-run  dynamics and the volatilities generated by the model. The chapter 
also analyses the  introduction of more than one shock, considering Italy as a small open 
economy subject to  exogenous interest rate shocks.
The message of th is chapter is the following. The volatility of hours can be increased 
by assuming a high elasticity of intertemporal substitution of leisure, or by introducing the 
possibility of borrowing and lending from the rest of the world. However, results from the
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simulations have shown th a t the increase in the volatility of hours either happens at the 
expense of the  volatility of consumption, which becomes too low, or at the expense of the 
volatility of investm ent, which becomes too high. This phenomenon can be explained by 
recalling th a t in the  RBC model the motive for changing the labour supply is intertemporal 
substitution. For example, a positive technology shock increases the payoff of working 
longer hours, bu t agents want to spread the payoff into the future via capital accumulation. 
Hence, consum ption moves less than  one for one with output, and investment increases. 
Moreover, an increase in labour supply elasticity results in more consumption smoothing, 
thus lowering the volatility of consumption or increasing the volatility of investment.
This helps to  explain why the standard RBC model cannot reproduce the stylized facts 
of the Italian  labour m arket, namely tha t hours fluctuate much more than employment. 
The possibility of increasing the responsiveness of labour supply by changing the model 
param eters (beyond the  values implied by microeconometric evidence for other countries) 
is limited by the consideration th a t if this strategy had been tried either the volatility of 
consumption would have become too low to match the data, or the volatility of investments 
would become too high.
However, the  standard  RBC model was “designed” for the US, therefore its inability 
to reproduce the  volatility of hours in Italy may not be inherently due to its propagation 
mechanism, bu t ra ther to  the neglect of some specific labour m arket institutions or features 
of the Italian  economy.
In particular, the Italian  labour market is more regulated than  the US one, and as a 
consequence it is costlier for firms to adjust the number of employees during recessions. 
The high volatility of hours in Italy may be plausibly a ttribu ted  to rigidities in the labour 
m arket, which prevent employers from firing after a bad shock. These rigidities may also 
be the cause of the lower standard deviation of employment in Italy, compared to the 
US. To evaluate whether a RBC model can capture the high volatility of hours, the next 
chapter introduces a model with both hiring and firing costs, as a way to model labour 
m arket rigidity.
Moreover, in bo th  the open and the closed economy models of this chapter the house­
hold’s decision to  supply labour had only one dimension, hours, or in the case of the 
indivisible labour model, participation only. However, to reproduce both the volatility 
of hours and employment in the Italian economy it is necessary to have a model where 
households can make a decision on both their labour market participation and the hours
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of work. Therefore, all the  models presented in the next chapter distinguish between these 
two dimensions of the  labour supply.
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A p p en d ix  2 .A: D efin itions and sources
Table 2.12: Data
Series Definition Source of data used in calculations
GDP
Gross D om estic Product at current prices /  GDP implicit 
price deflator
OECD Quarterly National Accounts
Capital Stock
Calculated by the following iteration:
N et Stock (t) =  N et Stock (t-1) +  Total investment - 
(Capital Consumption /  GDP implicit price deflator). 
Capital Consumption for Italy is annual data /  4.
Net Stock: OECD Flows and Stocks 
of Fixed Capital. Other: OECD 
Quarterly National Accounts
Employ ment
USA: Total Labour Force - Total Unemployment Italy: Bank of Italy
USA: OECD Quarterly Labour
Force Statistics
Per cap>ita hours
Italy: monthly hours of blue-collar workers in 
industrial firms, de-indexed, adjusted for 
seasonality. Quarter averages of monthly data. 
USA: average weekly hours of production workers. 
Quarter averages of monthly data.
Italy: ISTAT
USA: Bureau of Labor Statistics
Wages per capita
Adjusted Compensation of Employees /  Employment 
Adjusted Com pensation of Employees =  (Compensation 
of Employees /  Consumer Price Index) * Employment /  
Employees
OECD Quarterly Labour Force 
Statistics and Quarterly National 
Accounts
Wages per hour
Adjusted Compensation of Employees /  (Employment * 
Per capita hours)
Output per hour
G D P /  Employm ent OECD Quarterly Labour Force 
Statistics and Quarterly National 
Accounts
O utput per capita
| G D P /  (Em ploym ent * Per capita hours) |
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Table 2.13: (continues) Data
Series Definition Source of data used in calculations
Private consum ption
Private Final Consumption Expenditure at current prices 
/  Private Final Consumption implicit price deflator
OECD Quarterly National Accounts
Govern ment cons
Government Final Consumption Expenditure at current 
prices /  Government Final Cons, implicit price deflator
OECD Quarterly National Accounts
Total consum ption
| Private cons. +  Government cons. |
Fixed investment
Gross Fixed Capital Formation /  GFCF implicit price 
deflator
OECD Quarterly National Accounts
Inventc ry inv. /  GDP  
(Increase in Stocks /  GFCF implicit price deflator ) /  
G DP
OECD Quarterly National Accounts
Total iiivestm ent
(Gross Fixed Capital Formation +  Increase in Stocks) /  
GFCF im plicit price deflator
OECD Quarterly National Accounts
Current account /  GDP
| (Exports- Imports) /  GDP |
Export s
Exports of G oods and Services at current prices /  Exports 
im plicit price deflator
OECD Quarterly National Accounts
Import s
Im ports of G oods and Services at current prices /  Imports 
im plicit price deflator
OECD Quarterly National Accounts
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Chapter 3
Real Business Cycle Theory and 
the V olatility of Hours in Italy
3.1 In tro d u ctio n
The analysis of the previous chapter has shown that, in order to be able to reproduce the 
cyclical fluctuations of the Italian economy, the standard  RBC model needs to be modified 
in some way. In particular, this chapter considers the possibility of modelling explicitly 
two institu tions or features th a t characterise the Italian economy: a high degree of labour 
market rigidity, and the  existence of a large underground economy. Obviously, these are 
not the only two characteristics th a t set Italy apart from the US or other countries1, but 
for the purpose of “approxim ating reality” they might still do a good job. In fact, both 
the official statistics and a range of independent studies rank Italy  among the countries 
with the highest degree of labour market rigidity, and the US the lowest; Italy is also the 
OECD country w ith the largest underground sector2. More interestingly, the presence 
of labour m arket rigidities and the sizeable underground sector can explain why in Italy 
hours of work fluctuate more than  employment. Rigidities prevent or make it costlier for 
registered, “official” firms to  change the number of employed workers, and as a result they 
prefer to change hours instead of employees in response to shocks. Individuals can offset 
the change in the  registered or “official” hours by shifting from the production of goods in 
the registered sector to  the production of goods in the unregistered sector, or vice versa.
J As seen in the previous chapter, Maffezzoli (2001) considers the introduction of trade unions.
2Figures will be given in Sections 3.2 and 3.3.
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In this chapter the  specific type or source of labour market rigidity are the adjustment 
costs of the  labour force. Firms have to pay the adjustm ent cost both  for hiring and 
firing workers. I t  is im portan t to point out that, while firing and hiring costs are not the 
only source of labour rigidity, they nevertheless can be thought of as a simple but flexible 
modelling tool, capable of accommodating several arrangements. In fact, firing and hiring 
costs can either be due to  legislation, or they may be generated by market inefficiencies. 
For example, the hiring cost can also be interpreted as a search cost.
There are several RBC models th a t include labour adjustm ent costs or a nonmarket 
sector, bu t not w ith the purpose of increasing the volatility of hours worked. The models 
presented in this chapter have several features in common with the model of Kydland 
and Prescott (1991): bo th  hours of work and number of employees are choice variables, 
and there is a cost of moving in and out of work. Kydland and Prescott find in fact 
th a t moving costs increase the standard  deviation of hours per worker, which nevertheless 
never reaches the value of double the standard deviation of output (as it would be needed 
to m atch the Ita lian  data), even when the moving costs are very large. However, in 
Kydland and P resco tt’s model contemporaneous utility is nonseparable, therefore the 
intertem poral elasticity of substitution of leisure cannot be changed independently. It is 
therefore interesting to  see the performance of the RBC model with moving costs under 
different values for the  intertem poral elasticity of substitution of leisure, which is what 
Section 3.2 does.
There are also several RBC models th a t include a non-registered, “household” sector, 
as opposed to  a “m arket” sector, for example Benhabib, Rogerson, and Wright (1991) and 
Greenwood and Hercowitz (1991). Although they do not introduce a household sector to 
explicitly increase the  volatility of hours, the results from their simulations are conclusive 
in showing th a t in the  RBC model with a household sector hours worked in the market 
sector have higher standard  deviation. One limitation of Benhabib, Rogerson, and Wright, 
and Greenwood and Hercowitz’ approach is that, because of their assumption that the 
good produced in the  household sector cannot be traded, their models do not consider all 
other types of unregistered activities th a t result in the sale of goods. In order to verify the 
hypothesis th a t  I ta ly ’s large underground economy is responsible for the cyclical behaviour 
of the labour m arket, it seems therefore necessary to modify the standard RBC model 
by including one additional sector, while removing a t the same time the assumption of 
nontradability. This is w hat Section 3.3 does.
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The results from the simulations of both models are only in part satisfactory. The 
introduction of firing and hiring costs has the desired effect on the volatility of hours, but 
it is not possible to  m atch closely the high value observed in the Italian data. However, the 
model w ith the underground sector performs better with respect to  the other variables, 
and it is able to  generate a relatively high volatility of hours with small adjustment costs.
This chapter is organised as follows. Section 3.2 introduces hiring and firing costs in 
the model of Section 2.3, and Section 3.3 further adds an underground sector. Finally, 
Section 3.4 concludes.
3.2 T h e M o d el w ith  F iring C osts
In this chapter bo th  firing and hiring costs are introduced, in order to see whether the 
model of the  previous chapter can generate the high volatility of hours worked and the 
comparatively lower volatility of employment th a t characterise the Italian data. It is 
however difficult to  assess the size of hiring and firing costs or labour market rigidity in 
Italy com paratively to  other countries. One difficulty is th a t there are many ways to 
prevent or increase the cost for firms of hiring and firing3.
The O E C D ’s EPL (employment protection legislation) index is a comprehensive mea­
sure th a t refers bo th  to  legislated and de facto regulations concerning hiring and firing4. 
According to  the O E C D ’s Employment Outlook, Italy is ranked twenty-third for its degree 
of labour m arket rigidity in the late 1990s, having a score of 3.4 in overall EPL strictness0. 
Thus the OECD places Italy  very close to Portugal, the country with the highest degree 
of labour m arket rigidity, which is ranked twenty-sixth, and very far from the US, which 
is ranked first6. This view is confirmed by other studies. For example, the same OECD 
publication shows various other rankings tha t have been used by earlier studies to compare 
the strictness of EPL across countries. These rankings were published by the International 
O rganisation of Employers (1985), the EC ad hoc surveys (1991, 1995), Lazear (1990), 
Bertola (1990) and the OECD Jobs Study (1994), and all of them  place Italy among the
3 Quoting from Schivardi and Torrini (2004): “Firing costs can be thought of as the result of three main 
elements: the definition of fair and unfair dismissal; the cost of a no-fault dismissal and the penalty when 
the dism issal is ruled to be unfair; the uncertainty on the result of a possible trial” .
4It includes adm inistrative procedures for individual notice and dismissal; required notice and severance 
pay; conditions under which individual dismissals are fair or unfair; regulation of fixed-term contracts and 
of temporary work agencies.
5The overall EPL strictness index runs from 0 to 6.
6Source: OECD (1999), Chapter 2.
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countries w ith the  highest degree of EPL strictness.
One of the  consequences of the labour market rigidity in Italy is th a t a lot of labour 
adjustm ent takes place through the social security system. In fact, under some conditions, 
a troubled firm can have access to  the so-called “Cassa Integrazione Guadagni” , which
for a short period of time. Workers do not lose their job, and they receive a payment 
from the social security system th a t covers almost entirely their wage. W hat is important 
is th a t they  do not become unemployed, so this sort of labour adjustment is, as far as
same sort of restrictions which prevent the firms from firing work also in the opposite 
direction, m aking firms more reluctant to hire during expansions. If this is the case, a lot 
of labour adjustm ent will take place during expansions by resorting to overtime, instead 
of recruiting new workers. This again causes a change in hours worked, while employment 
is only mildly affected or not affected at all.
The m odel
The models of the  previous sections did not make a distinction between the decision to 
participate or not in the  labour market, and the decision on how many hours to supply. 
In reality, labour fluctuates along both the intensive margin and the extensive margin, a 
feature th a t can be captured only in a model where the two dimensions of variation of the 
labour input are explicitly modelled7.
There is a continuum  of agents on the interval [0,1]. The utility function of each agent
is
where ct is consum ption and It is leisure. The time endowment of each individual is 
normalised to  1, bu t if the individual decides to work he loses for commuting an amount 
of tim e equal to  1 — ip, where ip € (0,1] is a fixed param eter. Consequently, the amount
it is equal to  ip — ht, where ht are hours worked. The param eter ip models the cost of 
participation in the  labour market.
7The m odelling strategy used in this section follows quite closely Kydland and Prescott (1991).
allows it not to  employ some or all of its workers, without having to  dismiss them, at least
statistics are concerned, variation in hours and not “bodies” . It is also plausible that the
of leisure th a t the individual enjoys is equal to one if he does not work, and if he works
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Firms produce a composite good, which is given by the number of hours times a 
constant returns to  scale production technology:
y t  =  z tk % n \  a h t
where yt is ou tpu t, zt is the technology shock, kt is capital and n t is employment, so 
unemployment is l  — rit- The adjustm ent costs of the labour force are quadratic, and they 
are paid by the firms whenever they lay off workers or recruit new ones:
where 5 is the depreciation rate. Capital at time zero, &o, is giveib as well as employment 
at time t =  —1, n _ i. The logarithm  of the technology shock follows an AR(1) process.
Unemployment is the  only source of heterogeneity, since agents are the same in this 
economy. As a consequence, all the unemployed have the same level of consumption, and 
all the employed work the same number of hours and consume the same amount of the 
composite good. Individuals choose employment lotteries and either there is a market 
where individuals can insure themselves, or employment insurance is provided by firms.
As shown by Appendix 3.A, if both lotteries and a m arket for contingent contracts, 
which enables agents to  insure income risk, are introduced in the model economy, then the 
competitive equilibrium  is Pareto-optimal. As a result, it is possible to find the solution 
path  by solving the following social planning problem:
The law of m otion for capital is:






Ct =  (1 -  n t) (% +  ntc% ,
k t+1 =  (1 - 8 ) h  + it ,
log Zt+l = pl0gZt + £t+l ,
where is consum ption of the unemployed and cf is consumption of the employed. £t 
i.i.d N  (0,<r2). I t  follows th a t optim ality requires:
A (ip -  ht) 7 =  ct z tk f n t Q (3.1)
ct — P E t ct+i (! +  a z t+ik?+\n\+i h t+\ -  <5) (3.2)
A ~  fTTX   +  c< S _  z<fc? rat =  C( S0 (« t -  n t- i ) - 0  Et ctH?1^ ( n t+l -  rat)
(3.3)
Because preferences are separable in leisure and consumption, =  c® =  ct . Equa­
tions (3.1) and (3.2) are the  familiar intratem poral and intertem poral efficiency conditions. 
Equation (3.3) describes the  optim al allocation of agents between employment and unem­
ployment. The left-hand side is the marginal benefit of adding an additional worker to 
production, and the right-hand side is the present discounted value of the marginal cost.
Calibration
This economy has a unique nonstochastic steady state  in which the shock is equal to 
its mean value and the variance of innovations is zero. The param eter ip is set so as to 
m atch a given level of hours worked and the param eter A  is set so as to match a given 
participation ra te  in the steady state. In fact, dropping time subscripts, in the steady 
sta te  the  following m ust be true:
7-Z.1 = - ( l - a )  W - h ) - > h .
1 - 7
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Table 3.1: Parameter values
5 a P h n P
0.0088 0.33 0.99 0.32 0.37 0.99
The above equation can be solved for ip, once a  and h have been calibrated and a 
choice of 7  has been made.
Equation (3.2) gives the capital-output ratio in the steady state:
K ( i + ' - 0  ■
from which the output-em ploym ent ratio & can be derived. Then a consistent measure of 
the param eter A  is given by the following:
k \ ~ 9 ( V ^ - 9
which shows th a t n, the  fraction of population th a t works, must also be calibrated at some 
sensible level. Therefore n  is set equal to  the average employment -population ratio.
The fraction of tim e h devoted to market activities by working people is given by the 
average hours worked in a week (35.53), divided by to ta l tim e available (see footnote on 
page 40).
The param eters 9 , 7, and (p are set t °  a benchmark param etrization, and then some 
sensitivity analysis is performed.
The param eters 5 , a , /?, and p are set at the same values used previously. As before 
the variance of innovations of the process for technology is set at the level th a t reproduces 
the standard  deviation of ou tput in the data. The values of the param eters are reported 
in Table 3.1.
R esults
Table 3.2 reports the  standard  deviations of employment, hours, consumption and invest­
ment, relative to  the standard  deviation of output, obtained by simulating the model for 
different values of the  adjustm ent cost. Since the feature of the data  to be reproduced 
is the high standard  deviation of hours, only the value 7 =  0, or infinite intertemporal 
elasticity of substitu tion  of hours, is considered.
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Table 3.2: Model results
0 =  2 ,  7  =  0  
0  =  0  
<f> =  1 
0  =  1 .5  
(j) — 2  
0  =  2 .5
0  =  3
Relative standard deviation


























0  =  0 0.68 0.00 0.33 4.20
0  =  l 0.68 0.85 0.28 4.87
0  =  1 .5 0.51 1.05 0.19 5.39
0  =  2 0.36 1.10 0.12 5.60
0  =  2 .5 0.25 1.10 0.07 5.67
0  =  3 0.17 1.09 0.04 5.68
W hen (f) — 0 there are no labour adjustm ent costs, and, since the instantaneous utility 
of leisure hours is a convex function, households change their labour supply after a shock 
by changing n*, while hours ht do not move. In this case, as Table 3.2 shows, the standard 
deviation of consum ption is exactly the same as in the  model of Section 2.3, and the 
standard  deviation of employment rit is equal to the one of hours in the same model. This 
shows th a t when 0  =  0 this model becomes equivalent to  the model of Section 2.3, except 
th a t th a t  nt is substitu ted  for h t .
As Table 3.2 shows, an increase in the adjustm ent cost param eter 0 is successful in 
increasing the relative volatility of hours with respect to employment. 0 takes values 
between 1 and 3, which imply th a t the marginal cost of a 1-percent change in the employ­
ment level is between 0.002 and 0.007 percent of a quarter’s output. These values are well 
below the level employed by Cogley and Nason (1995), who proposed an estimate for the 
marginal cost equal to  0.36 percent. Higher values for 0 introduced complex roots in the 
model.
W hen 0 increases households become more willing to substitute hours over time, in 
order to avoid the hiring and firing costs. As a result, they become comparatively less 
willing to  substitu te  consumption over time, and the relative volatility of consumption 
decreases, as Table 3.2 shows.
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As in the model of Section 2.3, an increase in 0 tends to induce a decrease in the
volatility of consum ption relative to output. As explained before, this happens because 
when 9 is higher households are less eager to  substitute consumption over time, and as
relative volatility of employment, which is an unappealing feature of this model. The 
failure to  reproduce relative standard  deviations close to those in the data  is a consequence 
of the short-run dynamics induced by the model. As it can be seen from Figure 10, the 
labour adjustm ent cost has an impact on hours in the first quarter only, then hours stay 
constant afterw ards, which implies th a t the adjustm ent cost does not “bite” any longer. 
This happens because households adjust hours only in the first quarter because n t~\ is 
given, then  they find paths for employment and consumption such th a t the left-hand side of 
Equation (3.3) (the only dynamic equation with labour adjustm ent costs) is equal to zero. 
B ut then equations (3.1) and (3.3) together imply th a t hours are always constant if 0 =  0, 
otherwise they adjust only in the first period. Since hours adjust only once, (ft must be 
high to  generate a high volatility of hours, but then the standard  deviations of employment 
and consum ption become too low, and the standard  deviation of investment becomes too 
high. Also, th is model generates a negative correlation of hours with employment, while 
in the d a ta  it is positive and close to zero.
These problem s can be overcome by the choice of nonseparable preferences. When 
preferences are nonseparable, hours do not enter the optim ality conditions separately 
from consum ption, therefore, they must follow a smooth path , and not being adjusted one 
period only. I t  will not be possible to find paths for employment and consumption such 
th a t the left-hand side of the optim ality condition (3.3) is always zero. Assuming that the 
utility function of each agent is:
a result their labour supply moves less after a shock. This implies th a t the volatility of 
hours decreases. W hen the intertem poral elasticity of substitution of leisure 7 and ft are 
equal to  zero, all the  adjustm ent is made through employment.
The increase in the  relative volatility of hours is accompanied by a decrease of the
the optim ality  conditions become:
64
Table 3.3: Model results with nonseparable preferences
Relative standard deviation
n h C i
0 =  2 , 7  =  0
0  =  0 0.48 0.02 0.58 2.65
</> = l 0.27 0.13 0.58 2.65
0 =  1.5 0.24 0.18 0.59 2.64
0  =  2 0.22 0.19 0.59 2.64
0 =  2.5 0.20 0.20 0.60 2.63
0 =  3 0.18 0.21 0.60 2.63
= (ce y - » 0- 1 ^  _
(<*) =  (3Et 1 (1 +  a z t+ i k f - fn l - fh t + i  -  S)
1 - 1 -
- v . ( c ? r - « e +
+ft (<*)“->* (1> -  =
= ft ( c ? ) " - ^ - 1 (1 -  a )  Ztkf_i n ^ h t -  ft 4> (nt -  n , - , )  +
+/3Et
y h a r>~OL   1 ^  Ct
M 0  — ht
Table 3.3 reports the  results for the model with nonseparable preferences. Param eter 
values are calibrated  as before, fi is calibrated so as to m atch the employment level in 
steady sta te , and the  case 6 =  1 is excluded because it introduced complex roots in the 
approxim ated solutions. The model in unsuccessful in generating a standard volatility of 
hours much higher than  employment. As with separable preferences, the increase in the 
volatility of hours takes place at the expense of the volatility of employment.
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3.3 T h e underground  econom y and firing costs
One of the  characteristic features of Italy is the existence of a large underground economy. 
The estim ated size of the Italian underground sector in 1998 was, according to Istat, 
between 14.7 and 15.4% of GDP, while, according to the  European Commission, the 
average size of the  underground economy within the European Union is between 7 and 
16% of GDP. However, these estim ates from Ista t are regarded as “prudent” . For example, 
Schneider and E nste (2000; 2002) estim ated the size of the Italian underground sector in 
1994 to be 27.8% of GDP, the highest percentage among all OECD countries, and also 
growing over tim e8.
These num bers suggest th a t the existence of an alternative to registered market activ­
ities may provide an explanation for the high volatility of hours observed in the Italian 
data. The assum ption is th a t tim e spent in registered activities and time spent in unregis­
tered activities do not enter the household’s utility function separately, as households have 
preferences over consum ption and to ta l hours worked, irrespective of the sector in which 
they work. Then, households in Italy  may be willing to  accept a high volatility of hours 
in the registered sector because, by switching from the m arket sector to the underground 
economy and vice versa, they can m oderate the volatility of to tal hours worked, which 
affects their lifetime utility.
It m ust be pointed out, however, tha t the notion of an “unregistered” or “non­
observed” 9 economy does not coincide with the notion of an underground economy, and it 
seems necessary a t this point to draw some distinctions. According to Blades and Roberts 
(2002), the  group of non-observed (unregistered) activities comprises four categories: un­
derground activities, illegal activities, activities undertaken by households for their own 
final use, and activities th a t are non-observed because of deficiencies in the data collection 
programme. U nderground activities differ from the other unregistered activities because 
they consist in the  production and sale of goods and services th a t are perfectly legal, 
but they are concealed from the public authorities, for example to avoid paying taxes. 
Household activities are legal, bu t in most cases there is no sale of goods and services, as 
the household is a t the same tim e both  producer and consumer.
The distinction between unregistered, underground and household sector is im portant
8 Source: Zizza (2002).
9For the purposes of this analysis, “unregistered” or “non-observed” can be used interchangeably.
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because the closest the  real business cycle literature has got to modelling unregistered 
activities is by modelling the household sector. Models th a t incorporate the household 
sector into real business cycle theory are Benhabib, Rogerson, and Wright (1991) and 
Greenwood and Hercowitz (1991). In both these models, households have preferences over 
a m arket good, a nonm arket (or household) good, and leisure. Only the market good can 
be traded. The household good can only be consumed, as it cannot be used to finance the 
consumption of the  m arket good, or invested into capital.
It is im m ediate then  to  see tha t, by removing the assum ption of nontradability of the 
nonm arket good, the household sector in these RBC models becomes the analogue of the 
unregistered sector, minus the illegal activities and the statistical error, whose role can be 
assumed to  be minor. This is the approach th a t is followed here. As noted beforehand, 
Italy has a large underground (and thus unregistered) economy, and this might contribute 
to explaining why the volatility of hours is high. W hat is more, although none of the 
papers m entioned above introduced a household sector to explicitly increase the volatility 
of hours, their results seem encouraging for this strategy.
In fact, Benhabib, Rogerson, and W right show th a t in their real business cycle model 
with a household sector m arket hours have higher volatility, compared to the same model 
without a household sector. This happens because in addition to the standard motive 
(capital accum ulation) for increasing market hours when m arket productivity is high, 
there is an additional incentive to  substitu te home production with market production, as 
the la tte r  gives higher returns.
Also, Greenwood and Hercowitz find th a t their model with household production gen­
erates series w ith higher volatility of output and m arket tim e than  a prototypical real busi­
ness cycle model. They explain th a t the inclusion of household capital enhances labour’s 
responsiveness, as a result of the fact th a t both  household and business capital needs to be 
adjusted after a shock. I t must be pointed out th a t in their model the technology shock 
increases the  m arginal productivity of both household and business capital.
On the empirical side, a closely related work on the influence of the household sector 
on hours is Hall (1997). According to Hall, the most im portant driving force of changes in 
working hours are labour-supply shifts. He also suggests th a t non-market activities, such 
as job-search or home production, are the possible causes for these labor-supply shifts, 
and th a t the  behaviour of hours in the data  cannot be justified by relying entirely on 
technology shifts and intertem poral (capital accumulation) mechanisms.
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The m odel
There is one consum ption good in the economy, which can be produced either in the 
registered sector or in the unregistered sector. As in the previous model, hiring and 
firing costs prevent firms from adjusting the level of employment fully in response to a
unregistered activities. There is a continuum of measure one of agents, equally endowed 
with one unit of time. The utility function of each agent is:
where It is leisure and c* is consumption.
As in the previous section, there is a fixed cost of participation in registered activities, 
while there is no participation cost for unregistered activities. Employed agents are those 
working in the registered sector. Both the unemployed and the employed participate in 
unregistered activities: huut is tim e spent by the unemployed in unregistered activities, and 
heut and heRt denote the tim e allocated by the employed to, respectively, unregistered and 
registered activities. Individuals choose employment lotteries and either there is a market 
where individuals can insure themselves, or employment insurance is provided by firms. 
The variable n t is the  probability of being employed, 1 — n t is the probability of being 
unemployed: by the Law of Large Numbers, since there exists a continuum of agents of 
measure one, n t is also the fraction of employed agents, th a t is, those working in registered 
activities.
O utpu t in registered activities is given by:
where zRt is the  exogenous technology shock and kRt is capital used in registered activities. 
All agents have access to  production in unregistered activities, which takes place according 
to  a constant elasticity production function:
where zjjt is the exogenous shock, specific to the unregistered sector. Capital (consumer
shock, bu t now households can allocate their time between leisure, registered activities and
Vm =  zRtk m n t aheRt ,
durables) and labour used in unregistered activities are kut and hut =  (1 — n t) huut +
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ntheut- (1 — £)-1 gives the elasticity of substitution between capital and labour. It is 
assumed th a t all ou tpu t produced in the underground sector is analogous to output pro­
duced in the  registered sector. In any given period it can be consumed or stored and 
transform ed into capital. Consumption is allocated between the employed and the unem­
ployed according to  the  equation:
ct =  (1 -  n t) cut +  ntcet . (3.4)
Total capital is the sum of capital used in the registered and unregistered activities, 
and it evolves accordingly to the following laws of motion:
km+i =  (1 —  5 r )  km  +  im  , (3.5)
kut+i — (1 — Su) kut +  iut > (3-6)
where Sr  and 5u are depreciation rates on the two types of capital. kRo and kuQ are given, 
as well as employment a t tim e —1, n _ i.
Firm s pay adjustm ent costs whenever they lay off workers or recruit new ones:
A C t =  (nt -  n t- i ) 2 . (3.7)
O utpu t produced in the underground economy is tradeable and it is sold at the same 
price as ou tpu t produced in registered activities. The aggregate budget constraint is
ct + it = zRtkfttn l~ a heRt +  zut {r}kfjt +  (1 ~  l )  h ^ Y  -  ^  (n t -  n t- i f  , (3.8)
where it — iRt +  iut- The logarithm s of the exogenous shocks follow two distinct AR(1) 
processes:
log zm+i = pR log zRt +  £Rt+1 , (3.9)
log zut+1 =  Pu log zut +  £ut+i - (3.10)
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As explained by Appendix 3.A, under some conditions the decentralised solution co­
incides w ith the solution to  the social planner’s problem, which maximises the sum of 
agents’ utilities:
m ax
subject to  (3.4)-(3.10).
O ptim ality requires the marginal utilities for consumption and leisure of both the 
employed and the  unemployed to  be equal, therefore, since preferences are separable, 
employed and unemployed agents consume the same amount of c* and enjoy the same 
level of leisure. The first order conditions can be w ritten as follows:
= (Cut)-” =  {C ty6
A  ( i p -  heRt -  heUt) 7 =  (ct ) 9 zRtk% n t 01 =  (ct ) 9
(ct ) 9 =  PEt  ( c t+ i )  9 ( l  -  SR +  a z Rtkftt l n \  a heRt)
^ (ip -  heR -  heU) 1 7 -  1 _  ^ (1 -  huUf  7 -  1
=  (ct ) 9 (1 -  a )  z RtkRtnt a heRt +  (heUt -  huUt) -  (p(nt -  nt - 1) +  
+(3Et (ct+1)~6 (f> (nt+i -  nt)
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Table 3.4: Parameter values
a p 8 r  — 8 u 0 7 n h eR h eu k{j  /  h u PR — Pu
0.33 0.99 0.0088 1 2 0.37 0.32 0.25 11.63 0.95
Calibration
Because of the lack of statistics on the underground economy, only a subset of the para­
meters may be estim ated on the basis of a priori information. There is no information 
about the degree of substitu tab ility  between labour and capital in unregistered activities. 
The performance of the model and its ability to capture real world statistics can there­
fore vary a lot, bu t this does not constitute a drawback of the model, because several 
alternative versions can be tested against each other, according to alternative param eter 
specifications.
The capital share in registered activities a , the discount rate  /3, and the depreciation 
rate  8R are set a t the same level used in the previous sections. During simulation exercises, 
no interesting features emerged by varying the intertem poral elasticities of substitution of 
leisure and consum ption, therefore they have been set to  6 — 1 and 7 =  2, because these 
values were used in the other sections and seemed to m atch better the moments in the 
data. The depreciation ra te  of capital used in the underground sector is assumed equal to 
the one of capital employed in registered activities.
The four param eters A, a, 'ip and rj are obtained from the steady state equations in 
order to  m atch four observations: the fraction of population th a t works n, the fraction 
of tim e devoted to  registered activities heR and unregistered activities heU by employed 
households, and the capital/hours ratio in the underground economy. The values for heR 
and kv  /  hv  are taken from Greenwood, Rogerson, and W right (1995), n  and heR are set 
as in the previous calibration exercises. The autocorrelation coefficients pR and pv  are 
set equal to  0.95, as in much of the literature. As in the models of the previous sections, 
the standard  deviation of the exogenous shocks is calibrated so as to match the standard 
volatility of ou tpu t. It is also assumed th a t the shock in the underground sector mimics 
the shock in the  registered sector (pR — pv ). The param eter values and the steady state 
observation used for calibrating the model are reported in Table 3.4.
The param eter £ remains to be specified, together with the correlation between the 
innovations eRt and e m ■ There is little evidence to be used as a guide in the choice of these
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Table 3.5: Evaluation of the model for different parameter values
Relative standard deviation
n h eR c i
Model 1 0.98 0.22 0.43 1.17
Model 2 0.99 0.44 0.37 0.98
Model 3 0.89 0.18 0.43 3.77
Model 4 1.02 0.30 0.18 3.46
All models use c t  =  0.33, f t  — 0.99, S r  =  Sy  =  0.0088, 9  =  1, 7  =  2 , (f> =  0 .2 , p n  =  p y  =  0.95. 
a, A, Ip ,  and T] are determ ined so that 71 =  0.37, h e R  =  0.32, h e y  =  0.25, k y  /  h y  =  11.63.
Model 1 sets £  =  -0.6 and the correlation between the innovations 6R t  and Cut equal to -1.
Model 2 sets £ =  -2 and the correlation between the innovations Cut  aRd Cut equal to -1.
Model 3 sets £  =  -0.6 and the correlation between the innovations CRt and € y t  equal to 1.
Model 4 sets £ =  -2 and the correlation between the innovations CRt and Cut  equal to 1.
param eters, bu t several alternatives can be formulated and tested against each other, so 
th a t the behaviour of the model can be depicted under some selected scenery.
R esults
Table 3.5 lists some sum m ary statistics for several versions of the model. To allow com­
parison with the data , investment is investment in the two capital stocks, consumption 
is consumption of goods produced in the registered sector and hours worked are those 
in the registered sector. The m agnitude of the standard  deviations relative to output of 
the variables in the  model depends crucially on two aspects: the incentive to move across 
sectors, as m easured by the correlation between shocks, and the degree of substitutability 
between labour and capital in the underground economy, as measured by the parameter 
£. Table 3.5 reports the  results of simulations with a common adjustm ent cost of 0.2, 
and different, “extrem e” values of those param eters. Higher or lower values introduced 
complex roots in the  approxim ated solution, and therefore they were discarded.
Models 1 and 2 represent the cases of high incentives to move across sectors, because 
the correlation between shocks is equal to minus one, and Models 3 and 4 of low incentives, 
because the correlation between shocks is equal to one. Model 1 and 3 describe a situation 
of high substitu tab ility  of capital and hours in the underground economy, whereas Models 
2 and 4 a situation  of low substitutability.
The effect of incentives to  move across sectors on the volatility of the labour input 
is entirely predictable: when incentives to move are minimal there is less volatility of
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Table 3.6: Standard deviations and correlations with output
Relative standard deviation
n heR c i
0 =  0.30 0.99 0.63 0.33 3.23
0 =  0.31 0.94 0.76 0.31 3.08
0 =  0.32 0.87 0.94 0.27 2.78
0 =  0.33 0.75 1.17 0.17 2.22
Model 2 sets £  =  -1 and the correlation between the innovations €Rt  and £ u t  equal to 1. All
the other parameters are as in Table 3.5.
labour. Table 3.5 simply states th a t when the incentives increase labour adjustm ent is 
made through hours when hours and capital are low substitutes, and through employment 
when hours and capital are high substitutes. However when the correlation between 
shocks is equal to  minus one there is less volatility of investment. This happens because 
investment creates capital for future periods, but when shocks are negatively correlated 
and persistent there is less need to  change to ta l investment, because investment in one of 
the capital stocks can simply replace the other.
Different elasticities of substitution between capital and hours in the underground 
economy have an im pact on hours, consumption and investment. W hen substitutability 
is low there m ust be a larger increase in hours worked after a shock in the underground 
economy, therefore the  volatility of hours is higher. As in the models of the previous sec­
tions, when the labour supply is more rigid there is less consumption smoothing. When 
substitu tability  is high adjustm ent can be made through investment in unregistered ac­
tivities instead of hours, and this explains why the volatility of investment is higher. In 
conclusion, substitutability , and incentives to  move have different effects on the fluctua­
tions of the  variables of the  model, and trying to reproduce the Italian data  is difficult, as 
for example an increase in the volatility of hours can be made only at the expense of that 
of consumption.
The ability of the  model to  capture real-world statistics can be tested by making some 
choice for the param eters values. Since the main feature of the Italian business cycle is the 
high volatility of hours w ith respect to employment, param eters were chosen with the aim 
to m atch as closely as possible this empirical fact, avoiding at the same time generating 
a too low a volatility of consumption and too high a volatility of investment. Results 
obtained for th a t particular param etrization are in Table 3.6.
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Results are very sensitive to the choice of 0, bu t higher values of the adjustm ent cost 
introduced complex roots in the model. The model performs better than  the one in the 
previous section in m atching the relative volatility of investment, but the increase in the 
volatility of the  labour input is done at the expense of the volatility of consumption, which 
becomes too low. This phenomenon can be explained as in Section 2.5 by intertemporal 
substitution. After a positive technology shock, households spread the payoff of working 
longer hours into the future. The result is lower relative volatility of consumption, because 
consumption moves less than  one for one with output. This intertem poral substitution 
effect is less pronounced when the adjustm ent takes place via changes in n  instead of h\ 
probably this happens because the need to insure the unemployed limits the possibility of 
spreading the gain in production into future periods.
3.4 C on clu sion
This chapter modifies a RBC model by adding two im portant features of the Italian 
economy, namely the labour m arket rigidities and the underground sector. The rationale 
for this modification is the  high volatility of hours worked in Italy, which cannot be 
captured by a s tandard  RBC model, as explained in the previous chapter.
Unfortunately, Ita ly  lacks definite information on hours of work, since the only data 
available is for large industrial firms. As a result, the possibility of establishing whether 
or not “RBC theory can explain business cycle fluctuations in Italy” is diminished: the 
Solow residuals could not be computed, as the da ta  on hours are affected by measurement 
error. However, even though the available evidence is insufficient, it cannot be regarded 
as completely devoid of significance, furtherm ore, the relevance of the RBC theory can 
only increase if it is generalised to countries having “extrem e” (i.e. different from the US) 
fluctuations. Italy  is not the only country where a significant proportion of the adjustments 
in the labour input is m ade through changes in hours: according to B urdett and W right’s 
calculations10, the percentage of the variation in the labour input th a t is due to hours (as 
opposed to  num ber of employees) is considerably lower in the US and Canada than in the 
main European economies.
W ith  these considerations in mind, finding the “perfect” match for the volatility of 
hours worked in Italy  is probably less im portant than  putting the RBC theory to a test.
10(1989), page 1493.
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The introduction of labour adjustm ent costs and the unregistered sector had the desired 
effect of augmenting the volatility of hours, and therefore it can be considered as partially 
successful. The reason why success is not full is the behaviour of consumption: as in the 
previous chapter, when the standard  deviation of hours increases, the standard deviation 
of consumption falls, becoming much lower than in the actual data.
Of course, the institu tional differences between Italy  and the US are not limited to 
labour m arket rigidities and the underground sector. Therefore, there may be other mod­
elling strategies th a t can bring full success and at the same time be “realistic” , in the 
sense of giving a stylized yet accurate description of Ita ly ’s distinctive economic environ­
ment. W h a t’s more, a RBC researcher could say th a t per capita hours in Italy do not 
necessarily have a very high volatility because of “institu tions” or “imperfections” in the 
labour market. They may fluctuate so markedly because individuals want them  to, since 
all fluctuations are optim al responses to exogenous shocks, given the environment. Thus, 
the answer may lie in preferences, bu t then this line of attack is left to future research.
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A p p en d ix  3 .A: Socia l planner versus co m p etitiv e  equilibrium  
so lu tion
Throughout C hapter 3 the social planner problem is used to find the decentralised or 
com petitive' equilibrium  solution of all three RBC models. To see whether this is an 
appropriate stra tegy  I will look at each problem individually. In short, it is possible 
to prove th a t the  social planner solution coincides with the decentralised solution under 
some conditions: (i) lotteries are added to the individuals’ consumption sets; (ii) there is 
a m arket for contingent contracts, allowing agents to  seek insurance of income risk; (iii) 
we make some specific assumptions on the behavior of firms.
The m odel w ith  firing costs and separable utility, pages 59-64
This model is a simpler version of the model built by Kydland and Prescott, “Hours and 
Employment Variation in Business Cycle Theory” , Economic Theory, 1991. It is simpler 
because: (i) I do not consider tim e to build new capital; (ii) I do not include inventory 
investment in the  production function; and (iii) I do not assume th a t workweek lengths 
are different commodities, and households are constrained to choose only one workweek 
length. Instead, households can supply several workweek lengths to several plants at the 
same time.
The environment
There is a continuum  of households indexed by i G [0,1]. The utility function of each 
households is:
O O
Ui = EoY, PV&A) ■
t=0
The function U has the form:
"  ~ i - 0  1 _ 7
where c£ is consum ption and l\ is leisure. The time endowment of each household is 
normalised to  1, bu t if the household decides to work she loses for commuting an amount 
of tim e equal to  1 — ip, where rf) is a fixed parameter. Consequently, the amount of leisure
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th a t the household enjoys is equal to 1 if she does not work, and if she works it is equal 
to ip — h\, where h\ are hours worked.
Capital is owned by households and its law of motion is:
kt+i — (1 — <5) kt +  it ■
There is a continuum  of firms, all symmetric and indexed by j  E 
takes place in plants th a t are operated during a number of hours th a t 
workers. The p lan t’s production function is:
Vt =  ztk ^ n \~ a ht ,
where h denotes the workweek, n  employment in the plant and k the amount of capital 
in the plant. The variable 2 is the exogenous stochastic process for technology. As stated 
above, all the n  workers a t the plant work h units of time.
Kydland and P rescott (1991) use this production function to introduce adjustment 
along the intensive and the extensive margin, since both the tim e a plant can be operated 
and the num ber of workers operating a plant can be varied. We can see that, given the 
workweek, plants are subject to  constant returns to scale. P resco tt’s (2001) motivation for 
assuming a Cobb-Douglas in capital and employment is th a t the labour share of product 
is constant in the data , even though the price of labour relative to capital has increased 
dramatically.
W ith  this production function the marginal productivity of employment is decreasing, 
while the m arginal productivity  of hours is constant. Osuna and Rfos-Rull (2003) explain 
this by the presence of teamwork, which introduces imperfect substitutability between 
employment and hours. Teamwork means tha t a plant can only be operated when all its 
workers are present. W hen a plant changes its workweek, the amount of capital available 
to each worker does not change, therefore the marginal productivity of hours is constant. 
On the other hand, when a plant increases the size of its labor force, the amount of capital 
available to  each worker decreases, therefore the marginal productivity of employment is 
decreasing.
I assume th a t each firm can have several plants with different workweeks, and new 
plants can be opened a t zero cost. However, it is straightforward to  show that each firm 
will have one or several plants, bu t will choose only one workweek. In fact, given constant
(3.11)
[0,1]. Production 
is the same for all
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returns in bodies and capital, plants with n workers and a workweek of h hours can 
split a t no cost into n  units of one employee th a t works h hours. Moreover, consider for 
example plant A  and plant B  both  belonging to the same firm, and assume with no loss 
of generality th a t bo th  plants have only one employee and Ha  > h#. The firm takes the 
rental rate  of capital as given, and allocates capital across plants so as to equalise the 
marginal productivity  of capital in each plant to the rental rate  of capital, as shown by 
equation (3.30). In fact, equation (3.30) shows th a t capital per worker is a function of 
the rental ra te  of capital and the workweek length. Thus, plants can be indexed by their 
workweek and their capital per worker. Since it is optim al for the firm to allocate more 
capital in plant A  ra ther than  B  (cf. again equation 3.30), this means th a t the marginal 
product of hours will be greater in plant A  rather than  B. As a result, w' (Ha ) > w' (hs)  
(equation 3.32), bu t since Ha  and h s  are perfect substitutes from the household’ point of 
view, only plant A  will be operational. Thus, each firm may have one or several plants, 
but only one workweek length.
Firms pay quadratic  adjustm ent cost whenever workers are laid off or new workers are 
recruited:
where A C J denotes the adjustm ent cost paid by firm j .
Since households have to  use an amount of tim e ip before they provide any labour 
service, the  household choice set is not convex. Therefore, following Hansen (1985) and 
Rogerson (1988), I assume th a t households have access to employment lotteries.
Households choose a probability of working, and a lottery allocates the households 
between employment and unemployment. Several arrangements are possible to construct a 
competitive equilibrium  with lotteries where households are insured from income risk. For 
example, P rescott and Townsend (1984) assume th a t insurance is provided by production 
firms, while Hansen (1985) assumes perfectly competitive insurance firms. I will assume 
here th a t insurance is provided by production firms, and then I will show that the first 
order conditions in my model are the same for the social planner and the competitive 
equilibrium w ith lotteries.
In every period t, a lottery determines which households are to be employed and 
which households are to  be unemployed. Since the set of firms and the set of households
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have both  m easure one, and firms are all symmetric, the probability of being employed is 
simply denoted w ith n t , which is equal to the fraction of employed households over the 
total number of households. Moreover, prior to the resolution of uncertainty, households 
trade in contracts which provide units of consumption contingent on the realization of the 
lottery.
Pareto optimal allocation
The Pareto optim al allocation corresponds to the solution of the following social planning 
problem:




+ n t+j 1 -
(V; -  ht+j, -  1
subject to:
(1 -  n t) ctu +  n tc\ +  it = zt k%n\ aht -  ~  (n t -  n t_ i )2 ,
^+1 — (1 ~  kt + it ,
log zt+1 =  p log zt +  et+i ,
where is consum ption of the unemployed and cf is consumption of the employed, and 
et is i.i.d. N  (0, a 2). A  fraction n t of the households work, and the remaining (1 -  nt) do 
not. The social planner maximises the weighted sum of agent’s utilities, subject to the 
resource constrain t of the economy.
The first order conditions are:
( c ? r 9 =  ( c ? r 9 , (3.i2)
— ht) -7  _ z tk?nt (3.13)
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ct e = P E ,  c,+»j (1 +  o z l+lkf+l' n lt / { h , +1 -  d) j , (3.14)
ct S Ci- - a ) ztkt n t ah t - c t <!<l>(nt - n t - 1)+ 0E t c ^ t p  (n t+i -  n t ) .
(3.15)
Competitive Equilibrium
The rental rates of labour and capital are denoted by wt (wage per person) and rt respec­
tively. Each household chooses a lottery where with probability n t she works and with 
probability 1 — n t. she does not work. Hence, with probability n t her income is wt +  rtkt 
and with probability 1 — nt her income is rtk t . However, households can seek insurance 
by ex-ante trade in contingent contracts, which deliver units of consumption contingent 
on the outcome of the lottery.
Following Prescott and Townsend (page 40), let us assume th a t production firms supply 
these contingent contracts. T ha t is, firms commit to supply to the households, at a given 
price, units of consum ption conditional upon the outcome of the lottery. Alternatively, 
these contracts could be supplied by intermediaries, for example insurance firms. I will 
loosely refer to  these contracts between households and firms as both  "insurance contracts" 
and "contingent contracts".
The tim ing of the events is as follows: (i) at the s ta rt of period t the exogenous 
shock occurs, therefore the variable zt is publicly observed; (ii) firms and households trade 
in contingent contracts; (iii) agents determine their optim al levels of y t , c^, c^, ht , i t ,  it, 
kef+ 1, kuj+ 1, and the probability of working n t ; (iv) a lottery allocates households between 
employment and unemployment; (v) firms deliver units of consumption to households 
contingent on their type. Therefore, we can see th a t the competitive equilibrium with 
lotteries rests crucially on the lottery being publicly observable and the insurance contract 
enforceable.
Later, we will see th a t in the competitive equilibrium with lotteries there is perfect 
insurance of income risk, so initially identical households are also identical ex-post. This 
result, together w ith the assum ption tha t firms are symmetric, guarantees the equality 
between the "individually chosen" nt and the aggregate probability n t , because identical
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households make identical choices. On the other hand, the equality between the probability 
nt and the fraction or num ber of households th a t work is guaranteed by the law of large 
numbers (Uhlig (1996)).
Let qt denote the num ber of commitments to supply x f  units of output to the bearer 
(household) who announces she is of type 0, while pt denotes the unit price of such con­
tingent contract. Firm s only need to  provide insurance to unemployed households, so it is 
possible to  take the norm alisation x f  — 0 and x™ =  1. Then, for each firm, the following 
condition m ust be satisfied:
z tk ^ n \~ a ht -  r t kt -  w tn t -  ^  [nt -  n t- \ ) 2 + p tqt - q t (  1 -  A*) >  0 , (3.16)
where A* is the  probability of a household being employed. Equation (3.16) states that 
each firm cannot plan to  redistribute more than  the profit from production. The price of 
current ou tpu t is normalised to 1, and price of period-t consumption in terms of period-t 
output is also 1. Each firm takes At as given. The m arket for contingent contracts is a 
spot m arket.
Beforehand, we denoted the probability of a household being employed with n t , so it 
is tem pting to  write in (3.16) At = n t . However, the equivalence between the competitive 
equilibrium w ith lotteries and the Pareto-optim al allocation depends upon the requirement 
th a t firms fail to  recognise (or commit not to  recognise) th a t their choice of nt influences 
the am ount of insurance they offer. Firms choose the optim al number of workers by 
maximising profits w ith respect to  n^, given n t - 1, bu t they take the probability Xt of the 
condition (3.16) as given.
A reasonable justification for this behaviour is th a t n t is the number of workers that the 
individual firm employs (a choice variable), bu t the \ t in (3.16) is an aggregate probability 
th a t is beyond the control of the firm. An alternative approach (for example, Hansen 
on page 325) assumes th a t the contingent contracts are offered by perfectly competitive 
insurance firms who take nt as given.
Perfect com petition and price-taking behaviour in the market for contingent contracts 
are crucial assum ptions, so we must also assume th a t both households and firms take the 
price of the  contingent contract as given. Let pt be the price of the contract. Prior to the 
lottery, each firm acts to  maximise profits from the sale of insurance contracts:
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7T* =  Ptqt - q t {  1 -  h )  ,
which gives:
pt = 1 -  At ,
and 7rt =  0. Notice th a t both  firms and households choose the level of insurance taking At 
as given, bu t the  insurance contracts specify th a t Xt = n t , therefore it is also true that:
Pt =  1 -  n t (3.17)
(however, n t is chosen after qt is decided). In this environment, unemployment is the only 
source of heterogeneity. We assume th a t households are all identical at time zero. The 
objective of the  household is to maximise ex-ante expected utility:
max E t f t  
j =o
subject to:
(1 At+j) +  At+j
+  ~ ht+j)1 7 - l
1 - 1 -  7
(3.18)
c&t +  if  =  wt (ht ) +  rt kt -  ptqt with probability Xt , (3.19)
Ct +  i™ = rt kt + qt ~  Ptqt with probability (1 -  At) , (3.20)
ke,t+1 — (1 — S) kt + with probability At , (3-21)
ku,t+i — (1 — S) k t + it with probability (1 — At) . (3.22)
We want to  abstrac t from the initial distribution of capital in the economy, therefore 
we assume a particu lar case where kej  = kUtt. T hat is, households are all identical ex-ante. 
However, we will show th a t the trade in contingent contracts results in perfect insurance, 
therefore households are also identical ex-post and the above maximisation problem is
82
always valid. Note th a t the wage per person depends on the number of hours worked, due 
to the nature  of the  plant technology.
There are 4 s ta te  variables in the above problem: individual capital k, aggregate
capital (le t’s denote it by k), the aggregate probability A and the exogenous state 2. The
/
aggregate variables k and A affect the prices of labour and capital, but they are beyond 
the control of the household. The dynamic programming problem is:
V ( k , k , X , z )  = maxcu, ce, k'u, k'e, ie, iu, q
subject to  the  above constraints. The first order conditions are:
(c“)~e = f3EV1 (k'u , V ,  X’, z ' )  , (3.23)
= 0 E V 1 (k'e, k ' , X , z ' )  , (3.24)
(c“ )_e =  (c‘ )~e , (3.25)
where V\ is the  derivative of V  with respect to its first argument. Equation (3.25) implies
th a t — cf = ct . This, together with eqs. (3.23) and (3.24), imply th a t k'e = k 'u , therefore 
if =  i As a result, the  left-hand sides of eqs. (3.19) and (3.20) are identical. So, q  will
be chosen so th a t the right-hand sides are equal as well: qt =  w t . T hat is, households
will choose to  insure themselves fully. Because of complete insurance, ex-ante identical 
households are also identical ex-post, so k e — ku =  kt+
Then, the  expected am ount of resources available to  the household is:
Ct + H = n h  +  Wt (ht ) n t , (3.26)
and the law of m otion for capital is the same as (3.11). After the trade in contingent
83
contracts has taken place, households will maximise (3.18) subject to (3.26) and (3.11), 
substituting Xt w ith n t . The first-order conditions (3.23) and (3.24) can be written as:
ct e = (3Et (1 +  rt+1 -  S) 
the first-order condition with respect to n t is:
ct ew t (ht ) =  —A
1 - 7
and the first-order condition w ith respect to ht is:
n tA  {ij -  ht) 7 =  ct ew't {ht ) n t
From the m axim isation problem of the firm we get:
max£t E F Q t  ,t+jkt, nt




<f>z tk?n t aht -  r tkt -  wt (ht ) n t -  -  {nt -  n t- \ )
where /3^Qt}t+j is the  relevant discount factor between t and t + j .  Since firms are owned 
by households, Qt,t+j — Uu^c tf  =  ^ rst or(^er conditions with respect to kt , n t
and ht are:
rt =  a z t k f  l n\  a ht , (3.30)
rn {ht) =  (1 -  a )  Z t k fn t a ht -  <f){nt -  n t- i )  +  (3Et 't+1 <t> (n t+i -  n t ) (3.31)
q - 1  — a^ t  (ht) Tit — ztkt Tit (3.32)
and thus:
wt {ht ; rt ) =  ( ! - < * )  z l  a f ^  j  h] a -  <p {nt -  n t- 1) +  PEt -t+i—  4>{nt+i -  nt)
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These first-order conditions and expressions for w and r  are analogous to the ones 
presented by A lpanda and Ueberfeldt (2004) on page 22. We can note th a t in the steady 
state w and r  are homogeneous of degree zero in (A;,n), thus the assumption of perfect 
com petition is consistent.
Now, it is easy to  see th a t (3.12)-(3.15) can be obtained from (3.25)-(3.32). In con­
clusion, the solution of the social planner problem coincides with the solution of the 
competitive equilibrium  with lotteries and complete insurance of income risk. Since the 
competitive equilibrium  with lotteries and complete insurance is Pareto optimal, it then 
follows th a t there  is no incentive for ex-post (after the  lottery) trading between employed 
and unemployed households.
Some assum ptions on the behaviour of the firm are crucial to  ensure the equivalence 
between the com petitive and the social planner solutions. Firm s act as price-takers as 
their size is small w ith respect to the market, and since plants are ordered by workweek 
length and capital per worker (as explained on page 77), wages per person are a function 
of hours and the rental rate  of capital. Because of these behavioural assumptions, we are 
able to obtain our equivalence result, in spite of the increasing returns to scale technology 
and the possible externality  (due to  the labour adjustm ent costs), which are all potentially 
problematic.
The m odel w ith  firing costs and nonseparable utility, pages 64-65
The only difference between this model and the model on pages 59-64 is the momentary 
utility function:
The economic environm ent is the same as before: the plant technology and the labour 
adjustm ent costs are the same. Firms may have one or several plants, but for the reasons 
explained on page 77 they will choose only one workweek length. The lottery and the 
m arket for contingent contracts is introduced in the same way as before, with the same 
unfolding of events. Contingent contracts are provided by production firms, which behave
like perfectly com petitive insurers and take the aggregate probability At as given. As a 
result, the price of a contingent contract (which delivers one unit of the consumption good 
to the unemployed) is:
The first order conditions of the social planner’s problem are:
(3.33)
P E t (<?+iY  ^  1 (1 +  -  <5) ■ (3.34)
\ (cet y  (ip -  ht ),l-/x - 1
1 -
+fi(cet r ~ » 9 =
p. ( c J T - ^ - 1 (1 -  a) z t k ^ n ^ h t  -  fi ( c - ) ^ 0" 1 <t> (nt -  nt^ )  +
+P E t ^ { ct+ lV  ^  1<p{nt+i - n t ) (3.35)
(3.36)
H ip — ht
Households are initially identical, and before the lottery takes place they choose their 
level of insurance so as to  maximise ex-ante expected utility:
V ( k , k , \ , z )  = max
c u , ce , k'u , k'e , i e , i u , q 
,u\fi U-
(1 - A ) [(c“ )
-  1 + 0 E V  (k'u , k ' , A', 2/
+A




subject to  the  constraints (3.19)-(3.22), where the expression for p  has been substituted
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out. The first-order conditions are:
M (c” ) " - ^ - 1 = 0 EVi (k'u, k', A', z ')  , (3.37)
ft (c' ) " - " " - 1 (i/> -  =  pEVi  ( K , t ,  A', z' )  , (3.38)
=  ( c ' ) " - ^ - 1 (V> -  . (3.39)
Equations (3.37) to  (3.39) together imply th a t k'u =  k'e . Therefore, from the budget 
constraints of the employed and unemployed households, it is possible to find out an 
expression for q: ■
q — w (h ) — ce +  cu .
The proof th a t k'u =  k'e is presented at the end of this Section. This implies that 
iu =  ie 5 since households have the same amount of capital initially. Then, it is possible 
to see th a t, w ith nonseparable utility, there is no perfect insurance of income risk, as 
the consum ption of the unemployed is different from the consumption of the employed. 
However, initially identical households will have the same level of capital in each period.
The expected am ount of resources available is the same for all households. After 
substitu ting the exogenous At w ith n t , it is given by:
(1 -  n t ) cut +  n tcet + i t = r tk t +  w t (ht ) n t .
The first-order conditions of the optimal control problem, once the level of insurance 
has been substitu ted  in, are:
(1 -  n t) (c?) = m ( l-nt+1) 1 (1 +  r-e+1 -  <5) (3.40)
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I(c?) +
( c t Y  -  h t) -  1
+
+ M (c ? f - '‘0- i K ( / l() - 4 + c n  =  o (3.41)
(M  =  1 11 , • (3.42)
l i  ip - h t
As the production side is unchanged, the first-order conditions of the firm are the same 
as before, (3.30)-(3.32). B ut (3.30)-(3.32) together with (3.39)-(3.42) imply (3.33)-(3.36), 
therefore, the equivalence result between the competitive equilibrium with lotteries and 
the social planner solution is valid also in the case of nonseparable preferences. However, 
in this case there is no complete insurance, since c \  ^  d p .
Proof that k'u — k'e : The form of the value function V  is unknown, but the derivative 
with respect to  its first argum ent can be recovered by the envelope theorem:
, z )  = ii (1 +  r  -  <5) ( c T ^ 9- 1 ,
=  + r -  5) (ip -  .
For example, substitu ting  in the first expression c u and leading it forward we obtain:
V i (V, k \  A', =  /z (1 +  r' -  S ) (-*£ + (1 - d ) k '  +  r k '  +  q ' X ' Y  ^  1 , (3.43)
where fc" is a function of (k ! , k \  A', z'^J. Since the first-order conditions of the household 
m aximisation problem  require th a t V\ (k'u ,k  , \ ' , z ' ^  =  V\ (jc'e, k  , A i t  is clear that 
this is possible only if k'u — k'e. The same would be true if we used the second expression 
for V\.
The m odel w ith  an underground sector and firing costs, pages 68-73
Now both  employed and unemployed households have access to production in unregistered 
activities, which have a CES production function:
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Vut =  zut {rjkfjt +  (1 -  r?) }
where zut  is the exogenous shock, specific to the unregistered sector. The variables kut 
and hut  are to ta l capital and labour used in unregistered activities, and they are supplied 
by both  employed and unemployed households:
kut  — I keUt di  T I kuut di ,f x
r l
i +  /0 J  A
f X r 1I heUt di +  /0 J X
hut u  i  T I huut di .
Jo J A
where keu  (heu ) is capital (labour) supplied to the unregistered sector by the employed, 
and kuu (huu ) are supplied by the unemployed households. Employed households are 
those working in the  registered sector. For convenience, I assume that profits or losses 
in unregistered activities are distributed equally among all households, and tha t each 
productive factor is paid according to  its (aggregate) marginal productivity:
Kut =  V u t k u t  [hheUt +  (1 — At) huUt\ ■
vkut vhut
The CES production function may not be realistic, bu t little is known about the 
underground economy, and the CES functional form allows me more flexibility in the 
simulations.
The form of m om entary utility function and the assumptions on the production firms 
are the same as in the model of pages 59-64. Therefore, the first-order conditions of the 
firms’ optim ization problem, and the price of the contingent contract are the same as 
before. P roduction  firms are all registered.
Households are assum ed to  be initially identical, so kuu =  keu — ku and kUR = keR = 
kR. Households take the marginal productivities and as given. They choose the 
level of insurance so as to  solve the following problem:
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V  (kR , k u , x) =  max
= ^  ~ { (C 1 _ g 1 + + $ EV (kX  k'uVX )  |  +
+ a  { + a ^ ~  heR ; . f 7 ~ 1 + p E v  (k‘* ’ k ' V ’x ' ) } ■
subject to:
ce +  k'eR +  K u  — (1 +  r  — $ r ) &R +  ( 1 +  — $ u \  k u + U )  { h efi) +  - ^ - h e[j-\-TXiJ — { l  — A) q with p. A
cU +  ^ ufl +  ^ ut/ — (1 4- T — 5r)  kR+  ^1 +  — Sjj^ k i f - \ -~^-hui;-\-/Ki[+q\  with prob. (1 — A)
where x =  [kR, k u , A, zj is a vector of aggregate sta te  variables, and the <5’s are depreciation 
rates.
The first-order conditions with respect to the capital stocks next period and q are 
analogous to  the  ones found beforehand:
(c” ) " 9 =  0 E V \  (k'uR, k'uU% x ')  =  0 E V 2 (k'uR, k'uV, x ') (3.44)
( c ') " s =  0 EVt {K r X u X )  = PEV2 (k'eR, K u X )  , (3.45)
( c - y o  =  (c«) (3.46)
The last equation implies th a t ce =  cu = c in every period. By the envelope theorem:
V2 =  (C') = v2 (KRX cUX )  ,
y  (KrX ' uX )  = (<0 6 (1 + ’- ' - s R] = y  (k'eR, K u X )  ,
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where If =  (z'u)^ r] • The above two equations show th a t households in each pe­
riod equalise the expected returns from investing in both types of technology, the registered 
and the unregistered. Since r' is given for both employed and unemployed households,
t9y',and jj#- does not depend on the labour choices of the individual household, then it must 
be true th a t i u u  — i eU  , bu t this this implies th a t k'uU — k!eU . Therefore, k'uR  — k'e R . As a 
result, q will be chosen in the following way:
q =  w ( h ej i )  + — (h eU — h uu ) , 
v h u
therefore, the  expected am ount of resources available is the same for all households and it 
is equal to:
ct +  kR,t+1 +  &{/,£+1 — (1 +  rt ~  $r ) k m  +  ^1 +  ^  kut+
+ n t ( w  (heRt) +  +  (1 -  n t) ~ h^ut +  ^u t  ■
By analogy w ith  the  other models, we can now conclude th a t also in this model with 
an underground sector the  decentralised and the social planner solution are equivalent, 
provided we introduce lotteries and a market for contingent contracts, and provided we 
assume th a t ku  and hu  are paid their (aggregate) marginal productivity.
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Chapter 4
The R elative or Allocative Effects 
of Shocks in Open Economies
4.1 In tro d u ctio n
This chapter investigates how exogenous monetary, productivity and government expen­
diture shocks affect relative quantities and relative prices in an open economy. It does 
so by means of a two-country general equilibrium model, with monopolistic competition 
and sticky prices. Therefore, the model presented in this chapter is akin to the “new 
open economy macroeconomics” literature in itiated by Obstfeld and Rogoff’s (1995) Re- 
dux model, and recently surveyed by Lane (2001) and Sarno (2001). The relative effects 
under investigation are those between tradeable and nontradeable goods within the same 
country.
So far, the theoretical new open economy literature has not focused on the consequences 
of exogenous shocks for relative prices and quantities within one country. However, even 
if we restric t the  a tten tion  to  m onetary shocks only, there is some empirical evidence that 
clearly indicates th a t money has heterogeneous effects on the industries or sectors of the 
economy. For example, and w ithout any claim to provide an exhaustive list, the following 
papers look a t the  sectoral effects of either system atic m onetary policy or monetary policy 
shocks: B arth  and Ram ey (2001), Cimadomo (2003), Dedola and Lippi (2000), Ganley and 
Salmon (1997), Peersm an and Smets (2005), and Raddatz and Rigobon (2003). All these 
papers find th a t the responses to m onetary policy vary across sectors. But the empirical 
study th a t  is m ost closely related to this chapter is Llaudes (2003), who isolates the
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differential effects th a t m onetary policy and exchange ra te  fluctuations have on industry 
and the service sector of the economy1.
Some of these empirical papers on the industry or sectoral effects of monetary policy 
also look at f;he potential explanations. For example, Cimadomo finds a positive and strong 
correlation between the sensitivity to  systematic m onetary policy and the degree of price 
rigidity in a sector, while Dedola and Lippi find th a t the  responses to monetary policy 
shocks are related  to some industry characteristics such as output durability, financing 
requirem ents and borrowing capacity. None of this papers looks a t the degree of openness 
or tradability  a t the  sectoral level. Necessarily, applied research focuses on explanations 
tha t have already been pu t forward by theory. For example, a key assumption for money 
to have real effects is the  presence of nominal rigidities, so if they vary across sectors, 
then m onetary policy has heterogenous effects. On the other hand, Dedola and Lippi’s 
suggested explanation is founded on the theories th a t emphasize the importance of the 
cost-channel effect of m onetary policy and of financial frictions.
By investigating the  consequences of exogenous, and therefore also money, shocks 
for relative prices and quantities, this chapter suggests another possible explanation of 
the heterogeneous effects of m onetary policy shocks, namely the degree of- tradability 
a t the sectoral level. In fact, in new open economy models, m onetary shocks affect the 
relative price of tradeables over nontradeables, and the relative quantity of tradeables over 
nontradeables. Intuitively, this can happen both  because nominal exchange rate effects 
alter the  relative prices within the country, and because international wealth transfers 
induce the consumers to  reallocate their expenditures.
However, this chapter does not focus on m onetary shocks only, since other shocks 
also cause relative or allocative effects. The argum ent is th a t, w ith the introduction of 
nontradeable goods, new open economy models have become able to  generate predictions 
about the movement of relative prices and quantities, which can be compared with the 
actual data . Therefore, by looking at relative prices and output it is possible to better 
understand the models, or test them  along other dimensions. To increase understanding,
1 Llaudes finds that the response of manufacturing (tradeable) to a monetary policy shock is significantly 
different to the response of the service (nontradeable) sector. However, from the quantitative point of 
view his results cannot be directly compared to the ones presented in Section 4.5. In his paper, shocks 
are identified as innovations to domestic short-term interest rates, and shocks to the exchange rate are 
considered as different from money shocks (small open economy assumption). Moreover, the tradable 
sector is likely to contain nontradable components and vice-versa, and both sectors most likely use foreign 
nontradeables as production inputs.
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this chapter uses general functional forms where possible, and analyses how sensitive are 
the results to  the  choice of param eter values.
In contrast to  previous new open economy models with tradeables and nontradeables2, 
the model qf this chapter has the  following novel features. First, in order to analyse the 
impact of shocks on the sectoral allocation of employment, it is assumed th a t individuals 
cannot sim ultaneously work in both  sectors. However, they can adjust both hours of work 
and participation rates. Second, the model considers a full range of exogenous shocks: 
nominal (money), supply (productivity) and demand (government expenditure). Both 
productivity and government expenditure are sector-specific, bu t the effects of aggregate 
shocks of the same nature  can be analysed very easily. Third, in order to obtain a relative 
supply curve w ith an upward slope, this chapter explores the possibility tha t the marginal 
labour productiv ity  is decreasing.
The m ain results are as follows. Shocks have small effects on the relative price of 
domestic tradeables versus nontradeables, and on the ratios of domestic tradeable versus 
nontradeable ou tpu t and employment. These effects change in both sign and magnitude 
under alternative param etrizations. M onetary shocks may affect relative prices and rela­
tive output. Labour productivity  is crucial in understanding how tradeable-nontradeable 
prices and ou tpu t are affected by shocks.
The rest of the chapter is organised in the following way. Section 4.2 presents the 
model, and Section 4.3 describes the solution method. The calibration of the model is 
described in Section 4.4. Section 4.5 reports and explains the  findings. Finally, Section 
4.6 concludes w ith some additional remarks.
4.2 T h e  m o d el
The world economy consists of two countries of equal size, named Home and Foreign, 
th a t engage in the production and trade of differentiated goods for final consumption. 
Consumers purchase a variety of goods and for each differentiated good there exists a 
downward-sloping dem and curve. Goods can be tradeable or nontradeable. In the Home 
country, a continuum  of unit size of tradeables and a continuum of unit size of nontrade­
ables are produced, the  same is true for the Foreign country. Therefore, each country has 
two sectors, one for the production of tradeables and one for nontradeables.
2 The first new open economy model with tradeables and nontradeables is due to Hau (2000).
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The model possesses two standard  features of the new open-economy macroeconomics 
framework: nom inal rigidities and monopolistic competition. W hile the assumption of 
nominal rigidities is a t the root of the short run real effects of money, the assumption of 
monopolistic com petition simply introduces a wedge between prices and marginal costs. As 
we shall see, in the  short-run output is demand-determined, bu t prices do not adjust fully, 
so there is the  possibility th a t firms may prefer to  stop production because the marginal 
cost becomes higher than  the price. The assum ption of monopolistic competition allows 
us to neglect th is possibility, a t least for “sufficiently small” shocks3.
As in Hau (2000) and Obstfeld and Rogoff (2000), there is imperfect competition in 
both the goods and labour markets. Each individual is a monopolistic supplier of her 
own differentiated labour, and firms need a variety of labour inputs in production. The 
assum ption of monopolistic com petition in both  m arkets allows us to contemplate the 
contem poraneous introduction of two sorts of nominal rigidities, price and wage rigidities. 
This has been done, for example, by Chari, Kehoe and M acG rattan (2002); others like 
Corsetti and Pesenti (2001), Obstfeld and Rogoff (2000) and Hau (2000) introduce only 
wage rigidity. However, because the analysis of the interactions between price and wage 
rigidities goes beyond the purpose of the chapter, and in order not to complicate the model 
too much, the  model presented here has only price rigidity. This modelling strategy follows 
the Redux and it is probably still the most popular one in the new open economy literature.
A crucial assum ption in the model is th a t individuals cannot contemporaneously supply 
their labour to  the  production of both tradeable and nontradeable goods. Instead, they 
can work only in one sector a t a time. The standard  assum ption in new open economy 
models w ith tradeables and nontradeables is th a t the two sectors pay the same wage 
for the same labour type, and individuals can work contemporaneously in both sectors. 
This assum ption is made, for example, in Benigno and Thoenissen (2003), Cavelaars 
(2001), Hau (2000), Obstfeld and Rogoff (2000). In this way, the maximization problem 
is the same for all individuals, and there is no heterogeneity due to sectoral allocations 
and wage differentials. However, we shall see th a t this sort of heterogeneity is easy to 
work w ith, provided preferences are separable and there are complete domestic markets. 
Moreover, th is sort of heterogeneity has a potential advantage, because it allows the model 
to be extended to  include imperfections in the allocation of individuals across sectors, for
3 Obstfeld and Rogoff (1996) and Corsetti and Pesenti (2001) discuss this issue in detail.
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example due to  costly sectoral mobility or search frictions. These could be introduced in 
a rather straightforw ard manner. However, the model presented in this chapter does not 
introduce moving costs.
The mo^el also considers the possibility of decreasing marginal labour productivity. 
The standard  assum ption of the new open economy literature is constant marginal labour 
productivity and constant returns to scale, but in general, because of the assumption of 
imperfect com petition, it is possible to depart from this assumption. As compared to the 
case of constant m arginal labour productivity, decreasing marginal labour productivity 
has different implications for the relative supply curve (the relationship between the ratio 
of tradeable to  nontradeable output and the relative price of tradeables to nontradeables).
As in Chari, Kehoe and M cG rattan (2002), Home and Foreign money supplies are 
exogenous random  variables. The other sources of uncertainty in the economy are govern­
ment expenditure and productivity shocks. The model abstracts from long run growth, 
which implies th a t only tem porary shocks are considered.
Firm s and th e  labour m arket
Due to the assum ption of monopolistic competition and the restriction th a t individuals 
can only work in one sector, there is some tedious notation to  be introduced beforehand. 
The aim is nevertheless to  increase clarity.
In each country and in each sector a continuum of firms exist, each of them  producing 
a single differentiated product. T ha t is, in the Home country there is a continuum of unit 
size of firms in sector T H  and a continuum of unit size of firms in sector N.  The firms 
and the goods they produce are indexed by / t h  € [0,1] for the Home tradeable sector and 
fist G [0,1] for the Home nontradeable sector. In the Foreign country, they are indexed 
by f ^ F e  [0,1] and f l j  G [0,1]. Each country is populated by a continuum of unit size of 
individuals. Individuals in the Home country are indexed by i G [0,1], and individuals in 
the Foreign country are indexed by i* G [0,1]. All foreign variables, sets and indexes are 
indicated by stars.
Firm s need a variety of labour inputs in production, but each individual supplies labour 
to one sector only. Let us s ta rt with the Home country, and denote by IrH,t and I^ ,t the 
sets of individuals a t date t supplying, respectively, the tradeable and non tradeable goods 
sectors. T h a t is:
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IrH,t =  { i  € [0,1] : hTHft (i ) > 0} , 
lN,t =  {* £ [0 , 1] : hjyj  (i) >  0} .
Then, the restriction th a t individuals can only work in one sector is equivalent to 
the requirem ent IxH,t H Jjv,t =  0, but ( I t h j  G lN,t) C [0,1], since some individuals are 
not working. The individuals’ allocative choices will determine the “size” or probability 
measure of sectors T H  and N.  Let us call these measures m(lTH,t)  and m(lH,t):  and 
assume th a t the  production functions for each individual firm in sectors T H  and N  at 
date t  are respectively:
VTH,t ( I t h ) =  zTH,t ■ hrH,t  ( / r / / ) a , (4.1)
VN,t (/tv) =  z N,t ■ r,t (I n Y (4.2)
The variable Ht h  (I t h ) (^tv ( In ) )  is an aggregate of all labour inputs used by firm 
} t h  (/tv) in sector T H  (77), z t h  and zjq represent technology, and a  is a param eter which 
allows for decreasing m arginal labour productivity. The variables z t h  and -ztv affect labour 
productivity and the  logs follow exogenous stochastic processes.
The aggregators Ii t h  ( I t h ) and h n  (/tv) arise because of imperfect competition in 
the labour m arket. Labour inputs are imperfect substitu tes in production, with constant 
elasticity of substitu tion  rj-^ . Given the allocative choices of individuals, firms at date t 
combine individual labour inputs in the  following way:
hrH,t ( / t h ) m  (IrH,t)
hrH,t  ( l  I t h ) 7)1 di
’U- 1
hiv,t (/tv) = di
The corresponding wage indexes a t date t  for each sector are:








Wages for differentiated labour inputs are the same for firms within the same sector 
(that is, w t h  (h f m )  = w t h  (*))• Firms take the individuals’ allocative choice and supply 
of hours as given.
Cost m inim ization implies th a t the demands of firms f TH and f N for each differentiated 
labour input are:
h T H , t ( i , f T H ) =  ( m { l H t ) )  ( !9 ^ 7 )  W / r « )  i e I T H , (4.3)
hN,t (i, I n ) = h".‘ ( M  2 e • (4'4>
There are parallel production functions, labour input aggregators and labour demands 
for Foreign-produced tradeables and for Foreign nontradeables, with the same elasticity 
of substitu tion  r)1 and param eter a.
Individual p references and budget constraints
There is no possibility of m igration across countries, bu t individuals can move costlessly 
from one sector to  the other within each country. Individuals derive utility from con­
sumption, real money balances, government expenditure and leisure. Utility is separable. 
Real money balances are included in the utility function because of the liquidity services 
tha t they provide. Individuals can smooth their consumption by holding three assets: 
a domestic state-contingent bond, an international non-state-contingent real bond, and 
money, b u t they do not invest in physical capital.
The assum ption of no investment in physical capital is very common in new open 
economy models4, therefore it is also made here. The inclusion of capital may or may 
not alter the transm ission of shocks in these models, at least along some dimensions. For 
example, Chari, Kehoe and M cG rattan  (2002) found th a t almost all of the movements in 
output come from variations in labour, with little or no impact from physical investment. 
More generally, models w ithout capital are unsuitable for analyzing the impact of money
'See, for exam ple, Obstfeld and Rogoff (1995).
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shocks on investm ent fluctuations a t business cycle frequencies, and for answering certain 
types of policy questions.
This section s ta rts  w ith a description of the preferences, then moves to  the individual 
budget constraints, and finally concludes with the first-order conditions from the individual 
maximization problem.
Preferences
As shown in Section 4.2, individual labour supplies have distinctive characteristics 
and are only imperfect substitu tes in production. This allows each individual to act as a 
monopolistic supplier of her own labour effort, taking into account the labour demands 
from firms in her m axim ization problem.
Each individual is endowed with one unit of time, a fraction of which can be supplied 
as labour either to  the tradeable goods sector or to  the nontradeable goods sector. More­
over, as in Burnside, Eichenbaum  and Rebelo (1993), any individual who works incurs a 
fixed participation cost, m easured in units of foregone leisure. The standard assumption 
in new open economy models with tradeables and nontradeables is th a t individuals can 
work contem poraneously in bo th  sectors. In this model labour mobility is restricted, be­
cause labour services cannot be contemporaneously supplied to both  the tradeable and 
nontradeable goods sector. The advantage of having this restriction is th a t the model can 
be nested in a broad class of models with imperfections in the allocation of individuals 
across sectors, w ith causes ranging from costly sectoral mobility to search frictions. This 
is not possible in the  models where individuals can work contemporaneously in both sec­
tors5. However, since sectors do not need to  pay the same wage, this restriction introduces 
heterogeneity in the  model.
Nonetheless, th is type of heterogeneity can be easily dealt with by applying Roger- 
son’s (1988) result for sectoral economies. It basically states that, under the assumptions 
of separable u tility  function and complete domestic m arkets6, if individuals can choose 
the probabilities of working in sectors, then the decentralized equilibrium reproduces the
5 Like, for exam ple, Benigno and Thoenissen (2003), Cavelaars (2001), Hau (2000), Obstfeld and Rogoff 
(2000). These m odels assume that sectors pay the same wage. Wage differentials may arise, for example, 
because of costly sectoral m obility or search frictions, or because the disutility of working in the two sectors 
is different.
GRogerson (1988) does not explicitly introduce complete markets but this assumption is implicit in his 
analysis. In fact, he introduces lotteries to convexify the individual’s consumption sets, and he assumes 
that some market arrangements allow the individuals to perfectly share income risks. It is immediate to 
interpret these arrangements as trade in state-contingent claims.
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socially optim al allocation. As a result, if these assum ptions hold, it is not necessary 
to keep track of the  heterogeneity among individuals while solving for this decentralized 
equilibrium. This happens because optimal allocations for initially identical individuals 
imply th a t ,the m arginal u tility  of consumption is equal for all individuals; since utility 
is separable this implies th a t consumption levels m ust be equal for all individuals. Of 
course, in this decentralized equilibrium the wage th a t the individual receives depends on 
the sector she ends up in, b u t the assumption of complete m arkets is sufficient to ensure 
tha t individuals are all ex-ante identical in each period.
Following Rogerson, the probabilities of working in each sector are added to the indi­




“ (C( (*)) + £ ( MpP ) + F  (GrH.t , Gjv,() + nTH,t (*) v ( T  -  tp -  Ivth.i (*))
+ n N,t ( i ) v ( T  — xp — h N>t (z)) +  (1 -  nTH,t ( 0  -  n Nit (*)) v  (r )
(4.5)
where C  is an aggregate consumption index, Jp- are real money balances, G t h  and Gjv 
are Home government aggregate spending in tradeables and nontradeables, xith in N are 
the probabilities of working in the tradeable and nontradeable sectors, T is the total time 
available, xp is a fixed cost of participation, the same for all individuals, and h t h  and h/v 
are the to ta l hours supplied to  sectors T H  and N , th a t is:
(0 = / 1 Joh r H  (i)  / hxH (i, Jt h ) d frH , (4.6)
h N  (0 =  f
Jo
hN {i, I n ) dfiv ■ (4.7)
The functions u, L, F  and v are assumed to  be three times continuously differentiable, 
concave and strictly  increasing. Individuals take government expenditures as given7.
Separable preferences of this form have been used, among others, by Corsetti and 
Pesenti (2001) and Obstfeld and Rogoff (1995, 2000). If it is coupled with the assump­
tion of Cobb-Douglas preferences over tradeable goods, this form of momentary utility
7 Government expenditures are included in the utility function to allow a direct effect on individual 
welfare. The case of w asteful government expenditure is a special case, where F  (•) =  0.
100
function has the  advantage of removing perm anent wealth effects after a shock, because 
international borrowing and lending does not affect equilibrium allocations8.
Foreign preferences are similarly written:
n (C;  (i*)) +  L  ( ^ P )  +  F  G'ut)
~^~n TF,t (* ) v  f  ^  — Tp — Ylj-p , ( i ' ) j
( O  v — tb — h ^ ( (i ))  +  ( l  — (**) — ( (**) j  v fr)
(4.8)
thus assuming th a t  bo th  countries have the same functional forms it, L, F, v and para­
meters r ,  ip.
At this point, there is one more aspect of this setup th a t is worth highlighting. Roger-
complete dom estic m arkets produce the convenient result th a t it is not necessary to keep 
track of the heterogeneity among individuals. However, it is crucial to have individuals 
tha t are always identical ex-ante, before they are allocated to sectors. If individuals are 
always identical ex-ante, they always make the same choices. Specifically, they all choose
To understand this point, consider a model with Calvo-style wage rigidity and different 
wages in sectors. In this model individuals are different ex-ante because they cannot 
change their wage a t the same time; in fact, there would be a distribution of wages in 
the two sectors. In this case, it is not clear whether individuals will all choose the same 
probabilities of working in sectors. These considerations lead to the conclusion that the 
addition of wage stickiness is problem atic in this setup10.
8 However, a drawback of this setup with perfect insurance of income risk is that the unemployed enjoy 
greater utility ex-post than the employed, because consumption levels are the same but the unemployed 
have more tim e for leisure. It is possible to avoid this awkward implication by the adoption of a different 
specification of preferences, but this would entail a departure from the functional forms most commonly 
adopted in the literature. One of the aims of the paper is to try to make assumptions on functional forms 
that are quite general and already adopted in the literature. In this way it is hoped that the transmission 
of shocks will be more transparent, at least for those readers who are familiar with new open economy 
models.
9 N otw ithstanding the assum ption of monopolistic com petition, in reality this setup is close to a repre­
sentative agent model. This is because in the end we concentrate on equilibria where individuals make the 
same choices.
10The interaction of wage stickiness with price stickiness may generate some interesting dynamics that 
is not just the “sum ” of the two, but the advantage of focusing on only one type of nominal rigidity is that 
the transm ission mechanism is certainly more transparent.
son’s device (i.e. the  addition of lotteries to the consumption set) and the assumption of
the same probabilities9. Equality ex-ante is achieved here also because wages are flexible.
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Individual budget constraints
At the in ternational level, m arkets are incomplete: individuals trade in a real one-
period non-contingent bond B,  denominated in units of the Home tradeable goods con­
sumption index. In terest is decided at the beginning of the period and paid at the end.
The budget constraint of a Home individual of type i in period t is written as follows:
B t (i) Pr,t  +  M t (i) < (l  + r t- 1) B t- 1 ( i )Pr, t + M t - i { i )  + T R t ( i ) - P tCt (i) +
+nTH,t («) WTH,t (i) h TH,t {}) +  njv,t (i) w^, t (i) h N,t (i) +
n Jt h ) d frH +  f  HN,t (i, I n )  d fx  , (4.9)
Jo
where B  is the internationally  traded bond, M  are nominal money balances, r is the real 
interest rate , T R  are government transfers, w t h  and w n  are wages paid in the tradeable 
and nontradeable sectors, IIt h  (i, I t h ) and H y (i, /tv) are the profits th a t the individual 
i receives from firms / t h  in the tradeable sector and /tv in the nontradeable sector. 
Everyone owns an equal share of all domestic firms, therefore everyone receives the same 
share of profits, which arise because of the imperfect com petition assumption.'
Note th a t, following Rogerson, the probabilities of working in each sector are incorpo­
rated  in the budget constraint of the Home individual i. This is another way of showing 
th a t there are complete domestic markets, and as a result perfect insurance against indi­
vidual income uncertainty. Because individuals are choosing the probabilities of working 
in sectors w ith different wages, their labour income will be a random  variable. However, 
the individual income uncertainty can be eliminated by pooling it among all individuals. 
Because of the  concavity of the  utility function, this arrangem ent is optimal and is achieved 
through com plete dom estic m arkets. This is shown in the budget constraint, which states 
th a t the individual receives the expected income, given her choice of probabilities11.
A Foreign individual of type i in period t faces the following budget constraint:
11 As it w ill be explained later, in the end we concentrate on symmetric equilibria where individuals make 
the same choices. T hen, because of the law of large numbers, the probability chosen at the individual level 
and the fraction of individuals at the aggregate level that work in a given sector coincide. This individual 
budget constraint is justified both by the assumption of complete domestic markets and by the fact that 
the individual takes into account the impact on her expected income when choosing the probabilities.
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et
+ n TF,t (n w i n  (o *TF,t (o+n*Ntt (f) w*Ntt (t*) h^ it (z*) +
+  /  n mT F , t ( i * J T F ) d f T F +  f  n *N,t ( i r j ^ ) d r N , (4.io)
Jo Jo
whose explanation is similar to the  one given for the Home country. Naturally, an equi­
librium condition in the  bonds market a t each date t is added to the model:
and two Fisher parity  conditions define the Home and Foreign nominal interest rates:
First-order conditions
Individuals in the Home country maximize (4.5) subject to (4.9), (4.3) and (4.4) and 
the no Ponzi games condition. They aggregate hours as in (4.6) and (4.7). The first-order 
conditions th a t describe the optim al allocations are as follows:
Euler equation for consumption:




v! (C t ( t ) )  ^  =  0 E t \ ( 1 +  r, )  u' (Ct+i  ( i ) )
Ft .  Ft+ i
(4.13)
First-order condition with respect to money holdings:
(4.14)
First-order conditions w ith respect to  hours:
v>TH,t (i) (4.15)
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t/ (r -  <* -  hjv,t(i)) =  WNt(i )  5i_J.. (4.16)
Pi
First-order conditions with respect to the probabilities of working in sectors:
v  (T — ip — h.TH,t (i)) — v ( r )  = ------  ^ p   ^ ^  yJTH,t (0  h.TH,t (i) , (4-17)
Pt
v ( T - 1 > -  h Ntt (0 ) -  n (r) = (i) h (i) _ (4.18)
W hen maximizing w ith respect to  probabilities, individuals do not take into account 
the im pact th a t their allocative choices have on the labour demands from firms, or in other 
words, they are “sm all” with respect to  the market.
Analogous first-order conditions hold for the Foreign country.
G overnm ent b u d get constraint and m oney supp ly
The Home and Foreign governments purchase only tradeable and nontradeable goods 
produced in their own country. Public expenditures are financed by seigniorage revenues, 
and what is left is redistributed to individuals in the form of net transfers. The budget 
constraint of the  Home government a t date t is given by:
Gt h  and G n  are composite measures th a t aggregate the expenditures on each indi­
vidual good, in the  same m anner as private consumption:
The variables G t h  and Gyv can also be interpreted as public expenditure production 
functions. The Foreign government budget constraint and public expenditure aggregators 
are entirely analogous.
The two countries equate their own money supply to their own money demand, for
(4.19)
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example in the Home country at each date t the following equality holds:
[  M t (i ) di , 
Jo
and an analogous equality holds in the Foreign country. The money growth rate is defined 
as:
M t -  M t -1
As in Chari, Kehoe and M cG rattan  (2002), money growth rates and public expendi­
tures in both  countries are exogenous stochastic processes.
C on sum p tion  and  price indexes
Individuals consume a positive amount of the nontradeable goods produced in their own 
country, and a positive am ount of all the tradeable goods produced in both countries. 
Goods are im perfect substitu tes in consumption, and goods are aggregated in each country 
into three distinct bundles, which combine the types of goods th a t consumers regard as 
“im m ediate a lternatives” . T h a t is, consumers first allocate their expenditure between 
tradeables and nontradeables, then  they allocate their expenditure on tradeables between 
Home and Foreign goods, and then they allocate their expenditures on tradeables and 
nontradeables among all the individual goods.
To be specific, a t da te  t any individual i in the Home country has preferences over 
tradeable and nontradeable goods, described by the following CES aggregator:
Ct ( i ) =  (1 -  7 ) 0 (CT,t (*))**” +  7* (CW,t (*)) *
4>-l
where (1 — 7 ) and 7 are weights, and 4> is the substitution elasticity. In the Foreign 
country, the  preferences of the individual i* are described by an equivalent aggregator, 
with the same param eters 7  and <f>. Note th a t Cobb-Douglas preferences can be obtained 
as a special case by setting  </> equal to 1.
Consum ers regard ty p e -T H  goods (tradeable goods produced in the Home country) as 
forming a separate  bundle from type-T F  goods (tradeable goods produced in the Foreign 
country), bu t it is assum ed th a t type-T H  and type-T F  goods are “immediate alternatives” 
in consum ption. T h a t is, the aggregators for tradeable goods consumption in the Home
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and Foreign countries at date t are, respectively:
=1 ,1
Cr,t (i) — (1 — S)d (CrH,t (*)) 6 + 8<> (C t f j  (i)) 0
C*T,t ( O  = (1 5*)6 {C^H t (i*)) 0 + (8*)6 (CxF,t (**))
The elasticity of substitu tion  9 between type-71#  and t ype -TF  goods is the same in 
both countries. The weights of Foreign-produced tradeables, 8 and <5*, can differ, implying 
tha t there can be home bias in the model. Cobb-Douglas preferences can be obtained as 
a special case by setting  9 equal to 1.
The three consum ption subindexes for the Home individual i a t date t are:
Cth,i (i) =
/ ‘ I  V l ~  1
/ CTH,t(i, It h ) 172 dfTH 
JO
vi — i
CrF,t (0  =
Hz:




/ C7v,t(i,/iv) V2 dfN
Jo
2^ 
V I -  1
Foreign preferences are identical and have the same elasticity of substitution r}2. Hence, 
the degree of m arket power in the goods m arket can be different from the degree of market 
power in the labour m arket: r/2 can be different from r]1, bu t these two param eters are the 
same in bo th  countries.
The Home price indexes for the  three consumption baskets at date t are:





1 \  1 — VI* Af*PrF,t — ( I PTF,t (/ t f ) 712 dfrF (4.21)
Pn,i =  ( j (  PN,t (/A/)1"”2 dfN 





p *r TH,t PTH,t ( I t h ) 1 772 dfT H j^ , (4.23)
Pt f j  — Vt f ^ U t f )1 7)2 dfpp^j , (4.24)
p*
T/V.t
Prices are indicated by stars when they are in Foreign currency, unstarred prices are 
in Home currency. The model assumes th a t the law of one price holds, th a t is, there is 
no in ternational price discrim ination12. Denoting by et the exchange rate (price of Home 
country currency in term s of the Foreign country currency) a t date t, we can write:
PTH,t ( I t h ) =  e* • VrH.t U t h ) > (4-26)
PTF,t (f r F ) — et • Pt f j  (I t f ) • (4.27)
As a result:
PrH,t = ■ PrH,t > (4.28)
PrF,t =  et ■ PrF,t ■ (4.29)
A Home individual i allocates optim ally her expenditure within each category of goods 
by solving an expenditure m inimization problem. Her dem and functions at date t for the 
individual goods are:
CTH,t (h I t h ) =  (j THp ^ Tt ~^)  CTH,t(i) , (4.30)
12The first paper in the new open economy literature with traded and nontraded sectors, Hau (2000), 
assumed instead th at traded goods firms charge different prices in the Home and Foreign markets. However, 
in his m odel the law of one price is recovered, even though firms segment markets, since product prices 
are given by a mark-up over a fixed nominal wage.
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0 r F A i , f } F) = ( E ^ x r ^ CTFA i )  , (4.31)
cN,t (b I n ) = (4.32)
with parallel dem ands from a Foreign individual i*. Individual i ’s demand functions for 
the aggregate consum ption bundles are:
Pp,t is the  Home tradeables price index, Pt is the Home consumer price index. They 
are given by:
In the Foreign country, the demands CF H t (i*), CF F t (i*), C*N t (i*), CF t (i*), and 
the price indexes PF t , P * , have the same functional forms, bu t with the parameter (5* 
in place of 5. Since Home and Foreign consumers have different tastes for domestically 
versus foreign-produced traded  goods, this implies, unless preferences are identical (unless 
S = S*), th a t  Pr,t 7^  et ■ P ^ t ■ Therefore, deviations from purchasing power parity arise 
both  from differences in tastes ( 5 ^ 5 * )  and from the presence of nontradeable goods in 
the consum ption index.
To conclude, the  Home term s of trade is defined as the ratio of the price of imports 





P r , t =  (1 - S ) P l t t  + s p T~F°t
,1 - 9  i - o (4.37)
Pt = ( 1 - 7 ) P t f  + y P k ? (4.38)
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Using th is definition, a fall is an “improvement” of the term s of trade, since imports 
become cheaper. The Foreign term s of trade is simply T* =  (T*)-1 . Therefore, it is 
sufficient to  consider only one term s of trade as the other can be immediately calculated. 
To ease the exposition, from now on “term s of trade” will simply refer to the Home terms 
of trade, i.e. the ra tio  et^ FFA
* T H , t
Product price determ ination
The model introduces nom inal rigidities by assuming th a t firms have a less than one 
probability of changing their prices, th a t is, in each period a Home firm can change its 
price w ith a fixed probability 1 — <£>, and a Foreign firm can change its price with a fixed 
probability 1 — ip*. As a result, the average duration of prices is fixed, and it is equal to 
in the Home country and * in the Foreign country. This price-setting behaviour 
was introduced by Calvo (1983), and has the advantage of allowing the model-builder to 
increase or decrease the degree of nominal rigidity by simply decreasing or increasing the 
param eters <p and <p*, bu t on the other hand, there is no theoretical justification for this 
behaviour, nor it is modelled endogenously13.
Consider, for example, firm / t h  in the Home tradeable goods sector. Let Pt h j  ( /t h ) 
denote the  individual good price decided at date t (which may or may not apply at date 
t +  j ) ,  let yTH,t+j\t U t h ) denote the to ta l dem and14 for good f TH , and let hTH,t+j\t U t h ) 
denote the dem and from firm Jt h  for the aggregate labour input a t date t +  j  if the price 
PTH,t (I t h ) decided a t t still applies. At each date t, only a fraction 1 — p  of firms is 
allowed to  change its price. If the draw is “favourable” a t date t and therefore firm f th  
is allowed to  change its price, prH,t (I t h ) is chosen so as to maximize expected future 
discounted profits, taking into account th a t the probability th a t PTH,t U t h ) still applies 
at the fu ture da te  t +  j  is <U ■ Therefore, firm fTH solves the following problem:
13 Alternatively, nom inal rigidities can be introduced in the model by assuming convex price adjustment 
costs, as in R otem berg (1982), or by assuming convex costs of adjusting both prices and output, as in the 
“P-bar m odel” of M cCallum and Nelson (1999). Inasmuch as the adjustment costs do not arise endoge­
nously but are exogenous features, these approaches are similar in spirit to the Calvo setup. However, the 
dynamics may be different.
14This is found by integrating and summing the demand functions of the individuals and the government.
m ax E t ES=o U P ) j Qt,t+j
p t h A / t h )
t + j VTH,t+j\t U t h )  +
_ Wpf+]+3 ' hTH,t+j\t U t h )
s-fi VTH,t+j\t U t h ) — (CTH,t+j +  CrH,t+j +  G th ,t+ j)  (4-40)
where Qtit+j =  , CTH,t+j = Jq CTH,t+j (i) di and C ^ H t+j =  [* C ^H t+j {?) di*.
Firms are owned by individuals. P^Qtft+j  is the  relevant discount factor between t and 
t +  j ,  and it is the same for all individuals in the Home country because of the assumption 
of complete dom estic m arkets. hj<H,t+j\t U t h )  and UTH,t+j\t U t h )  are linked by equation 
(4.1), and the  constrain t can be used to substitu te yrH,t+j\t U t h )  out of the objective 
function. The first-order condition is as follows:
f f c ; - V T H , t + j \ t ( . f T H ) ( l - V 2 ) +  =Q
W r H , t + i  _ ^ T H , t + j \ t ( f T H )  V T H , t + j \ t { f T H )  ’ \  ' J
P t + j  $ V T H , t + j \ t ( f T H ) P T  H, t  { / t h )
where h r H , t + j \ t  U t h ) denotes firm / t h  s  dem and for the aggregate labour input at date 
t +  j  if PTH,t U t h ) still applies. Moreover, because of the assum ptions on the functional 
forms and the  requirem ent a  < 1, profits are a concave function, therefore the first-order 
condition is bo th  necessary and sufficient for an interior maximum.
The individual good dem and function VTH,t+j\t U t h )  shows the absence of market 
segm entation from the model: firm fxH  sets the same price for the Home and Foreign 
markets. Moreover, prices are sticky in producer country currency, th a t is, the model 
assumes producer currency pricing instead of local currency pricing10. The absence of 
m arket segm entation (for tradeable goods) is an im portant assumption since the model 
allows for decreasing m arginal labour productivity. If firm / t h  set two different prices, 
one for the Home and one for the Foreign market, the presence of decreasing marginal 
labour productiv ity  would complicate the analysis because the two pricing decisions would
15 M odels th at assum e local currency pricing, or sticky prices in the buyer’s currency, are, among many, 
B etts and Devereux (1996, 1998) and Chari, Kehoe and McGrattan (2003). The implications of this 
assumption are very serious: with full local currency pricing the degree of exchange-rate pass-through to 
import prices is 0, and countries are insulated from foreign monetary shocks. However, the attractiveness 
of this approach is that it makes possible to  replicate some stylized facts about business cycle fluctuations, 
for exam ple, the high variability of real and nominal exchange rates and the comovements in international 





The m axim ization problems of Home firms and Foreign firms f FF and are 
entirely analogous, the  m ain difference is th a t for firms producing nontradeable goods 
there is n o d em an d  coming from abroad. For example, the maximization problem of firm 
/jv in t'he Foreign nontradeable goods sector is as follows:
t,t+j
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( C N,t+j +  G N,t+j (4.42)
and the first-order condition is:
^ N,t+j\t (In ) V*N,t+j\t ( fh)
Pt+j '®y*N,t+j\t (fiv) P*N,t (/iv)
(4.43)
Each Home and Foreign firm is the only supplier of its own differentiated product. The 
resulting m arket power enables the firm to earn positive profits. Indeed, in the steady state 
of the economy prices are a m arkup over the nominal marginal cost of production17 16. 
However, after a shock occurs, there are a fraction of firms <p in the Home tradeable goods 
sector, and a fraction ip in the  Home nontradeable goods sector, th a t cannot adjust their 
prices (<p* in the Foreign country). These firms m ust find optim al to supply all the output 
th a t is dem anded a t the price last set, th a t is, they m ust not incur losses. It has now
16This problem, and Obstfeld and R ogoff’s remarks, motivate the decision to consider only producer cur­
rency pricing. Some authors take an “intermediate stance”, and adopt a pass-through function, proposed 
by Corsetti and Pesenti (2001), which allows the impact of nominal exchange rates changes on consumers 
prices to vary.
17In this m odel firms take into account the demand for their product when maximizing profits, but they 
take the individuals’ allocative choice and supply of hours as given.
18For exam ple, if we denote by m c ( /r / / )  the nominal marginal cost of production of firm / t h , in the 
steady state the following is true:
P t h  ( f t h ) =  ’ m c ( / r / / )
t)2 is greater than 1 by assum ption. The lower is rj2, the higher are the degree of market power and the 
markup.
We can think of the steady state as the deterministic stationary equilibrium that is approached in 
the lim it, as t —> oo, when there is no money growth (and therefore no inflation) and all the exogenous 
processes are constant and equal to their expected level. The steady state coincides with the flexible price 
equilibrium. In fact, as f -> oo, everybody has been given the chance to adjust the price. If there is no 
uncertainty, then at each date all firms that adjust the price set the same price.
E ‘ £1 t+ j ■ VN,t+j\t (/iv) (1 — V2 ) +  V2
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become standard  to  say th a t  this condition will always be satisfied if shocks are sufficiently 
“small” or the  m arkup is sufficiently high.
Gall and G ertler (1999) have introduced an empirically-motivated alteration of the 
original Calvo pricing mechanism. Their assum ption is th a t at each point in time two 
types of firm coexist: one type th a t sets prices in a forward looking, Calvo-style, manner, 
and the other type th a t sets prices in a backward looking manner. By doing so, they are 
able to  increase the persistence of inflation. It may be interesting to ascertain whether the 
introduction of an additional type of nominal rigidity of this kind fundamentally alters 
the transm ission of shocks along other dimensions, bu t this issue goes beyond the purpose 
of this chapter. The analysis is therefore focused on the original Calvo setup.
The model assumes imperfect com petition with flexible wages in the labour market. 
However, as shown by Chari, Kehoe and M cG rattan  (2002), it is possible to increase the 
persistence (m oderately) by adding sticky wages to  the m odel19. Moreover, Christiano, 
Eichenbaum and Evans (1997) have found th a t firm profits seem to decrease after a mon­
etary contraction, and they have pointed out th a t a model with sticky wages correctly 
predicts procyclical firm profits, while a model with sticky prices does not. On the other 
hand, the  litera tu re  to  date  suggests th a t one or the other form of nominal rigidity does 
not alter the  basic transm ission of shocks to  key macroeconomic variables: the impact on 
output and inflation, for example, is almost the same in a model with sticky prices as in 
a model w ith sticky wages20. Of course, it might be interesting to analyze the interaction 
between sticky prices and sticky wages in the transmission mechanism, but this goes be­
yond the purpose of the  chapter. In conclusion, this chapter shares the view of Obstfeld 
and Rogoff (2000) th a t neither extreme set of assum ptions is right, and tha t it is probably 
more “realistic” to  adopt a combination of sticky product prices and sticky wages, but, for 
the purpose of the  analysis of the  transmission mechanism, it is better to avoid too much 
complexity and thus choose one assum ption over the other. For the theoretical reasons 
explained in Section 4.2, and because price stickiness is widely adopted in the literature, 
this chapter introduces sticky prices as the only source of nominal rigidity, but warns the 
reader of their unpleasant consequences for the firms profits21.
19This approach has been followed, for example, by Benigno and Thoenissen (2003).
20For exam ple, th is was im plicit in the analysis of Corsetti and Pesenti (2001).
21 Lane (2001) claim s that the new open economy literature seems to largely emphasize price stickiness 
over wage stickiness, for the reasons discussed by Kimball (1995).
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4.3  T h e so lu tio n  o f  th e  m od el
The rest of the  chapter focuses on an equilibrium where all individuals are symmetric and 
make the same choices, and all firms th a t can modify their price at date t set the same price. 
After having aggregated the equations describing the economy, the indexes i, i*, f r H ,  / t v , 
/ t F ’ /tv can b e dropped, and variables can be reinterpreted in per-capita terms. The 
aggregation a t the  individual level is straightforw ard because individuals supply the same 
hours to  the sectors, and therefore wages are the same for everyone22. Moreover, because 
of the law of large num bers, there is a correspondence between probabilities chosen at the 
individual level and the fraction of individuals a t the aggregate level. On the other hand, 
firms are not all sym m etric, because they set prices a t different dates, and as a consequence 
labour dem and differs from firm to firm. For those firms th a t cannot adjust their price 
at date t dem and determ ines both  output and the required labour input. However, with 
the Calvo pricing mechanism it is not necessary to keep track of the distribution of firms, 
since the aggregate equations th a t describe the firms pricing behaviour can be written in 
term s of inflation rates instead of price levels. This will be apparent in Appendix 4.A, 
which explicitly shows the derivation of the log-linearised equations for inflation.
In particu lar, an equilibrium  for this economy is a collection of allocations for Home and 
Foreign individuals, allocations and prices for Home and Foreign firms, aggregate prices, 
wages, a nom inal exchange ra te  and real and nominal interest rates th a t satisfy the follow­
ing conditions, given the exogenous processes, initial allocations and initial prices: (i ) the 
individual allocations solve the maximization problems of Home and Foreign individuals; 
(ii) Home and Foreign firms th a t are free to adjust prices maximize their profits; (Hi) 
the Home and Foreign government budget constraints are satisfied; ( iv ) demand equals 
supply in all m arkets. A t each date £, the equilibrium satisfies equations (4.1), (4.2), (4.3), 
(4.4) and their Foreign counterparts, equations (4.9), (4.10), (4.11) and (4.12), equations 
(4.13), (4.14), (4.15), (4.16), (4.17), (4.18), (4.19) and their Foreign counterparts, equa­
tions (4.20) to  (4.29), equations (4.30) to (4.38) and their Foreign counterparts, equations 
(4.40), (4-41), (4.42), (4.43) and their counterparts, plus a no Ponzi games condition aimed 
at preventing unlim ited borrowing.
The model cannot be solved in closed form, and a numerical approximated solution
22 More precisely, and taking sector TH  as an example, a symmetric equilibrium implies hTH,t (i, f t h ) =  
h,TH,t O', / t h )  at any date t. Equation (4.3) then implies w Th  (0  =  w t h  ( i f ). However, hTH,t (i, / t h )  ^  
hrH,t  (b / t h )  because firms are not symmetric.
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must be found instead. This is obtained by aggregating and log-linearising the above- 
m entioned equations around a determ inistic equilibrium or steady state in which all the 
exogenous stochastic processes are set equal to  their unconditional means, their variances 
are set to  zero, the  individuals hold no internationally traded bond, and all government 
expenditures are equal to  zero. Moreover, it is assumed th a t all firms within a sector have 
the same price23, therefore this determ inistic equilibrium coincides with a flexible price 
equilibrium. Moreover, in the determ inistic equilibrium there is no growth in the money 
stock, therefore inflation is equal to  zero.
As in Obstfeld and Rogoff’s Redux, the equilibrium dynamics implied by the model 
is not stationary: s ta rting  from a determ inistic equilibrium in which international bond 
holdings are equal to  zero, a wide range of transitory  shocks causes individuals to borrow 
or lend as they try  to  sm ooth their consumption over time. The wealth allocation between 
the two countries changes, and as a result shocks have perm anent effects on the endogenous 
variables, which depend on this wealth allocation. This behaviour reveals itself with the 
presence of unit roots in the  system of difference equations implied by the log-linearised 
model, which is not returning to  the initial steady sta te  after a shock. Therefore, the 
main shortcom ing of nonstationarity  is th a t it impairs the accuracy of the numerical 
approxim ated solution. In the very short run, however, this approximation certainly 
cannot be much worse th an  in an equivalent stationary model, since wealth transfers take 
some tim e to  build up24. However, if the following three conditions are all satisfied: (i) 
the elasticity of substitu tion  between tradeable and nontradeable goods is equal to the 
intertem poral substitu tion  elasticity; (ii) the elasticity of substitution between Home and 
Foreign tradeables is equal to one; (in)  the weights of Home and Foreign goods in the 
tradeables consum ption indexes are equal; then there are no perm anent wealth effects after 
a shock, and the  model becomes stationary. Therefore, stationarity  can be embedded as
23W ith the Calvo pricing mechanism, this situation would arise at infinity because as t —> oo every 
firm is given th e chance to  adjust the price. If there is no inflation, and technology shocks are always 
equal to their unconditional expectation, then each period all firms that adjust the price set the same 
price. Therefore, if there is no uncertainty, as t —► oo the Calvo equilibrium approaches the flexible price 
equilibrium.
2 4  N onstationarity could be elim inated by introducing complete markets in the model, or by resorting 
to some other ad-hoc stationarity-inducing features, which, however, may or may not be theoretically- 
m otivated as accurate descriptions of the economy. In the context of a small open economy, Schmitt-Grohe 
and Uribe (2003) show that m odels w ith or without permanent wealth effects deliver identical dynamics 
at business-cycle frequencies. In a two country setup, Chari, Kehoe and MacGrattan (2003) show that 
having com plete or incom plete markets does not matter quantitatively for the volatility and persistence of 
real exchange rates.
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a special case. The possibility of eliminating perm anent wealth effects by assuming a 
unitary elasticity was discovered by Corsetti and Pesenti (2001).
There are ten  exogenous stochastic processes in the model: two describe the behaviour 
of the Home and Foreign nominal money growth rates, four describe the behaviour of 
productivity in the Home and Foreign productions of tradeables and nontradeables, and 
four describe the behaviour of the  Home and Foreign government expenditures in trade­
ables and nontradeables. All shocks to these exogenous processes are temporary. The 
unconditional m ean of the  money and government expenditure processes is zero.
Because the  model has nominal money growth and inflation, nominal variables in the 
dynamic system  of equations (the approxim ated solution) are divided by the appropriate 
price levels in order to  use Uhlig’s “Toolkit” algorithm  (1999). The approximated solution 
m ethod clearly relies on the knowledge of the steady sta te  of the model. A close inspection 
of the steady s ta te  equations reveals th a t steady sta te  prices can be pinned down only if 
the stocks of Home and Foreign money are known, and th a t money stocks do not affect 
real variables. As a result, steady sta te  prices can be normalised at any level without 
affecting real variables. However, the steady sta te  term s of trade (the price of imports 
over the  price of exports in the  same currency) and all the relative prices are not nominally 
indeterm inate, since they depend not only on the preference param eters but also on real 
factors, such as the  unconditional means of the productivity processes.
The determ ination  of the steady sta te  term s of trade follows Obstfeld and Rogoff 
(1995). After substitu ting  out the variables, the optim al allocation of effort between sectors 
in the Home country becomes a function of Home tradeable output and the terms of trade. 
Analogously, the  optim al allocation of effort in the Foreign country can be written as a 
function of Foreign tradeable output and the term s of trade. After some manipulation 
of the o u tpu t dem and equations, it is possible to find the demand for Home tradeable 
output relative to  Foreign tradeable output (in this steady sta te  with no international 
bond holdings and government expenditures) as a function of the terms of trade only. 
Therefore, finding the steady sta te  term s of trade boils down to solving a system of three 
equations in three unknowns, given all the param eters of the model and the unconditional 
means of the  exogenous processes. Then it is possible to compute all the coefficients of 
the log-linearised model, which is shown in Appendix 4.B.
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4 .4  C alib ration
In order to make the im plications of the model as transparent as possible, and closely 
connected to  m ost of the  new open economy literature, the functional forms adopted for 
preferences are quite standard . In particular, u and L are standard  CRRA functions, with 
risk aversion param eters o  and e respectively. U tility from leisure is given by v (x ) =  ftyy- 
The choice of param eter values allows the researcher to adapt the model to a particular 
setup (Euro area versus the US, for example). Param eters may be obtained for this purpose 
from the existing literature , or they may be estim ated so as to  m atch selected business- 
cycle or long-run m om ents in the data. However, the former strategy relies on the existence 
of confirmed em pirical estim ates, and the la tte r one entails some degree of freedom about 
the selection of m om ents to  devote to  the estim ates of the param eter instead of model 
testing. Because of this degree of freedom, it is im portant to have some knowledge about 
how param eters affect the  im pact of shocks, which is one of the objectives of this chapter.
However, in practice this degree of freedom is very small for a subset of the parameters 
of the model, either because there is a firm consensus and the choice of moments to match 
is restricted by the literature , or because some param eters only affect the steady state 
equations bu t not the  dynam ic log-linearised equations, and therefore they have no impact 
on business cycle sta tistics and on the transmission of shocks in the model.
Therefore, it is necessary to  choose beforehand the calibration of a minimal set of 
param eters, thus restricting the question of how shocks are transm itted  only to parameters 
th a t can be chosen (in m ost cases) with some degree of freedom. These minimal choices 
are m ade as follows. The discount factor (3 is set so as to  yield an annual real interest rate 
of four percent in the  determ inistic equilibrium. is calibrated in the following way. In 
the determ inistic equilibrium  around which the approxim ation is taken, hours worked in 
the two Home sectors have to satisfy equations (4.15) to  (4.18). Let us denote the variables 
in this determ inistic equilibrium  with a subscript 0. By combining equation (4.15) with 
(4.17), and (4.16) w ith (4.18), and after replacing the functional form for v, it is possible 
to obtain:
— (T — i/j -  h-THo)1^ -  — (r )w =  (T -  -0 -  h TH,o)u 1 hr/*,o , (4.44)
to ' t o  rj1 — l
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(F ^  hyv,o) — (r)w — — T>1 1 k  (r — ip — hAr,o)w 1 h^,o • (4.45)^  UJ 7)i — 1
It can then  be seen th a t25 the determ inistic equilibrium or steady state level of hours 
worked in each sector is uniquely determ ined if the participation cost ip is known. There­
fore, ip is set so as to  m atch a given level of hours worked. This calibration strategy 
follows Burnside and Eichenbaum  (1996). Using their estimates, the deterministic equi­
librium hours worked are set to  324.8/136926, and T is normalised to 1. Burnside and 
Eichenbaum also found th a t the choice of ip does not alter the results. Since the partic­
ipation cost ip is the same for both  sectors, this calibration strategy forces steady state 
hours to  be the same in the two sectors of the Home country27. The same happens in the 
Foreign country28.
Moreover, because equations (4.44) and (4.45) have to  hold a t all dates t, hours always 
have to  stay constan t along the solution path. As a result, with this particular choice 
of preferences, all the  adjustm ent in the labour inputs takes place through the extensive 
margin, i.e. the  participation  rates riTH,t and n ^ t . A second consequence is that, by 
equations (4.15) to  (4.18), the Home relative wage (wage paid in the tradeable sector 
divided by the wage paid in the nontradeable sector) stays constant at all dates t. The 
explanation for this is th a t because individuals can move across sectors and wages are 
flexible, the  relative wage is always kept equal to the marginal ra te  of substitution between 
hours in the two sectors, which here is constant and equal to one. The marginal rate of 
substitu tion betw een hours stays constant because hours stay constant along the solution 
path , and it is equal to  one because the hours worked in the two sectors are equal in 
the steady sta te . It is im portan t to remember th a t, even with the equalisation of wages, 
lotteries and the  m arket for contingent contracts are still needed, in order to be able to 
write th a t individuals m aximise expected utility ex-ante subject to the expected budget 
constraint
In practice, the  model behaves like a sticky-prices sectoral variant of Hansen’s (1985)
25Given the function v and the degree of monopolistic com petition in the labour market 77^
26 The ratio betw een average hours worked in a year and total hours available, according to Burnside 
and Eichenbaum ’s estim ates.
2 7  As a result, steady state  real wages will also be the same in the two Home sectors.
2 8  Given that the participation cost is forced to be the same, steady state hours in the Foreign sectors 
will be the sam e as in the Home sectors. A different participation cost ip* may be introduced, but, in 
the light of Burnside and Eichenbaum ’s results, the implications of having ip* ^  ip are not likely to be 
interesting for the transm ission of shocks.
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indivisible labour model. In analogy with the literature on indivisible labour models29, the 
preference param eter k could be calibrated with the first order conditions for the labour 
input. However, k does not enter the  dynamic equations and therefore its calibration is 
irrelevant. '
As explained in Section 4.3, the steady sta te  term s of trade depends on the uncondi­
tional means of the  productiv ity  processes. These unconditional means may be difficult 
to estim ate a t the  sectoral level if d a ta  is not available, bu t on the other hand, they do 
not enter the  dynam ic log-linearised equations directly. However, in an empirical applica­
tion of the model it would be desirable to m atch the tradeable-nontradeable employment 
ratios in bo th  countries, th a t is, I^ 2L and D ata  is almost always available on these71IV Tljy
employment ratios, and they are im portan t characteristics of the economy. Moreover, it 
is plausible to  assume th a t in the  steady sta te  these ratios are determined by technology 
and not by preference param eters. Therefore, the determ ination of the steady state or de-
Tl*
term inistic equilibrium  term s of trade assumes th a t the ratios and T/ '°  are known,j^V,0 ^Ar,0
while -TH,° and Z\ F’° are determ ined endogenously30. As stated  before, and z\ Ffi
ZN,0 ZN,0 z N.O z N ,0
do not enter directly the  dynam ic log-linearised equations, bu t they do so only indirectly, 
through their im pact on the steady state  term s of trade. This calibration strategy may 
be preferable to  a simple norm alization of and Z~/'° in an empirical application of
the model.
4.5 F in d in g s
Having laid out and solved numerically the  model with sectors and individual allocative 
choices, it is possible to  investigate the transmission of shocks to the key macroeconomic 
variables.
In order to  be able to  do so, it is necessary to select a baseline parametrization, 
a benchm ark th a t allows the effects of changes in key param eters of the model to be 
compared. The best benchm ark is of course one th a t does not give more influence to one 
country or sector over the  o ther one, and th a t reflects the choices most commonly made 
in the literature . This baseline param etrization, which could therefore be described as
29 Both Hansen and Burnside, Eichenbaum and Rebelo in their indivisible labour case use the first order 
condition with respect to hours or employment in the calibration of their equivalent for the parameter k.
3 0 However, th is approach is not viable when <p equals one. In this particular case the calibration strategy 
assumes that and are known, while the ratios n™‘°- and are determined endogenously.
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“sym m etric” or standard , is reproduced in Table 4.1.
All the exogenous stochastic processes in the model are assumed to be AR(1). There­
fore, m onetary policy is not specified by means of an interest rate rule. This is because 
shocks to  the in terest ra te  rule are not unambiguously m onetary in nature, furthermore, 
with an interest ra te  rule it is not possible to  isolate the genuine transmission mechanism 
from the  m onetary policy reaction function, since the response of all variables depends on 
the behaviour of the  central bank.
The values for <7, p, p* and the autocorrelation coefficients for the nominal growth rates 
of money in the  two countries are taken from Gall (2003). The assumption of log utility 
for consum ption is standard . The fact th a t the probabilities of not changing prices are 
set equal to  0 .75 -implies an average price duration of one year in both countries. Andres, 
Lopez-Salido and Valles (2002) choose one as the value for the elasticity of money demand 
with respect to  consum ption, a value taken from the long run estimates of Lucas (1988). 
This m otivates the choice of e =  1 in this model31. The choices of unitary elasticities of 
substitution, </> =  $ =  1, and of equal weights in the consumption indexes, 7 =  <5 =  6* =  1, 
are made to  ensure sym m etry between countries and sectors. The values for (3 and r]2 are 
taken from P appa  (2002). rj1 is set equal to rj2, implying an equal m arkup (15%) in both 
the labour and the goods m arket. The choice of a  =  1 corresponds to constant marginal 
labour productivity. An autoregressive param eter for productivity of 0.9 is a standard 
choice in the  real business cycle literature, in line w ith many empirical estimates. In 
the baseline param etrization  all the exogenous processes for productivity have the same 
characteristics, therefore the  same autoregressive param eter is chosen for tradeables and 
nontradeables, Home and Foreign. Similarly, a common autoregressive param eter is chosen 
for government expenditures. The value of 0.9 comes from Rotemberg and Woodford 
(1995), and it is close to  the  estim ates of Christiano and Eichenbaum (1992).
The consequences o f shocks for relative prices and allocations
This section looks a t the  predictions of the model regarding relative prices and allocations 
after a shock occurs. These predictions can be better understood by looking at the sup­
ply and dem and for relative ou tpu t (tha t is, the ratio  of tradeable to nontradeable 
ou tpu t), as functions of the  relative price For simplicity, the analysis is limited to
31 £ _  a _  j jn the m odel the elasticity of demand for real money balances with respect to consumption
is equal to  one.
Table 4.1: Baseline parametrisation
Preferences:
f3 Discount factor 0.99
cr Risk aversion for consum ption 1
e Risk aversion for real money balances 1
0 E lasticity  of substitu tion  tradeable-nontradeable goods 1
7 W eight of nontradeable goods in the to ta l consumption index 0.5
6 E lasticity  of substitu tion  Home-Foreign tradeable goods 1
5 W eight of Foreign goods in the  Home tradeable consumption index 0.5
5* W eight of Foreign goods in Foreign tradeable consumption index 0.5
Production:
T]1 Degree of m onopolistic com petition in the labour market 7.66
ry2 Degree of m onopolistic com petition in the goods market 7.66
p  Probability  of not changing prices in the Home country 0.75
ip* P robability  of not changing prices in the Foreign country 0.75
a  Labour productiv ity 1
Exogenous processes:
Autoregressive param eters for nominal money growth 0.5
Autoregressive param eters for productivity 0.9
Autoregressive param eters for government expenditure 0.9
the Home country: all the  findings reported from now on can be extended to the Foreign 
country, which is not left out of the picture, since Foreign shocks may have an impact on 
the Home economy as well.
W hat follows is the  derivation of the dem and and supply for relative output in 
the model.
The long-run demand and supply for relative output
The supply for relative ou tpu t describes how firms adjust production ^  following 
changes in the  relative price . This relationship is much easier to obtain using steady 
state  equations. As explained in Section 4.3, the  model does not have a unique steady 
state  or determ inistic equilibrium, and after a shock the economy may or may not return 
in the long-run to  the  in itial steady state. The steady sta te  equations hold true across 
all the possible steady states. By log-linearising the steady state equations around the 
initial steady s ta te , it is possible to find out the long run implications of the model for the 
variables of interest.
For any variable X ,  let X q denote the value of the variable in the initial deterministic
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equilibrium or steady sta te , and X s s  denote the value in the new steady state. Let 
X  =  X”Xo X° — l°g (w ithout subscript) denote the approxim ate log-deviation from
the initial steady state . To find the long-run relationship between relative output and the 
relative price implied by supply I proceed along the following steps. First, I divide the 
steady sta te  version of equation (4.1) by (4.2) and I log-linearise the resulting expression. 
Then I do the same w ith the first-order conditions th a t describe the steady state optimal 
price setting in sectors T H  and N .  Some algebraic m anipulation leads to the following 
supply relationship th a t holds across steady states:
Pt h  ~  Pn  =  (zth  ~  %n ) H (Y t h  — Y n ) ■a a  \ /
In the case of decreasing m arginal labour productivity, Y zsl is positive, thus the rel­
ative supply curve is upward-sloping: the supply of relative output increases when the 
relative price increases. This happens because with decreasing marginal labour produc­
tivity the m arginal productiv ity  of labour falls w ith production. The relationship between 
relative ou tpu t and relative prices says th a t if monopolistic competitive firms experience 
an increase in dem and for their good they will charge higher prices to compensate for the 
fall in productivity. An increase of productivity in the T H  sector shifts the relationship 
down, and an increase of productivity  in the N  sector shifts the relationship up.
W ith  constant m arginal labour productivity (a = 1) there is no effect of the relative 
price on the supply of -y ^ ,  thus the relative supply relationship is horizontal. If 
increasing m arginal labour productivity  (a > 1) was introduced, the slope of the relative 
supply curve would become negative. The long-run supply relationship with a  < 1 and 
a  =  1 is shown in Figure 11.
The procedure to  find the dem and relationship is as follows. First, I aggregate and 
divide the  steady s ta te  version of (4.40) by its equivalent for sector A , and then take logs. 
The portion of dem and for Yt h  th a t comes from the Foreign country can be substituted 
out, using the  Home and Foreign aggregate resource constraints and the demands (4.33), 
(4.35) and (4.36), log-linearised around the initial steady state. The relationship between 
relative o u tpu t and relative prices implied by dem and is:
Yt h  — Yn  =  —0 ( Pt h  — Pn ^ Y  (1 ^0(1 k \ ) T  (1 k\) k^dB  -I- k%dGTH k^dGn  .
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The equation says th a t the  dem and for relative output decreases when the relative 
price increases. The relationship is affected by changes in T, B , Gt h  and G n  across 
steady states. For example, if government expenditure on tradeable (nontradeable) goods 
increases, relative ou tpu t goes up (down). The coefficients 1 — k\, £4, k$, and kj  are 
all positive32. The long-run dem and relationship is shown in Figure 11.
The response of Home relative ou tpu t to  changes in the term s of trade is ambiguous, it 
depends on the sign of (0 — 1). If 0 is larger than  one, the response is negative. This hap­
pens because whenever <fi is larger than  one, an increase in the relative price of tradeables 
to nontradeables, causes a more than  proportional fall in the relative consumption 
of th a t is, consumers substitu te  a large am ount of tradeables with nontradeables. 
The above equation then  says th a t, keeping B, G t h  and G n  fixed33, an increase
in the term s of trad e  increases the relative price and if (j) is larger than one relative 
output dem and falls, because of the large reallocation of Home consumption towards 
nontradeables. However, if 4> is less than  one, the Home substitution towards nontrade­
able goods is less im portan t than  the positive effect on Foreign dem and for Yt h  due to 
expenditure switching34.
If d B  is greater th an  zero, the Home country becomes a lender and the Foreign country 
a borrower in the  long run. In other words, there is an increase in wealth in the Home
country and a decrease in wealth in the Foreign country. The negative wealth effect
in the Foreign country depresses Foreign demand for Yt h > thus explaining the negative 
relationship between changes in B  and changes in -yff--
A simple m anipulation of the equations for production in the steady state leads to 
the following relationship between changes in relative employment and changes in 
relative o u tp u t -y^--
u t h  — u/v =  — (  Yt h  — Yn )  {z t h  — z n )a  \ /  a
32 hi,  k 6 , and k 7 are given in A ppendix B, while k A = yriTTI* ( j  -  l )  '§•")■ S in c e
jB0 =  Gth  0  =  Gn ,0  =  0 by assum ption, the demand equation is linearised (not log-linearised) with 
respect to  bond holdings and government expenditures. Linear deviations are normalised relative to initial 
steady state  consum ption: d X  =  ^ c ^ -
33 Supply and dem and determ ine Y t h  — Y n  and P t h  — P n , given z t h  — zN, T ,  d B ,  G t h  and G n  
z T H  — S n ,  G t h  and G n  are exogenous, T  and d B  are endogenous variables, determined by other steady 
state equations.
34 An increase in the term s of trade brings about an expenditure switching effect, because Foreign trade- 
able goods are more expensive compared to Home tradeable goods. The expenditure switching effect 
increases dem and and therefore production of Home tradeable goods.
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The short-run demand and supply for  relative output
For any variable X , let X t  = Xtx * °  — log denote the approximate short-run
log-deviation from the initial steady sta te35.
The derivation of the  forward-looking equation for inflation in the Home tradeable 
goods sector is shown in A ppendix 4.A. By subtracting the forward-looking equations for 
inflation in the two sectors, it is possible to understand how the short-run relative price 
adjusts following changes in output:
PTH,t -  ?N,t  =  E t Y f  , ( V 0 Y  ( *TH,t+J ~  +  I J - f f
■Et 0 (<p@y ( M C TH,t+j -  M C Nj+j^j ,
where:
— -  1 _ 1 -  a -
XICi,t+j ~  Pi,t+j d" “  Fitt+j j i — T H , N
According to  the  above equation, short run movements in ~pPf  reflect expectations 
of future inflation and real m arginal cost differentials36. If the inflation rate and the real 
marginal cost in one sector are equal to  those in the  other sector, then no changes in the 
relative price occur.
It is possible to  find also the short-run relationship between relative output and the 
relative price implied by dem and. The procedure is analogous to  the one described for the 
long-run, and it leads to  the  following relationship37:
YTH,t — YN,t =  {PTH,t ~  ^N,tj +  (1 — 0) (1 — &i) Tt +
— (1 — k i ) ~  **” k6dGTf{,t ~  fc7dGA^(4.46)
35 And let d X t =  4^ denote normalised linear deviations.
36 N otice that P t h  t — Pjv.t appears both on the right and on the left-hand side of the relationship. Of 
course, it is possible to solve it for the change in the relative price Pp ”[l , but in that case the analogy with
the long-run supply relationship would be less immediate.
37This short-run dem and relationship can be solved forward, as it is the short run supply relationship, 
but in that case the analogy with the long-run demand relationship would be less immediate.
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The short-run relationship between changes in relative employment n^ H,t and relative 
output :
nrH,t ~  n N t^ =  — ( 9 TH,t ~  VJv,t) -  ~  {zTH,t ~  zN,t)
Ot \  J d t
The advantage of the  graphical apparatus presented in Figure 11 is that it simplifies 
the explanation and helps understanding how monetary, productivity and government 
expenditure shocks affect relative prices and allocations. Shocks shift the relationships 
both in the  short and in the long run, and these shifts can be inferred from the analytical 
expressions which have been derived. However, it may be worth pointing out that since 
only tem porary, not perm anent, shocks are considered, long-run effects on relative prices 
and allocations are possible only if tem porary shocks induce perm anent wealth effects, 
th a t is, if they cause d B  to  differ from zero.
Moreover, the  equations show th a t the effects of aggregate shocks can be obtained 
simply as the  sum  of sectoral shocks.
The consequences of monetary shocks
Consider a positive m onetary shock in the Home country, consisting of a one percent 
innovation in the  Home money growth rate, under the baseline param etrization of Table 
4.1.
After having observed the m onetary shock, firms in the T H  and N  sectors expect 
higher fu ture inflation rates and higher future real m arginal costs38. However, the two 
sectors have the  same degree of price stickiness, therefore expected future inflation will 
be the same for T H  and N  goods, and expected future real marginal costs will also be 
the same in the two sectors. As a consequence, the relative supply relationship does not 
shift in the  short run after a money shock. Moreover, under the baseline parametrization 
(f> is equal to  1 and there are no wealth effects, therefore the relative demand relationship 
also does not shift in the  short run. Since neither the dem and nor the supply relationship 
shift, under the  baseline param etrization money shocks are neutral with respect to relative 
prices and allocations, as shown in the first column of Table 4.2.
38 Higher future real marginal costs will occur because wages will rise after a monetary shock, but prices 
will not fully adjust. Moreover, if a  <  1, the increase in output after a monetary shock will contribute to 
the rise in real marginal costs.
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Table 4.2: Responses to a Home monetary shock
t Baseline <MoII
■e- (f) =  5 <7 =  2 <35 II o to 9 =  5 9 = 5&
a  =  0.7
' Response of PT H
P n
1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.057
5 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.119
21 0 0 0 0 0 0 -0.014
Response of ^ T H
Y n
1 0 0.324 -1.463 0.178 -0.570 2.848 2.777
5 0 0.122 -0.456 0.052 -0.167 0.834 0.872
21 0 0.028 0.015 -0.007 0.021 -0.106 -0.097
Response of n T Htin
1 0 . 0.324 -1.463 0.178 -0.570 2.848 3.968
5 0 0.122 -0.456 0.052 -0.167 0.834 1.246
21 0 0.028 0.015 -0.007 0.021 -0.106 -0.138
Note: The baseline parametrization is shown in Table 4.1. Responses are percent 
deviations from steady state values, t is measured in quarters. The other specifications 
differ from the baseline only with respect to the parameters indicated 
at the top of each column.
However, m onetary  shocks may induce wealth and term s of trade effects tha t shift 
the relative dem and relationship. In these situations m onetary shocks are not neutral. 
For example, consider the  case (shown in the second column of Table 4.2) of 4> being 
less than  one, while the  rem aining param eters are left to the values of the benchmark 
param etrisation in Table 4.1. A positive m onetary shock causes an increase (deterioration) 
of the term s of tra d e 39, thus, as equation (4.46) shows, the relative demand curve shifts 
to the right. The second column of Table 4.2 shows th a t, as a result of the shift due to 
the term s of trade  effect, relative ou tpu t increases initially. This happens because 
the term s of trade  depreciation makes Home tradeables more attractive and substitution 
towards nontradeables C n  is low (</> < 1). In addition to this terms of trade effect, 
there is also a w ealth effect. The la tte r arises because the positive m onetary shock makes 
tradeables goods C t  more expensive, and since substitution towards nontradeables Cn  
is low, Home individuals prefer to  borrow in order to be able to afford tradeables Ct  in 
the current period40. The wealth effect influences the relative demand (4.46) alongside
39 Under all param etrisations, a positive monetary shock causes a depreciation of the Home currency. 
Since prices are rigid, th is always results in a deterioration of the terms of trade Tt, and in an increase in
the price of tradeables Pr,t-
40If 4> >  1, Home individuals would be more willing to postpone the consumption of tradeables C t , so
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the term s of trade  effect, bu t the wealth effect is gradual, since B  is a stock variable that 
adjusts slowly, while the  term s of trade effect is maximum at im pact41. Both the wealth 
effect and the term s of trade effect are perm anent, and in the long run there is a higher 
demand for -relative ou tpu t .
The th ird  colum n of Table 4.2 shows the case of 0 greater than  one. After a positive 
Home money shock, the  relative dem and curve shifts initially to the left, then gradually 
to the right. As a result, an increase in Home money supply increases at impact relative 
output and employment if 0 is less than  one, and decreases a t impact relative output and 
employment if 0  is greater than  one.
Similar reasonings help explain the remaining columns of Table 4.2. Shifts in the 
relative dem and relationship  occur if either 0, 0 or cr are different from one. In the 
presence of decreasing m arginal productivity of labour, m onetary shocks affect relative 
prices as well, since the relative supply curve is no longer horizontal. For example, if 6 = 5 
and a  = 0.7, then  a positive Home m onetary shock causes initially an increase in relative 
prices, followed by a decrease.
The consequences of productivity shocks
Let us consider the  two types of productivity shocks in the Home country, consisting of 
one percent innovations in the productivity processes for tradeables and nontradeables.
Positive p roductiv ity  shocks lower real m arginal costs for firms, thus inducing them 
to lower their prices. Therefore, after a productivity shock in one of the two sectors 
is observed, bo th  the  expected future inflation differential and the expected future real 
marginal cost differential change, and as a result the  short run relative supply relationship 
shifts. In particu lar, the  short run relative supply relationship shifts up after a positive 
productivity shock in the  T H  sector, down after a positive productivity shock in the 
N  sector. As for the  relative dem and relationship, it does not shift under the baseline 
param etrization, since in th is particular case there are no perm anent wealth effects, and 
changes in the  term s of trade  are not transm itted  whenever 0 is equal to 1.
The columns of Tables 4.3 and 4.4 can be understood then by simply looking at Figure 
11 and “introducing the dynam ics” to  it. For example (Table 4.3), a positive productivity
they would lend resources abroad.
41 Since w ealth effects (changes in B)  constitute a reallocation of wealth across countries, they are always 
associated w ith perm anent term s of trade effects. W hen there are no wealth effects, in the long run the 
terms of trade goes back to its initial value.
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Table 4.3: Responses to a Home technology shock in tradeables
t Baseline a  =  0.85 a  =  0.7 0 =  5 0 =  5 f  =  0.9 AR =  0
Response of P t h
P n |
1 -0.194 -0.129 -0.099 -0.194 -0.194 -0.055 -0.064
5 -0.457 -0.351 -0.291 -0.457 -0.457 -0.181 -0.020
21 -0.138 -0.147 -0.150 -0.138 -0.138 -0.140 0
Response of y t h
Y n
1 0.194 0.129 0.099 0.582 0.444 0.055 0.064
5 0.457 0.351 0.291 1.371 1.232 0.181 0.020
21 0.138 0.147 0.150 0.415 0.277 0.140 0
Response of n T Hn N
1 -0.806 -1.025 -1.286 -0.418 -0.556 -0.945 -0.936
5 -0.199 . -0.359 -0.522 0.715 0.576 -0.476 0.020
21 0.017 0.030 0.040 0.294 0.156 0.019 0
Note: See Table 4.2.
shocks in the  T H  sector shifts the  relative supply down, thus lowering relative prices and 
increasing relative ou tpu t. Moreover, since now tradeable output can be produced with 
less labour, relative employment falls at impact. All these responses are temporary, and 
they are opposite in sign if the positive productivity shock occurs in the N  sector (Table 
4.4).
In the  presence of decreasing marginal productivity of labour (columns 3 and 4 of 
both  tables), th e  effects of productivity  shocks on relative prices and output are analogous 
in sign, b u t their m agnitude a t im pact is reduced by the positive slope in the relative 
supply curve. Moreover, w ith decreasing marginal productivity of labour, the response 
of relative employm ent after a productivity shock is amplified. This happens because a 
positive p roductiv ity  shock in one sector allows firms within th a t sector to  dispense with 
labour, and the  less productive are the workers, the more labour is dispensed.
The response of relative ou tpu t can be considerably higher if the parameters 0 or 
6 are different from one. This happens because when 0 and 0 are different from one 
productivity  shocks bring about perm anent wealth effects, and as a result the relative 
dem and relationship (whose slope is given by the inverse of 0) shifts.
The last colum ns of Tables 3 and 4 show th a t both the param eter f  and the autore­
gressive param eter of the  productivity  shock affect affect the size of and the persistence 
of the responses. This happens because these param eters determine the expected future
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Table 4.4: Responses to a Home technology shock in nontradeables
t Baseline a  -  0.85
t-oII3 lOII 0 =  5 f  = 0.9 > SO II o
Response of Ur h  
P n
1 0.194 0.129 0.099 0.194 0.194 0.055 0.064
5 0.457 0.351 0.291 0.457 0.457 0.181 0.020
21 0.138 0.147 0.150 0.138 0.138 0.140 0
Response of Yt h
Y n
1 -0.194 -0.129 -0.099 -0.753 -0.194 -0.055 -0.064
5 -0.457 -0.351 -0.291 -1.805 -0.457 -0.181 -0.020
21 -0.138 -0.147 -0.150 -0.531 -0.138 -0.140 0
Response of n T  H  nN
1 0.806 1.025 1.286 0.247 0.806 0.945 0.936
5 0.199 . 0.359 0.522 -1.148 0.199 0.476 -0.020
21 -0.017 -0.030 -0.040 -0.409 -0.017 -0.019 0
Note: See Table 4.2.
inflation and real m arginal cost differentials.
The consequences of government expenditure shocks
Under the  baseline param etrization, increases in government expenditures on either good 
do not shift the  relative supply relationship in the short-run, since the expected future 
inflation differential and the expected future real marginal cost differential are not affected. 
However, as shown by the analytical expressions for the short and the long run, the relative 
demand relationship is shifted by changes in government expenditure. Therefore, when 
the relative supply relationship is horizontal, government expenditure shocks affect only 
relative quantities, b u t not prices. W hen the relative supply relationship is upward-sloping 
(decreasing m arginal productiv ity  of labour), government expenditure shocks affect both
relative quantities and prices.
For example, after a positive government expenditure shock in tradeables (nontrade­
ables) the  dem and relationship in Figure 11 shifts up (down) in the short run, and, as 
a result, relative ou tp u t and employment increase (decrease), in order to accommodate 
the changes in dem and brought about by government spending. In the case of decreasing 
m arginal p roductiv ity  of labour, relative prices must increase (decrease), and the effects 
on relative em ploym ent are more pronounced, since increases (decreases) in output must 
be accom panied by higher increases (decreases) in employment, to compensate for the
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Table 4.5: Responses to a Home government expenditure shock in tradeables
t Baseline a  =  0.85 7 =  0.25 7 =  0.75 7 ' °  -  5 ^  -  0.2
T F , 0  T F , 0
, Response
1 0 0.014 0 0 0 0
5 0 0.037 0 0 0 0
21 0 0.016 0 0 0 0
Response of Y™  01 yn
1 0.707 0.693 0.452 1.917 0.473 1.057
5 0.464 0.427 0.296 1.258 0.310 0.694
21 0.086 0.070 0.055 0.233 0.057 0.129
Response of
H a t
1 0.707 0.816 0.452 1.917 0.473 1.057
5 0.464 ' 0.502 0.296 1.258 0.310 0.694
21 0.086 0.083 0.055 0.233 0.057 0.129
Note: See Table 4.2.
decreasing productivity.
Tradeables and nontradeables government expenditure shocks have a symmetric im­
pact on relative ou tpu t, unless the weight of nontradeable goods in to tal consumption 7, 
and the weights of Foreign tradeables 8 and 8* (not shown in the Tables), are different 
from 0.5. The param eters 7, 8 and <5* affect the coefficients k\, k§ and kj  which appears 
in the relative dem and equations. This happens because 7, 8 and 8* affect the steady 
state term s of trade, and in this way they affect the coefficients of the approximated
log-linearised solution.
Moreover, as explained in Section 4.4, the steady sta te  term s of trade is also affected 
by the values chosen for the  unconditional means of the productivity processes. Conse­
quently, different assum ptions on the ratio  between the unconditional means of the trade- 
able productiv ity  shocks in the two countries also affect the coefficients of the relative 
dem and relationships. As an example, the last columns of Tables 4.5 and 4.6 show that 
different assum ptions on these ratios affect the responses of relative output and prices to 
government expenditure shock. In other words, w hat these columns show is that a wrong 
calibration of the  steady sta te  term s of trade may introduce erroneous responses.
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Table 4.6: Responses to a Home government expenditure shock in nontradeables
t Baseline a  — 0.85 7  =  0.25 7  =  0.75 Z T  H , 0  r_* =  5 *!H’° -  0.2
TF, 0 ZTF,  0
, Response of
1 0 -0.014 0 0 0 0
5 0 -0.037 0 0 0 0
21 0 -0.016 0 0 0 0
Response of
1 -0.707 -0.693 -1.355 -0.639 -0.473 -1.057
5 -0.464 -0.427 -0.889 -0.419 -0.310 -0.694
21 -0.086 -0.070 -0.165 -0.078 -0.057 -0.129
Response of
1 -0.707 -0.816 -1.355 -0.639 -0.473 -1.057
5 -0.464 ' -0.502 -0.889 -0.419 -0.310 -0.694
21 -0.086 -0.083 -0.165 -0.078 -0.057 -0.129
Note: See Table 4.2.
4.6 C on clu sion
The explicit consideration of relative or allocative effects of exogenous shocks in new open 
economy models is potentially  very beneficial, not only because it allows us to understand 
the models b e tte r, bu t also because it provides an additional dimension to test or, alter­
natively, calibrate the  models. The analysis of sectoral shocks has probably been limited 
so far by the availability of disaggregated statistics, but as more data  becomes available 
this lim itation is likely to  disappear. In an open economy setting, the distinction between 
tradeables and nontradeables is then  the natural point to s tart.
Naturally, the  results of the  analysis crucially depend on the modelling choices (for 
example, home bias, substitu tab ility  among goods, and so on). To mitigate (but not com­
pletely elim inate)42 th is problem, the approach taken here is to  choose general functional 
forms where possible, and conduct detailed sensitivity analysis.
The core message of the  chapter is th a t not only sector-specific supply or demand 
shocks have small to  sizeable relative effects, bu t so do aggregate monetary shocks. This 
finding is particu larly  interesting because the empirical literature has consistently pointed 
out th a t m oney has heterogeneous effects. These may be explained, as the Introduction 
suggests, by characteristics such as the degree of tradability  at the sectoral level.
42Other m odelling options that have not been taken explicitly in consideration are market segmentation 
or local currency pricing.
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Llaudes finds th a t a contractionary m onetary policy shock causes a medium-run decline 
in tradeable sector ou tpu t, while ou tpu t in the  nontradeable sector tends to increase after 
the shock. I obtain  in my model analogous results by setting either </> < 1 or 6 > 1. No­
tably, Llaudes’ results are robust across countries, bu t they are of difficult interpretation, 
since in some countries bo th  the nominal and the real exchange rates appreciate43 after 
the contractionary m onetary policy shock, while in other countries44 there is a depreci­
ation. This “exchange ra te  puzzle” is not peculiar to Llaudes’ paper, but apparently it 
is a feature of other empirical studies. Since the source of changes in the relative price 
is the exchange ra te , because of the exchange ra te  puzzle it is problematic to interpret 
the same effect on the  tradable and nontradable ou tpu t both under an appreciation and 
under a depreciation. However, one of the advantages of the model tha t I put forward is 
th a t it can reproduce short-run responses th a t are different in sign from the medium-run 
responses.
There is perhaps another reason to  study the allocative effects of m onetary or fiscal 
shocks. In the  new open economy framework it is possible to devise optimal policies, 
th a t is, policies aim ed a t reducing the welfare losses brought about by fluctuations, in the 
presence of m arket imperfections and nominal rigidities. For the moment, the literature 
has not focused on the  allocative effects of m onetary or fiscal policies, bu t it makes sense 
also to  do so, especially when there are costs of moving resources across sectors. This 
interesting issue is left to  future research.
43Italy, France, and the U.K.
44Germany and Japan.
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A p p en d ix  4 .A: O p tim al price se tt in g
This appendix shows how to  derive the log-linearised equation (4.54) from the problem 
of firm fxH  changing its price a t tim e t. As shown in Section 4.2, the first-order condition 
describing optim al price setting is:
7 ^ -  • yri/,i+,\t U t h )  (1 -  r/2) +
I W r H , t + j  . $ h .T  H , t + j \ t ( f T  H ) V T H , t + j \ t ( f T H )
' 2  P t + j  d y T H , t  +  j \ t ( f T H ) P T H , t { f T H )
=  0
Given the sequences {C t }, { P t }  and { W t h j } ,  the  sequences of shocks and the initial 
conditions, each producer th a t chooses a new price in period t will choose the same price 
PTH,t U t h ) and the same level of ou tput VTH,t+j\t ( I t h )- Then the optimal paths of 
prices { p t h j  U t h ) > PrH , t }  satisfy the above first-order condition and the following law 
of motion:
P t h ,i =  1 +  (! _  <f)PTH,t U t h ) 1
By log-linearising the  law of m otion above I get:
- v  2 l-»?2
X t = 1 -  <p7TTH,t ,
where Xt  =  PTI^ t^ TH) ; and t t t h j  = l°g p™t i 1S inflati°n ra te in the Home tradeable
P t h ,
goods sector. Note tha t:
Xt+i = X t -  5 ^ s=I ^TH,t+s =
where X t+j = PTp ^ ^ _ ~ ~ ■ From equation (4.1) I obtain:
d h TH,t+j\tUTH)  1 ( x - i  / ( f -----  — r =  -  • (ZTH,t+j) Q • {VTH,t+j\t \ J t h ) )
vyTH, t+j \ t  U t h ) oc
S ubstitu ting  the above expression into the first-order condition and multiplying by 
PTH,t U t h )  I obtain:
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P T H , t ( f T H ) P T H , t + i  _ f c  \  r t  \  .
p T H , t + j  r u f '  ' U t h )  (1 -  V2) +
1
+  ^  • (zTH,t+j) * ■ Wtp”^ 3 ■ {yTH,t+j\t U t h ))
0 .
Now I log-linearise around a determ inistic equilibrium in which all the exogenous 
stochastic processes are set equal to their unconditional means, their variances are set to 
zero, the individuals hold no internationally traded  bond, and all government expenditures 
are equal to  zero. In th is determ inistic equilibrium PTH,t U t h ) — PrH,t+j- I obtain:
E OO ,
3=0 ^
X t+j +  PrH,t+j — Pt+j +  Vt H,t+j\t U t h ) +
“  ( “ a ' *TH,t+j + WrH,t+j ~ Pt+j + J  ’ VTH,t+j\t ( /r tf))
= 0
Log-linearising equation (4.40) I obtain:
VTH,t+j\t U t h )  — —p2 ' X t+ j  +  k\CTH,t+j +  (1 — ki) C?pH,t+j +  k&dGTH,t+j •
The coefficients k\ and ke are derived from steady sta te  equations and are given in 
Appendix 4.B. I can substitu te  into the log-linearised first-order condition the expressions 
for X t+j  and VTH,t+j\t Uth)-,  and after some simplifications I obtain:
(1 + ^ ^ 2) T^^TH, t  -  (1 + ^TH,t+8 + ETH,t+j -  WTH,t+j
T ~ “ztH,t+j ~  U ^ k i C r H t+ j  ~  Uf" (1 ~  ki) C^Ht+:j — k$dGTH,t+j
which can be fu rther simplified as follows:
<P 1 -  a  1 H-----------112 ) 7TTH,t
E oo
,=0 (v/3)
1 — (p/3 1 — ip
1 1 # ( 1  +  ----- V 2 ) E t Y 2  1 & P Y  KTH,t+j +
PTH,t+j ~  W TH,t+j + iZTH,t+j ~  ^ k i C TH,t+3
~ U r  — ^i) C ^ n  t+j — Uf-k§dGTH,t+j
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Finally, simplifying and using the law of iterated  expectations, I can write the forward- 
looking equation for inflation in the Home tradeable goods sector:
ojp . (  1 — TP 1 — f WTH,t ~  PTH,t ~ ^ZTH,t +  ^ Lk\CTH,t +KTH,t =  p E t7TTH>t+1+ \     ^ I
V  +  — V2 V> j  \  +i=a(l - k i )C i .Ht +  ^ k edGTH,t
which can be rew ritten  as:
f  1 — (p/3 1 — ip \  f '—' 1 ^  1 — a  ^ \
^TH,t — pEt7VTH,t+l +    i~Z--------------- I WxH,t ~ PrH,t------ZTH,t H----------^TH.t\ 1  +  ^ r j 2 <p J  V a  ’ Q J
The forward-looking equation links current inflation to  expected future inflation and 
real m arginal costs, since:
—  — -  1 _ 1 — a -
M C r H , t  =  W t h j  — P r H , t ------- z t h j  H Y t h j . ,a  a
where M C t h j  is real m arginal cost in sector T H .  If m arginal labour productivity to 
scale is constant (a  =  1), the  level of ou tput does not affect real marginal costs, and the 
equation becomes more standard:
TtTH,t = /3Et7rTH,t+1 + (1 -  VP) — ( w TH,t ~  PTH,t ~  ■
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A p p en d ix  4.B : T h e log-linearised  m od el equations
The subscript 0 indicates a variable in the  initial determ inistic equilibrium or steady 
state. In w hat follows, variables with a hat denote log-deviations from the initial deter­
ministic equilibrium  or steady state , for example Ct =  logC* — log Co. Some equations 
are mixed log-linear and linear approxim ations, because they have been linearised with 
respect to  those variables whose initial steady sta te  value is zero by assumption. Lin­
ear deviations, prefixed with d, are normalised with respect to consumption, for example 
dBt = % ~Q. The coefficients Aq, /C2, ... are derived from the steady state equations and 
are given a t the  end.
Home resource constraint
d B t — -pdBt- i  — (1 — Aq) k2koTt +  k2k^YrH,t +  (1 — k2) k ^ Y ^ t  — k^Ct +
—k2kskQdGTH,t — (1 — k2) k^kjdG^^t ■ (4-47)
To obtain  (4.47), aggregate the budget constraint equation (4.9), consolidate it with
j T72“1 *?2 *72 — 1 9^-i
Jo UTH,t U t h )  V2 dfrH and YNjt = Jo VN,t (In)  112 dfN
*72 — 1
level changes. Yt h j  =
are aggregates for ou tp u t in the two sectors. dGTH,t = G and dG^.t =  “7 ^  are linear 
deviations, norm alised w ith respect to  steady sta te  consumption. Since B I  =  —B t at all 
dates, it is not necessary to  add the Foreign resource constraint to the system of equations.
Nominal interest rates
H ^  (1 — ^1) (EtTt+i  — Tt'j +  E t7rTH,t+i +  rt , (4.48)
i* =  i t +  ^  -~p )  ^  _  Etet+i) ■ (4.49)
(4.48) and (4.49) are obtained by log-linearising (4.11) and (4.12), and substituting out 
price level changes. I can see from (4.49) th a t the uncovered interest parity condition holds. 
Variables denoted w ith 7r are inflation rates in the four sectors, for example 'Rt H,t-\-1 —
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log PTH,t + l
P t h ,
Euler equations
a E tCt+l -  aCt  =  (1 -  0) h  +  (1 -  k x) (1 -  k2) (^Etf t+1 -  f t)  +
+  (1 — k2) E tiTTH,t+i ~  (1 — k2) EtitN.t+i , (4.50)
o E t C ;+1 - a C t  =  (1 -  0) r,  +  (fcf fcj -  fc,) ( E tTM  -  Tt)  +
+  (1 — k%) (Et7TTF,t+1 — ^ 7r*N,t+l) • (4.51)
(4.50) and (4.51) are obtained by aggregating and log-linearising (4.13) and its Foreign 
counterpart, and  substitu ting  out relative price level changes.
Money demand equations
e m t = 1 - / 3
a C t -  (j/3EtCt+\ -  (3 (1 -  k i)  k2 ( E tTt+i -  +
— fypEt-KTHt+l — (1 — k2) /3Et7TN,t+1
(4.52)
em+ -
1 - / 3
(4.53)
aC t* -  (T/3Etd ;+1 +  /3k*k*2 ( E tTt+1 -  f t )  +
—k^fiEtFjip'j+i ~~ (1 — k2) /3Et7rN t+1
(4.52) and (4.53) are obtained by aggregating and log-linearising (4.14) and its Foreign 
counterpart, and  substitu ting  out price level changes. m t =  and m f  =  are real 
money balances in the  two countries.
Forward-looking equations for inflation
KTH,t — (3Et7TTH,t+l+ —V 1 4- Tj2
1 — tp(3 1 — / W rH , t  — PrH, t  — ■ z t h j  +  ^ - ^ k i C r H . t
+  1=2(1 - k l ) C T H , t + 1—QksdGrH.t
(4.54)
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^  =  0 E t* " ™ + { T T ^ ' - i r )  ( w » - < ~ ^ - z ' ^ +  +
(4.55)
I - i p * 8 ’*   p *    4. c* i 1 — <3 pi
■n'TF,t =  P E t * T F , t + i + \  /  J 1- a ± ~ Y  II " T F ’t F’‘ ° '  TF't ~ k l C T F J
(! -  k t) C'TRt + ^ k l d G ^ r ,
(4.56)
' » *  =  + ( W k< -  P k t  -  {  ■ 2n i( +
(4.57)
The derivation of equation (4.54) is shown in A ppendix 4.A, and equations (4.55),
(4.56) and (4.57) are derived following an analogous procedure. dGFFt = G^ ,t and
(-** ’ 0 dr'* — N,t N,t — c* ■
Real money balances
m t — rnt- i  — fit — (1 — k i)  &2 ( r t — Tt-i 'j  — kz^THj, — (1 — ^2) ttN,t , (4.58)
m t ~  m t~ 1 — Mt +  ^1 ^ 2  (Tt ~ T t - 1  ^ — k^ jpp t  — (1 — k.2 ) 1 . (4.59)
(4.58) and (4.59) are derived from the real money balances identities, substituting out 
relative price level changes. p t =  log and = log are nominal money growth 
rates.
The other equations of the  dynamic system are obtained by aggregating and log- 
linearising equations (4.1), (4.2), (4.3), (4.4) and their Foreign counterparts, equations 
(4.15), (4.16), (4.17), (4.18) and their Foreign counterparts, equations (4.28) and (4.29), 
equations (4.30) to  (4.39) and their Foreign counterparts40, and equations (4.40) and (4.42)
45The log-linearised equations (4.30) to (4.38) and their Foreign counterparts are also first-differenced in 
order to elim inate price level changes from the system. Price level changes are substituted with inflation 
rates, which have no long-run growth.
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plus their counterparts. £ t , //J, dGTH,t, dG*T F t, dG*N t , 2 th ,t, ^v,*, 2£F>t, are
all exogenous stochastic processes.
The procedure to  find the steady sta te  term s of trade, To, is described in Section 4.3. 
After To is found, the  coefficients of the  log-linearised model are derived from the steady 
state equations as follows:
k i  = C t h q  
Yt h o  ’
k l  = C t f q  .Y *  ’ I T F  0
II P t o C t o  
PoCo ’ k*2  =
P *  C *
T O  T O
T C
k 3 = M l.
P t o  ’
II
*cO P n*
P *  ! 
T O












The International Transm ission of 
Shocks
5.1 In tro d u ctio n
This chapter investigates the domestic and the international transmission of monetary, 
government expenditure and productivity  shocks in a dynamic general equilibrium model 
with nom inal rigidities. This will be done prim arily w ith the model presented in the 
previous chapter, which is characterized by the assum ption th a t individuals cannot work 
in both  sectors, b u t they  can choose both  allocations and hours of work. However, in 
order to  generate a b e tte r  understanding of the transmission, results are also shown for 
another version of the  model, in which individuals can supply hours of work to both sectors 
contem poraneously, b u t they  cannot choose allocations.
A lthough the  benefits of understanding the international transmission are numerous1, 
concerning the  general framework of the new open economy models, no comprehensive 
study exists on a wide range of shocks, nor on the robustness to changes in parameter 
values. It is fair to  say th a t the  international transm ission of shocks depends on the mod­
elling stra tegy  chosen. For decades, the M undell-Fleming-Dornbusch model2 has provided 
the framework to  study  the in ternational transmission of m onetary shocks, but now the 
framework m ore widely used is the Redux (together with its extensions), which has been 
introduced relatively recently. It is ra ther more difficult to understand the transmission of
*For exam ple, it could provide the empirical VAR literature the restrictions needed to identify and 
measure the shocks that are in the data.
2M undell, (1962, 1963); Flem ing, (1962); Dornbusch, (1976).
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shocks in an in tertem poral general equilibrium model than  in the IS-LM-based Mundell- 
Fleming-Dornbusch model. Moreover, the literature so far has privileged monetary shocks 
instead of analysing all shocks.
One of the  contribu tions of this chapter therefore consists in extending the basic model 
by adding productiv ity  and  governm ent expenditure shocks. However, in the open econ­
omy shocks can have very different effects according to  whether they occur in the tradeable 
or in the nontradeable sector. Therefore, productivity and government expenditure shocks 
are d istinct for tradeables and  nontradeables, bu t the effects of aggregate shocks of the 
same natu re  can be analysed easily. Different assum ptions about the model’s parameters 
are considered, and  extensive sensitivity analysis is conducted.
An analysis of the  transm ission mechanism of m onetary shocks in a new open economy 
model can be found in O bstfeld and Rogoff’s original Redux paper3, or in Mark (2001). 
However, the  models presented there do not have the same degree of complexity as the more 
recent models. Some crucial assum ptions and their effect on the transmission of money 
shocks have been analysed separately in recent papers. For example, Tille (2001) analyses 
the role of different cross-country and w ithin-country substitu tability  of goods, Hau (2000) 
analyses the  role of the  nontraded  goods sector, W arnock (2003) covers home bias, and 
Betts and Devereux (1996, 2000) introduced and analysed the role of local currency pricing. 
This chapter constitu tes a more comprehensive analysis than  these studies because: 1) 
many of the critical param eters already studied in isolation are present, so their role can 
be analysed sim ultaneously; 2) the  analysis is not confined to m onetary shocks; 3) shocks 
are disaggregated by sector; 4) some novel assum ptions are introduced (the assumptions 
th a t the m arginal productiv ity  of labour may be decreasing, and th a t individuals cannot 
work in bo th  sectors). These la tte r modelling innovations are introduced in a way that 
preserves com parability  w ith the other papers: constant marginal productivity of labour 
is trea ted  as a special case, and results are also shown for the case in which individuals 
can work in b o th  sectors.
The m ain results of the  chapter are as follows. In the short run, monetary shocks 
dom inate the  responses of consumption, real and nominal exchange rates, real output 
and employm ent. Even w ithout capital in the model, the effects of productivity shocks 
are quite persisten t, and this persistence is due to the nominal rigidities4. Government
3 O bstfeld and Rogoff (1995, also 1996).
4 The explanation is given on page 154.
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expenditure shocks have little  im pact on the m ain variables, and often no impact at all. 
The propagation of Foreign shocks to  output and employment is weak, and the sign of the 
response of o u tpu t and employment to Foreign shocks depends on param eter values. The 
assum ption th a t individuals cannot work in both  sectors leads to a lower elasticity of the 
marginal costs 'w ith  respect to  output.
The rem ainder of the  chapter is organised in the following way. Section 5.2 presents the 
equations of the  model, bu t w ith the assum ption th a t individuals can supply their hours 
of work contem poraneously to  both  sectors. Section 5.3 presents the findings regarding 
the transm ission of shocks to  consumption, real and nominal exchange rates, real output 
and em ployment, and Section 5.4 concludes.
5.2 T h e  m o d e l w ith o u t th e  choice o f  a llocations
In order to  investigate how the shocks are transm itted  to the macroeconomic variables, 
another version of the  model of the  previous chapter, in which individuals can contempo­
raneously work in bo th  sectors, has been solved. This Section illustrates how to derive the 
equations for th e  m odel in which individuals can work contemporaneously in both sectors, 
at the same wage. This is a s tandard  assum ption in new open economy models with trade­
ables and nontradeables. In this way, by comparing the two models, with and without the 
choice of allocations, it is possible to  assess whether the restriction tha t individuals can 
work only in one sector introduces any change in the dynamics.
All the o ther assum ptions are unchanged, and the functional forms adopted are the 
same. Therefore, it is not necessary to go through all the equations th a t describe the 
model w ithout allocations, b u t it sufficient to focus only on those th a t are different. Here 
follows a synthetic  description of the Home country; the Foreign country is parallel and 
therefore its description is om itted  for simplicity.
Individuals do not have probabilities added to their consumptions sets. Instead, the 
lifetime u tility  of a Home individual of type i is as follows:
U  («) = E 0 YZo 0t f “(Ct {i)) + L {~pF) +  F ( G W  G‘W,t) + ’
where h  is an aggregate of hours worked in the two sectors. The share of firms produc-
ing tradeables is denoted by n  in the Home country and by n* in the Foreign country. 
Therefore, Home firms and the goods they produce are indexed by / t h  £ [0, n) for the 
tradeable sector and / n  G [n, 1] for the nontradeable sector. In the Foreign country, the 
indexes are f FF G [0,n*] for the tradeable sector and G [n*,l] for the nontradeable 
sector. Aggregate hours worked by individual i at date t are thus given by:
rn
(i) = h TH,t (0 + h Mt  W = /  hrH,t (h Ith) dfFH +
Jo
and her budget constraint is given by:
h>N,t (h In )  dfN
Bt (i) Pr,t +  M t (i) <  (1 +  r<_i) B t -1 (i) Pr,t + M t~\ (i) + T R t (i ) +  +wt (i) h* (i) +
+ [  n / th) dfrH + I ^N,t (h In ) dfN ~ PtCt (i) ■
Jo Jo
The first-order condition with respect to hours worked becomes: 
t r r  i u u '(C t (i)) 77! - 1v (T -  ip -  h t (i)) = ----- - ----- wt ( i ) ---------  . (5.1)
Pt m
There are also some modifications at the level of the firms. The aggregators hFH (Ith) 
and hjv (In ) and the demands for individual types of labour are modified as follows:
~  /  l  *71 - 1  \  *7 1 - 1  ~  /  !  *71 - 1  \  vi  - 1
hrH ,t{fT H ) — ( /o hTH,t(h Ith) V1 d i j  , hx,t ( /n ) =  ( f0 (i, I n )  771 d ij
hTH,t( i , / t h) = ( j w f )  h>TH,t(fTH) » (h I n )  = ( " l ^ )  ^N,t (/jv) • (5-2)
The production functions in the two sectors are the same, the consumption and price 
indexes C, C t,  P  and P t  stay the same, while the indexes th a t aggregate individual goods 





The other aggregate indexes C t f , C m , G t h , G m , Yt h , Yn , P t f  and P m are w ritten 
following the same logic. Consequently, taking good T H  as an example, demand at date 
t is given by:
of allocations. Since all the other assumptions and the functional forms stay the same, 
there are only m inor changes. The two sectors pay the same wage, therefore the nominal 
wage th a t appears in the forward-looking equation for inflation (given in Appendix 4.A) 
is not sector-specific bu t common to both  sectors. Everything else in the forward-looking 
equation for inflation is unchanged.
The adjustm ent in the labour input takes place only along the intensive margin. In­
dividuals’ labour supply, obtained by log-linearising the first-order condition (5.1), is for 
aggregate hours worked in both sectors, while firms’ labour demands, obtained by log- 
linearising equations (5.2) and production, are sector-specific. Therefore, the demand side 
determ ines how aggregate hours supplied are allocated across sectors.
Finally, the  choice of param eter values in the model w ithout the choice of allocations 
is as follows. The discount factor (3 is set to 1/0.04. The steady sta te  term s of trade is 
determ ined following the same procedure described in Section 4.3. The goal of the proce­
dure described in Section 4.3, which follows Obstfeld and Rogoff (1995), is to determine 
the term s of trade  endogenously, w ithout making any normalization of the unconditional 
means of the  exogenous productivity processes. Such normalization may be difficult to jus­
tify in an empirical application of the model. Utility from leisure is given by v (x ) =  k.^-. 
The preference param eters k , ip and u  are determined endogenously so th a t hours worked 
in the steady sta te  are equal to 324.8/1369 and the Frisch elasticity of labour supply is
(pTH , t  + C t h j  + G t h j )
Here I describe briefly the log-linearised equations of the model without the choice
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in the range of estim ates found by M aCurdy (1981). In this way the choice of parameter 
values is analogous to  the  one adopted for the model with the choice of allocations.
5.3 T h e tran sm ission  o f shocks
In order to  see the transmission of shocks in the model, the examination of the impulse 
responses generated by the numerical solution is complemented by an analytical approach, 
based on the  log-linearised equations. The aim of the analytical approach is to get more 
insight by combining with each other the approximated, log-linearised equations, thus 
reducing the complex system to a condensed form.
The first relationship th a t forms the basis of the analytical approach is an equilibrium 
condition for the money market, obtained by combining equations (4.47) to (4.53), and 
using the log-linearised equation (4.39):
(M t -  A?t*) -  ( P i  -  P(' )  = |  ( C t  -  c f)  -  -eT^-p ( E t e t + 1 -  ?t) . (5.3)
Equation (5.3) will be referred to as the money market equilibrium condition. It is 
an equilibrium  condition which equates (in terms of changes) demand and supply of rel­
ative real money balances in both countries, (^Mt — P t j  — (m ?  — P * ^ j. Demand for real 
money balances increases with consumption and decreases with the nominal interest rate. 
Equation (5.3) says th a t, after an increase in nominal money supply at Home relative to 
Foreign, the equilibrium in the money market can be restored by either an increase in 
relative prices, or by an increase in relative consumption, or by an expected appreciation 
of the Home currency (so th a t the Home nominal interest rate  falls below the Foreign), or 
by a com bination of these.
The second relationship is obtained by subtracting from the log-linearised Home bud­
get constraint (4.47) its Foreign counterpart. Consumption and output changes can be 
substitu ted  out by using the log-linearised equations (4.33) to (4.36) and their Foreign 
counterparts, and the log-linearised demand equations for tradeable output. The result­
ing equilibrium  condition is:
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dBl = ^ B(_1_ ^ ( c 1-C (*) + i ^ l ( P t* + e( - P t)
+ ^ - ^ r {e{l + k 1 - k \ ) - < t , ( k i - k \ ) - \ ) f t . (5.4)
P «4
Equation (5.4) will be referred to as the current account equation. It posits a negative 
relationship between changes in bond holdings and changes in relative consumption, and 
a positive relationship between changes in bond holdings and changes in the real exchange 
rate. The relationship between changes in bond holdings and changes in the terms of trade 
depends on the param eters of the model. An increase in the (Home) terms of trade makes 
Foreign tradeable goods more expensive compared to Home tradeable goods, and it affects 
the relative price of tradeable to nontradeable goods in both countries. The parameters 
of the model determ ine the size of the shift in demand from Home to Foreign tradeables 
(expenditure-switching effect), and the size and direction of the shift in demand from or 
to nontradeables in bo th  countries.
The th ird  relationship is derived from the log-linearised Euler equations for consump­
tion, by subtracting (4.51) from (4.50):
a E t  ( Ct+1  -  c t*+1)  ~ a ( c t -  C t)  = E t (P t*+I +  e(+1 -  Pt+1)  -  ( p (* + et -  Pt)  . (5.5)
Because it describes the optimal intertem poral allocation of changes in relative con­
sum ption I can call equation (5.5) the Euler equation for relative consumption in both 
countries. It posits a positive relationship between the expected growth rate in relative 
consum ption and the expected growth rate of the real exchange rate. The real exchange 
ra te  is defined as thus an increase (fall) in this quantity is a “depreciation” ( “appre­
ciation”).
Equations (5.3), (5.4) and (5.5) constitute a dynamic system of three equations in five 
unknowns, where the unknowns are changes in relative consumption, Ct — C l , in the real 
exchange ra te  P I + et — Pt, in the nominal exchange rate et , in bond holdings dBt , and 
in the  term s of trade, T t . Even if the number of equations is lower than the number of 
unknowns, equations (5.3) to (5.5) still have a lot to say about the impact of shocks in 
the model.
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In particular, consider the baseline param etrization. The param eters 0 and 0 are 
equal to one, S is equal to  6*, and this guarantees th a t k\ and kl are equal. As a result, T* 
disappears from equation (5.4). Moreover, since <r is equal to one, equation (5.5) implies 
th a t the expected growth ra te  of relative consumption is always equal to the expected 
growth ra te  of the  real exchange rate. Using this last fact and recalling that ^ is greater
than  one, it is possible to conclude from equation (5.4) th a t dBt is stable as t goes to
infinity if and only if:
Ct ~ c; =  p ;  + et - p t . (5.6)
Given th a t the  solution m ethod explicitly looks for the path  th a t does not violate
stability5, in the  baseline param etrization relative consumption changes are always equal 
to real exchange ra te  changes. Shocks have an impact on the real exchange rate only if 
they affect relative consumption, and vice versa. Intuitively, the above relationship would 
not hold w ith equality in some departures from the baseline param etrization, but the 
model would always retain a strong link between relative consumption and real exchange 
rate changes.
Incidentally, equation (5.6) characterizes a complete m arkets allocation. Therefore it 
can be inferred from the above discussion tha t the model reproduces a complete markets 
allocation in any param etrization such that: i) T) disappears from equation (5.4), and ii) 
<7 is equal to  one.
T he last equation can be used to solve forward equation (5.3) in the baseline parame­
trization w ith e =  1, obtaining:
e, =  (1 -  0) E t F  (M t+J -  % , )  (5.7)
The above relationship says th a t the nominal exchange rate  depends only on current 
and future expected changes in relative money supply, and is unaffected by the other 
exogenous shocks in the model6. The nominal exchange rate may be affected by other
5 Individuals observe the shocks at date t and form expectations conditional upon that realisation of 
the shocks. Given that their optimal allocation of changes in relative consumption is dictated by the Euler 
equation for relative consum ption, the only way for them to prevent in expectation an explosive path for 
d B t in the log-linearised solution is by setting C t — C* = Pf + e t — Pt.
6 For example, if a shock of size e in the Home nominal growth rate of money occurs at date t , and 
no other Home or Foreign shocks occur afterwards, then the response of the nominal exchange rate is 
et =  \ ~-lpp i w here p  is the autoregressive parameters for the Home nominal money growth rate.
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shocks in some other param etrizations, but intuitively the model always retains a strong 
link between money and the nominal exchange rate. Fluctuations in money supply are 
the exclusive or the m ain cause of fluctuations in the nominal exchange rate.
In conclusion, equations (5.3) to (5.5) can be used to illustrate that in the baseline 
param etrization there is a perfect correlation between changes in relative consumption and 
changes in the  real exchange rate, and between relative money supply and the nominal 
exchange rate . For this reasons, equations (5.3) to (5.5) can also be used to understand 
how departures from the baseline param etrization affect these correlations for different 
types of shocks.
The effects of aggregate shocks can be obtained simply as the sum of sectoral shocks. 
The response of consumption
Figure 12 shows the  response of consumption in the baseline param etrization to one per­
cent shocks in the  exogenous processes. The two m onetary shocks have the highest impact 
in the short run, productivity shocks have a much smaller impact, but they are quite per­
sistent, and government expenditure shocks have no impact on consumption. Moreover, 
sensitivity analysis has shown th a t the order of importance between m onetary and produc­
tivity shocks is a stable feature of the model, since it is preserved under different parameter 
values. Therefore, according to the model, if shocks all have the same variance (and the 
same quarterly  frequency), then the main source of short-run fluctuations in consumption 
are m onetary shocks, while productivity shocks are responsible for medium to long-run 
fluctuations.
Let us analyse the transmission of m onetary shocks first. An increase in nominal 
money supply a t Home causes a depreciation of the Home currency, an increase of the 
Home consumer price index, and a fall in the real interest rate. As a result of the lower 
real interest rate , Home and Foreign consumption increase. The fact tha t increases in 
nominal money supply a t Home have a positive impact on Foreign consumption can be 
inferred from Figure 12, by looking at the positive impact of Foreign money supply on 
Home consum ption. Due to the symmetry of the baseline param etrization, responses to 
Foreign shocks are the same as the responses of Foreign variables to Home shocks.
Then, the  transm ission of productivity shocks. Positive shocks in productivity trigger 
a fall in prices, and thus an increase in real money balances and consumption. Since 
shocks in Foreign nontradeables do not affect Home prices, they are not transm itted to
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Home consumption. Figure 12 shows that, in the baseline param etrization, shocks in 
2)v have more im pact on Home consumption than  shocks in zth  or Zrp- This happens 
because, in this param etrization, nontradeable goods are given the same weight as the 
composite bundle of Home and Foreign tradeables, and as a result Home nontradeables 
productivity shocks have more impact on the Home CPI than  either kind of tradeable 
productivity shock. Because there is no physical capital, the persistence of the effects of 
productivity shocks is a very interesting feature of the model. Productivity shocks are 
transm itted  through the fall in prices, but this can happen only gradually, because of 
price rigidities. As a result, productivity shocks have persistent effects on real money 
balances and consumption. The persistence of the effects of productivity shocks is due to 
the nom inal rigidities and does not require the presence of capital in the model.
Finally, the  transm ission of government expenditure shocks. Positive government ex­
penditure shocks increase output, thus they have both a positive and negative effect on the 
left-hand side of equation (4.47) in Appendix 4.B. However, the net effect of government 
expenditure on the current account is zero, as equation (5.4) shows. Equation (5.4) is 
obtained by substitu ting  out of the Home and Foreign aggregate resource constraints a 
m arket clearing condition for Home and Foreign tradeable output. Hence, the increase in 
ou tput dem and induced by a positive government expenditure shock is exactly counter­
balanced by an analogous increase in output supply, with no effects on the current account 
and consum ption. Sensitivity analysis has shown th a t the neutrality for consumption of 
government expenditure shocks is a stable feature of the model, with the exception of 
decreasing m arginal labour productivity. Chart 1 shows th a t if a  <  1 government expen­
diture shocks have a negative impact on consumption. This happens because increases in 
government expenditures boost the demand for output; if a  < 1, firms expand produc­
tion bu t increase their prices at the same time. The fact th a t government expenditure 
shocks are followed by increases in prices if a  <  1 can be inferred from equations (4.54) 
to  (4.57). The increases in prices explains why government expenditure shocks have a 
negative im pact on consumption if a  < 1.
By com paring the responses in Figure 12 to the responses in the model without the 
choice of allocations (Figure 13), it is possible to assess how the dynamics of consumption is 
affected by the introduction of probabilities in the utility function. The different responses 
in Figures 12 and 13 are due to the slope of the labour supply, and the response of real 
wages, in the two cases. In the model without the choice of allocations the sectoral, log-
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linearised labour supply has a “standard” slope, th a t is, increases in hours worked require 
an increase in the  real wage. However, in the model with the choice of allocations, changes 
in labour supply (in each sectoral labour market) are not associated with changes in real 
wages7. Therefore, while in the model with the choice of allocations output increases do 
not entail increases in the real wages, in the model without the choice of allocations shocks 
th a t cause ou tpu t to  increase are followed by increases in real wages, which in turn have 
a positive effect on prices, because of the firms’ pricing behaviour.
For example, let us consider a positive Home or Foreign m onetary shock. In the model 
w ithout the  choice of allocations this is followed by an increase in real wages, consequently, 
there is a higher increase in prices and a lower impact on consumption, compared to the 
model where individuals can choose the probabilities of working in sectors. Next, let us 
consider a positive Home or Foreign productivity shock. This causes a decrease in Home 
or Foreign wages. In the model without the choice of allocations the fall in wages is more 
pronounced (because it is tied in with a fall in hours), and as a result, the consequent fall 
in prices and the positive im pact on consumption are more pronounced. Lastly, consider 
a positive Home or Foreign government expenditure shock. Its effect is to increase Home 
or Foreign ou tpu t. In the  model without the choice of allocations real wages go up with 
ou tpu t, therefore prices increase too, and by this way the effect on consumption is negative.
Figures 14 and 15 show the response at impact of consumption after a Home monetary 
shock, for different values of <r, <j) and 6. Changes in these param eters are associated with 
perm anent wealth effects, which influence consumption. For example, if 0 > ^ individuals 
are more willing to  postpone the consumption of tradeable goods and lend units of C j  
abroad: a positive Home m onetary shock induces a positive wealth effect in the Home 
country, and the response of Home consumption becomes larger. If 0 > 1, T H  and T F  
goods are close substitu tes and a positive Home m onetary shock induces a positive effect on 
the trade  balance of the Home country, thus the response of Home consumption becomes 
larger.
7 This result follows from the log-linearized first-order ^ conditions for labour supply in the model with 
the choice of allocations, and from the fact that h TH,t =  =  0.
The economic intuition of this result is the following. Because the disutility of work is convex in hours 
(but linear in probabilities), individuals want to keep working hours always constant and equal to the 
steady state  values. Therefore, all the adjustment takes place along the extensive margin. Individuals 
only accept the change in the real wage that will keep their hours constant, and the only way for them to 
achieve this result is to accom m odate all the labour demand from firms. In each of the two sectoral labour 
markets, the log-linearized labour supply (in probabilities) is infinitely elastic.
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The response o f th e  real exchange rate
Figure 16 shows the response of the real exchange rate in the baseline param etrization to 
one percent shocks in the exogenous processes. Because of the above-mentioned link with 
relative consum ption changes, the above-mentioned symmetry and the fact that shock 
have the same size, the  response of the real exchange rate to a shock is the same as the 
responses of Home consumption to  the same shock, minus the response to th a t kind of 
shock occurring in the other country8.
M onetary shocks have the highest impact in the short run, productivity shocks in 
nontradeables have a smaller impact in the short run but are quite persistent, while 
productivity  shocks in tradeables and government expenditure shocks have no impact 
in the baseline param etrization. The model thus explains the short-run fluctuations in the 
real exchange ra te  as due to  m onetary shocks, while productivity shocks in nontradeables 
are responsible for medium to  long-run fluctuations, assuming equal variance for all shocks.
Let us analyse the transmission of monetary shocks first. An increase in money sup­
ply a t Home causes a nominal depreciation of the Home currency, an increase in the 
Home consumer price index, and a fall in the Foreign consumer price index. Because of 
price rigidity, the  effect on the nominal exchange ra te  prevails, therefore a positive Home 
money supply shocks brings about a depreciation (increase) in the real exchange rate. By 
the opposite mechanism, a positive Foreign money supply shock causes an appreciation 
(decrease) in the  real exchange rate.
Then, the transm ission of productivity shocks. Positive productivity shocks in non­
tradeables Home (Foreign) goods cause a decrease in Home (Foreign) prices, thus they 
cause an increase (decrease) in the real exchange rate. In the baseline parametrization, 
shocks in tradeable goods have the same impact on both  the Home and Foreign CPI, 
therefore their im pact on the real exchange rate is zero.
Finally, the  transm ission of government expenditure shocks. As explained above, gov­
ernm ent expenditure shocks are neutral for consumption, except when a  is less than one. 
Only in th is case then government expenditure shocks have an impact on the real ex­
change rate. In all the other cases, since relative consumption does not change, there are 
no effects on the  real exchange rate, as equation (5.5) makes clear.
8 For exam ple, the response of the real exchange rate to a one percent shock in p is the same as the 
response of Home consum ption to the one percent shock in /i minus the response to a one percent shock 
in n* .
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Differences in the  responses of the model without the choice of allocations are caused 
by the behaviour of real wages and prices, explained above (see Figure 17).
The neutrality  of productivity shocks in tradeables shows up only under the symmetric, 
“baseline” param etrization. Productivity shocks in tradeables cause a fall in both the 
Home and the Foreign price levels. In the baseline param etrization these falls are identical, 
therefore the  effect on the real exchange rate is zero. However, if the proportions in 
consumption of tradeable goods of the same type are different in the two countries, then 
the response of the real exchange rate is not equal to zero, and becomes indeterminate in 
sign, as Figure 18 illustrates. Therefore, Figure 18 shows th a t the model’s implications 
for the fluctuations in the real exchange rate may be biased if 8 and 8* are not estimated 
correctly.
The response of the real exchange rate to m onetary and productivity shocks may also 
be affected by the elasticity of substitution between Home and Foreign tradeable goods. 
Figures 19 and 21 report the responses a t impact of the real exchange rate obtained by 
varying sim ultaneously 9 and 8, while 8* is changed specularly. If 8 = 1 — 8* is less than 
0.5, there is home bias in the model9. W hen <5=1 — <5^* is low, the fall in Home prices 
after a positive productivity  shock is higher than  the fall in Foreign prices, and as a result 
the real exchange ra te  goeg up. The elasticity of substitution 9 determines the size of 
the switch in dem and from T F  to T H  goods. If 9 is higher than  one, more consumers 
substitu te  Foreign tradeables with Home tradeables, thus causing a nominal appreciation 
so as to  bring the goods m arket back into equilibrium. On the other hand, if 9 is lower 
than  one, less consumers substitu te Foreign tradeables with Home tradeables, and as a 
result the nom inal exchange rate  depreciates, strengthening the positive effect on the real 
exchange ra te  in the home bias situations. In conclusion, the message of Figure 21 for 
the Balassa-Samuelson hypothesis is the following. A positive productivity shock in the 
tradeable goods sector may cause an increase in the real exchange rate, but this effect is 
very small unless there is a high degree of home bias and 6 approaches zero (a situation 
of alm ost no substitu tab ility  between T H  and T F  goods).
D epartures from 9 = 1 are associated with the emergence of perm anent wealth effects,
9Warnock (2003) defines home bias as a situation where at any given relative price, Home consumers 
consum e more home produced tradeable (relative to foreign produced tradeable) than do Foreign con­
sumers. Since: _ g
§ £  = ¥ ( $ * ) ■  a„d
then home bias arises in the model whenever S <  S*.
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as shown in Figures 20 and 22. However, these wealth effects influence only marginally 
the response of the  real exchange rate to  monetary shocks, and are more relevant in the 
case of productivity  shocks.
The response of the nominal exchange rate
Figure 23 shows the response of the nominal exchange rate, in the baseline parametrization, 
to one percent shocks in the exogenous processes. As explained in Section 5.3, in this 
param etrization the nominal exchange rate is only affected by m onetary shocks. Moreover, 
m onetary shocks, as it can be deduced from equation (5.7), are symmetric: if a nominal, 
positive shock of size e occurs at date t , and no other shock occurs afterwards, then the 
response of the  nominal exchange rate is e* =  \ l p p for a shock in the Home nominal 
growth ra te  of money, and et = — \ lp p for a shock in the Foreign nominal growth rate of 
money, assuming a common autoregressive param eter p. The same is true in the baseline 
param etrization of the model without the choice of allocations, for this reason the impulse 
responses of the nom inal exchange rate are not shown for th a t model, as they are identical.
D epartures from the baseline may entail different responses, but, intuitively, the model 
will always reta in  a strong link between nominal shocks and the nominal exchange rate. 
The formulas given above show th a t the param eters (3 and p govern the response of the 
nominal exchange ra te  to  m onetary shocks; changes in other param eters may generate 
some effects, albeit quantitatively small.
For example, Hau (2000) proves th a t nontradeables have an “exchange rate magnifi­
cation effect” , th a t is, a high proportion of nontradeables increases the volatility of the 
nom inal exchange rate. Quantitatively, this effect is quite small10, but it is one of the 
established facts of the new open economy literature. However, the sensitivity analysis 
shown in Figures 24 to  27 suggests th a t param eters other than  7  affect more the response 
of the  nom inal exchange ra te  to m onetary shocks.
T he elasticity of substitution between tradeables and nontradeables 4> affects the re­
sponse of the nominal exchange rate in both models, with and without the choice of 
allocations. Higher values for 4> are associated with lower responses of the nominal ex­
change ra te  after a positive Home m onetary shock. This happens for the following reason.
10 As shown by Hau on page 441, Figure 2. More nontradeables reduce the impact of monetary shocks 
on the CPI, therefore, the nominal exchange rate moves more in order to bring the money market back to 
equilibrium.
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A positive Home m onetary shock causes a nominal depreciation, an increase of the Home 
tradeable goods price index Pj<, and a decrease of the Foreign tradeable goods price index 
P, T h e  nominal depreciation makes the T F  goods more expensive for Home consumers, 
and the T H  goods less expensive for Foreign consumers. The higher is <f>, the higher will 
be the substitu tion  towards nontraded goods and the fall in demand for T F  goods from 
Home consumers. Similarly, the  higher is 0, the higher will be the substitution away from 
nontraded goods and the increase in demand for T H  goods from Foreign consumers. As a 
result, for higher values of 0 a lower increase in e ensures th a t the demand for T F  (TH ) 
goods does not fall (increase) too much, and the goods m arket can stay in equilibrium.
Moreover, it is not always true th a t more nontradeables increase the response of the 
nominal exchange ra te  to m onetary shocks. In fact, in the model without the choice of 
allocations (Figure 25), if (f) is less than  one more nontradeables increase the response of 
e, bu t the  opposite happens if <p is higher than one. This can be explained by recalling 
th a t in the  model w ithout the choice of allocations changes in output are associated 
with changes in real wages. Simulation results have shown that, in the model without the 
choice of allocations, if <j) is greater than  one Foreign real wages fall after a Home monetary 
expansion, and th is fall is less pronounced if there are less nontradeables (7 low). The fall 
in Foreign real wages induces Foreign firms to reduce their prices, contributing towards 
the increase in Foreign real balances. Since the latter effect is less pronounced if there are 
less nontradeables, it is possible to  understand why whenever 4> > 1 the nominal exchange 
ra te  increases more if 7 is low. On the other hand, simulation results show th a t if <$> is less 
than  one Foreign real wages increase after a Home m onetary expansion, and the increase 
is less pronounced if there are more nontradeables (7 high). The increase in Foreign real 
wages induces Foreign firms to increase their prices, dampening demand. Therefore, in 
the  model w ithout the choice of allocations, whenever 4> < 1 the nominal exchange rate 
increases more if 7 is high.
The elasticity of substitution 6 and 8 =  1 — <5* affects the response of the nominal 
exchange ra te  to  m onetary shocks in both  models (Figures 26 and 27). A nominal de­
preciation makes T H  goods more attractive, however, for the same Home positive money 
shock, the  nom inal depreciation must be lower for higher levels of 9 , since the higher is 0, 
the higher is the switch in dem and from T F  to T H  goods. This explains why the nominal 
exchange ra te  is very volatile for low values of 6. The param eters 8 and determine the 
size of the  expenditure-switching effect, therefore they govern also how much e can change
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while keeping the equilibrium in the goods market.
The response of output and employment
As it can be seen from Figure 28, the response of Home real ou tpu t11 to Home monetary 
shocks is the  highest in the short run, while productivity shocks in the Home country and 
Home government expenditure shocks have a higher response in the long run. Then, if all 
shocks have the same variance, the model identifies m onetary shocks as the main source 
of short-run ou tpu t fluctuations, and productivity and government expenditure shocks as 
the main source of medium to long-run output fluctuations.
Let us analyse the transmission of monetary shocks first. An increase in Home money 
supply has a positive effect on Home and Foreign consumption and causes a depreciation of 
the Home currency. Home ou tput is driven up partly by the increase in Home and Foreign 
consumption, and partly  by the depreciation, which makes Home tradeable goods cheaper. 
However, Foreign money shocks have no effect on Home output. This happens because of 
the values chosen for the elasticities of substitution in the baseline param etrization. After 
a positive Foreign m onetary shock, the Home currency appreciates and Home tradeable 
goods become more expensive compared to Foreign tradeable goods. Under the baseline 
param etrization, after a positive Foreign money shock demand increases only for Foreign 
goods, while the  dem and for Home tradeables and nontradeables is unaffected.
Then, the  transm ission of productivity shocks. It is interesting to note that, without 
capital accum ulation, productivity shocks produce a hum p-shaped response th a t peaks at 
roughly one quarter. The persistence of the response to  productivity shocks is explained 
by nom inal rigidities. After a positive productivity shock in the Home country, Home 
firms reduce their prices (because their marginal cost is lower), thus inducing individuals 
to  increase consum ption. O utput increases to meet the demand for consumption, however, 
because of price rigidity the fall in prices is gradual, so the im pact on consumption and 
ou tpu t is long-lasting. Finally, government expenditure shocks increase the demand for 
ou tpu t and are never transm itted  abroad, as governments purchase only tradeable and 
nontradeable goods produced in their own country.
The responses of ou tput to  the shocks in the model without the choice of allocations are 
qualitatively similar, as shown by Figure 29. However, their sizes are markedly different,
11 Here real output is the sum of tradeable and nontradeable output, evaluated at constant, steady state, 
prices.
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since the responses to  money and government shocks are dampened, and the responses to 
productivity shocks are amplified, compared to the model with the choice of allocations. 
This happens because increases in output entail increases in hours worked, but in the 
model, w ithout the  choice of allocations increases in hours drive real wages up. As a 
result, firms pass p a rt of the increase in real wages onto prices, curbing demand. The 
explanation of why the response of output to  productivity shocks is amplified in the 
model w ithout the  choice of allocations also revolves around labour supply. Contrary to 
m onetary and government expenditure shocks, positive productivity shocks are associated 
with reductions in labour dem and12. As a result, hours worked fall, and in the model 
w ithout the allocations choice real wages must fall until labour supply becomes equal to 
demand. Then, the  fall in real wages results into lower prices and higher output demand. 
Therefore, in the  model w ithout the choice of allocations, productivity shocks are followed 
by a m arked increase in output, which is relatively stronger than  in the model with the 
choice of allocations.
Figures 30 to  33 illustrate th a t if the assumptions of unitary elasticities 0 and 6 are 
relaxed, then Foreign m onetary and nontradeable productivity shocks have an impact on 
Home ou tpu t, bu t they generate only very small effects th a t are indeterm inate in sign. In 
fact, if the  elasticities 0 and 6 are less than  one, then Foreign shocks have a positive impact 
on ou tpu t, otherwise the sign is reversed. After a positive Foreign monetary shock, con­
sum ption increases in both  countries, and the Home currency appreciates. Because of the 
nominal appreciation, Pt  goes down bu t P£ goes up, hence the aggregate basket of trade- 
able goods becomes relatively less expensive (compared to  nontradeables) in the Home 
country, and relatively more expensive in the Foreign country. Moreover, Home tradeable 
goods become relatively more expensive compared to  Foreign tradeable goods. When ei­
ther 0 or 9 are low, individuals in the Foreign country (where the response of consumption 
is higher) substitu te  little towards, respectively, nontradeables or Foreign-produced trade­
ables. However, when either 0 or 6 are high, substitution effects are more pronounced, 
and a positive Foreign m onetary shock has a negative impact on Home tradeable goods 
and Home ou tpu t. In  the case of Foreign productivity shocks, their main consequence is 
the  fall of prices in the relevant sectors and the increase in Foreign consumption. If 0 or
12 P ositive m onetary and government expenditure shocks are associated with increases in hours worked 
(because output increases drive up hours), while positive technology shocks cause a decrease in hours 
worked (because firms require less labour).
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9 are low, substitu tion  effects are small, and the increased consumption demand in the 
Foreign country results in more demand for Home tradeable goods and output.
Figure 34 shows the impulse responses of to tal Home employment, which is defined as 
the sum of the  employment rates in the two sectors. Using equations (4.1) and (4.2), it 
can be shown th a t the  responses of to tal employment are the same as the responses of real 
output presented in Figure 28, except for productivity shocks and in the case of decreasing 
labour productivity. For this reason, Figure 34 shows the responses with decreasing labour 
productivity alongside the responses with constant labour productivity.
Total employment increases after a positive m onetary or government expenditure 
shock, since firms can satisfy the higher output demand only by increasing the labour 
input. In the  case of decreasing labour productivity, firms must employ more workers in 
order to  satisfy dem and. On the other hand, after a positive productivity shock more out­
pu t can be produced w ith less labour, therefore employment falls. W ith decreasing labour 
productivity firms cut more workers because labour is less productive, since one worker 
produces less th an  one unit of ou tput (adjusted for productivity). Moreover, sensitivity 
analysis shows th a t  if the  assumptions of unitary elasticities 0 and 9 are relaxed, then 
Foreign m onetary  and nontradeable productivity shocks can have an impact on Home 
employment, as one could expect by looking at Figures 30 to  33. These effects are positive 
for low values of 0  and 0, and negative for values of 4> and 9 greater than  one, both for 
productiv ity  and m onetary shocks.
5.4  C on clu sion
The move tow ards an intertem poral general equilibrium model with explicit microfounda­
tions constitu tes a  rather recent “paradigm  shift” for the study of the international trans­
mission of shocks. However, the transmission of shocks in the Redux or in its extensions 
is different, bo th  quantitatively and qualitatively, from the traditional Mundell-Fleming- 
Dornbusch model. The model presented in this chapter uses very general functional forms, 
to  ensure com parability with similar models, and the analysis of the transmission of shocks 
is conducted also for the case in which individuals can work in both sectors.
The insights th a t can be gained from the sort of theoretical analysis presented in this 
chapter m ay thus be useful to  all those researchers looking for a better model to match the 
data. In fact, since the chapter explains the effects of changes in param eter values on the
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transmission mechanism, it is possible to  evaluate whether the empirical calibration of this 
model or a similar one is likely to  be successful, or else some change in the assumptions is 
needed. This point can be illustrated with reference to the main findings of the chapter.
The strong im pact of money on all variables in the short run may be altered by 
resorting to  a different calibration of the shock13, but the absence of persistence is an 
inherent feature of this and similar models, since changes in param eters did not have a 
noticeable effect on it.
The effects of government expenditure shocks on output have been shown to be sensi­
tive to changes in param eters: this means th a t there are some gains tha t can be exploited 
by some suitable empirical calibration and testing procedure. However, under all parame- 
trizations the responses of ou tput to government expenditure shocks were rather weak and 
poorly persistent, calling for a change in some of the modelling assumptions. A change is 
also needed to  allow government expenditure shocks having an effect on the real exchange 
rate. B u t on the  positive side, the assumption th a t individuals cannot work in both sec­
tors seems to  be a desirable feature to have in the model, since it prevents government 
expenditure shocks having a negative effect on consumption.
Lastly, the  effects of Foreign shocks on Home output and employment. The message 
th a t can be inferred from Figures 30 to 33 is twofold. On the one hand, the weak trans­
mission of Foreign shocks to Home output calls for a change in the modelling assumptions 
14. For example, some degree of pricing to market would reduce the expenditure switching 
effect, and generate a positive co-movement of output. On the other hand, since changes in 
the elasticities of substitu tion  generate responses having different size and magnitude, the 
model is very flexible15. In particular, by allowing the elasticities to differ across countries, 
it could be possible to  reproduce the internationally asymmetric effects of money shocks16. 
Since there are no papers th a t estim ate two-country models by looking at the responses
13 For exam ple, the shock may be in the level instead of in the growth rate of money. In this Chapter 
monetary policy is not specified by means of an interest rate rule. This is because shocks to the interest rate 
rule are not unambiguously monetary in nature, furthermore, with an interest rate rule it is not possible 
to isolate the genuine transmission mechanism from the monetary policy reaction, since the response of all 
variables depends on the behaviour of the central bank.
14B etts and D evereux (2001), and Kim (1999) find a strong positive response of foreign outputs to US 
expansionary m onetary shocks.
15 In the M undell-Fleming-Dornbusch model, under flexible exchange rates a monetary expansion in one 
country produces a negative output response in the other country. See Borondo (2002).
16 T he empirical literature has highlighted that shocks originating in the US seem to have different effects 
on European variables than shocks originating in Europe on US variables. See, for example, Artis, Osborn 
and Perez (2004).
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The thesis applies a variety of DSGE models to a set of problems, all of them related with 
the study of economic fluctuations. Their summarised conclusions constitute the point of 
departure for an appraisal of the DSGE methodology, from the particular point of view 
of the analysis of fluctuations.
C hapter 2 docum ents the crucial features of economic fluctuations in Italy, namely 
the high volatility of hours worked and the low volatility of employment, and explains 
why the s tandard  RBC model cannot reproduce them. In fact, the volatility of hours can 
be increased by assuming a high elasticity of intertem poral substitution of leisure, or by 
introducing the  possibility of borrowing and lending from the rest of the world. However, 
results from the  sim ulations have shown th a t the increase in the volatility of hours always 
happens a t the  expense of the volatility of consumption, which becomes too low.
C hapter 2 then  concludes th a t the inability of the standard  RBC model in generating 
a high volatility of hours is due to  the nature of the transmission of the technology shock 
in the RBC model, and the way the persistence is generated. In the RBC model the 
motive for changing the  labour supply is intertem poral substitution, but agents want to 
spread the payoff of working longer hours into the future, via capital accumulation. As a 
result, when the responsiveness of hours of work is increased (via a change in the labour 
supply elasticity), the RBC model generates too much consumption smoothing or too high 
volatility of investm ent to  be consistent with the data.
However, the  standard  RBC model was applied initially only to the US, therefore it is 
possible th a t  its original design was heavily influenced by the institutional characteristics 
of the US economy. W hen applied to other countries, a suitable adaptation to the specific 
institu tional features may increase the model’s ability to m atch the data. Therefore, the 
inability of the  standard  RBC model to reproduce the volatility of hours in Italy may 
not be inherently due to  its propagation mechanism, but rather to the neglect of some
159
specific labour m arket institutions or features of the Italian economy. In particular, the 
Italian economy is characterised by a high degree of labour market rigidity, and by the 
existence of a large underground economy. The presence of labour market rigidities and 
the sizeable underground sector can explain why in Italy hours of work fluctuate more than 
employment. Rigidities prevent or make it costlier for registered, “official” firms to change 
the num ber of employed workers, and as a result they prefer to change hours instead of 
employees in response to  shocks. Individuals can offset the change in the registered or 
“official” hours by shifting from the production of goods in the registered sector to the 
production of goods in the unregistered sector, or vice versa.
Therefore, C hapter 3 modifies the RBC model by adding labour market rigidities and 
the underground sector, and explains why these modifications are successful in generating 
a high volatility  of hours and a low volatility of employment. However, the modified RBC 
model is still not completely able to reproduce the fluctuations in the Italian economy, 
since the standard  deviation of consumption is again lower than  in the actual data. Nev­
ertheless, the  exercise conducted in Chapter 3 is useful because it suggest that, in order 
to  m atch all the  s tandard  deviations in the Italian data , the modified RBC model must 
be supplem ented by some additional assumptions. In fact, as highlighted on page 75, 
although the  m odel introduced in C hapter 3 captures im portant institutional differences 
between Ita ly  and the  US (labour m arket rigidities and the underground sector), it does 
not, of course, cap ture all of them; furthermore, the distinctive features of business cycle 
fluctuations in Ita ly  may also be due to individual preferences and tastes. Thus there are 
several promising avenues for future research.
Using a tw o-country model with nominal rigidities, C hapters 4 and 5 illustrate the 
high po ten tia l of DSGE m ethods in understanding the transmission of shocks, both to 
relative prices and quantities and between countries. The model tha t is put forward in 
C hapters 4 and 5 belongs to  the “new open economy macroeconomics” literature initiated 
by O bstfeld and Rogoff (1995), but the analysis is more comprehensive than the previous 
studies. This is because: 1) many of the critical param eters already studied in isolation 
are present, so their role can be analysed simultaneously; 2) the analysis is not confined 
to  m onetary  shocks; 3) shocks are disaggregated by sector; 4) some novel assumptions are 
in troduced (the assum ptions th a t the marginal productivity of labour may be decreasing, 
and th a t  individuals cannot work in both  sectors). These latter modelling innovations are 
introduced in a way th a t preserves comparability with the other papers: constant marginal
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productivity of labour is trea ted  as a special case, and results are also shown for the case 
in which individuals can work in both  sectors.
In particular, C hapter 4 investigates how shocks are transm itted  to the relative price of 
domestic tradeables versus nontradeables, and to  the ratios of domestic tradeable versus 
nontradeable ou tpu t and employment. Using a two-country general equilibrium model 
with m onopolistic com petition and sticky prices, the chapter shows tha t not only sector- 
specific supply or dem and shocks affect these relative prices and allocations, but also 
aggregate m onetary shocks, thus contributing to  explain why money has sectoral effects, 
as found by the empirical literature. The effects of all shocks (money, supply and demand) 
depend on the  choice of param eter values.
C hapter 5 investigates the domestic and international transmission of shocks to the 
main m acroeconomic variables. W hile m onetary shocks dom inate the responses of all 
variables b u t are poorly persistent, demand (government expenditure) shocks have little 
im pact on the  m ain variables. Even without capital, technology shocks are quite persistent. 
The chapter shows th a t the sign of the response of ou tput and employment to Foreign 
shocks is not determ ined bu t it depends on param eter values, and the propagation of 
Foreign shocks to  ou tpu t and employment is weak. The la tte r result is im portant because, 
although the  em pirical research is still under way in this area, w hat is known now about 
the transm ission of shocks across countries seems not always to be fitting into the picture 
coming from the  theoretical model. In fact, Betts and Devereux (2001), and Kim (1999) 
find a strong positive response of foreign outputs to  US expansionary monetary shocks. 
B ut on the  positive side, the theoretical research itself is still under construction, and 
as the “new open economy” literature keeps expanding, the days in which international 
m acroeconom ists will have a framework universally accepted and fully consistent with the 
da ta  m ay get closer.
Thus, the  experience gained by applying the DSGE methodology to a set of somehow 
similar problem s points to  a m ixture of successes and failures. In fact, it was possible to 
reproduce to  some extent the facts th a t characterise the economic fluctuations in Italy, but 
it was not possible to  obtain a perfect m atch of the standard deviations; it was possible 
to  obtain  meaningful responses to exogenous shocks, bu t the sign and the persistence 
of some responses were not in line with the evidence. It seems that, decades after the 
Lucas’ critique, macroeconomists are finally equipped with a rigorous framework for policy 
analysis, b u t the  need to  establish all policy recommendations on models that are fully
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consistent w ith the empirical evidence is still there. Due to  the stylized nature of their 
early models, Kydland and Prescott (1982), and Long and Plosser (1983), set out to 
reproduce only second-order moments, bu t since then the state-of-the-art DSGE modelling 
has become far more sophisticated, so it seems right to  ask for more.
However, the message th a t can be inferred from the thesis’ chapters17 is that the re­
maining shortcomings of DSGE modelling do not constitute a lethal threat, capable of 
putting  into question the structure of the models. Indeed, since the DSGE methodology 
is flexible and capable of incorporating a variety of assumptions, there is always the pos­
sibility of finding the “right sort of imperfection” or modelling trick (even adding biases 
and tim e-inconsistencies in agents’ behaviour), th a t could reconcile the real world facts 
with the theory.
Considering the more or less recent advances in DSGE modelling, it is fair to say that 
this avenue has now been travelled to a great extent. In fact, to  give just some examples, 
some m odels18 explain the real effects of money by relying on the assumption that not all 
the agents optim ally adjust their wages or prices. O ther models introduce frictions19 or 
institu tional features th a t  prevent the immediate response of the agents and thus increase 
the persistence of the  effects of the shocks. However, judging in the light of the literature 
review presented in the  previous Section, this approach or avenue is likely to lead away 
from the desire for a “scientific” or intellectually rigorous discipline, a desire th a t has been 
crucial for the  construction of the DSGE methodology.
To the  rem ark th a t employment fluctuations are not all voluntary, because social 
conventions and institu tional structures affect them , Lucas replied th a t conventions and 
institu tions do not impose themselves on individuals, bu t instead they are chosen them­
selves, in order to  aid in m atching preferences and opportunities20. But as more frictions, 
institu tional features or ad hoc assumptions are added to the models, the DSGE approach 
gradually seems to  move towards the stage when it will be no more “scientific” than start­
ing directly w ith an aggregative model. Nonetheless, the strategies th a t have been tried 
in DSGE modelling to  narrow the gap between the data  and the theory have now gener­
ated  a b e tte r  knowledge, and, since the discipline of economics will always be evolving, 
a paradigm  m ust be “tried and tested” first, and perhaps also stretched in all directions,
17 See, for exam ple, the remarks on pages 75 and 157.
18 A s in Chapters 4 and 5.
19 As in Chapter 3.
20See Lucas (1981), page 4.
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before something new can come along.
In conclusion, since the thesis did not aim to be (and could not be) a complete eval­
uation of the DSGE methodology, based on all problems th a t can be solved with it, the 
message th a t it pu ts forward is only provisional. Future developments in DSGE modelling 
will certainly affect profoundly this methodology.
It has been noted in several places in the thesis th a t DSGE models are successful in 
reproducing some empirical facts or tendencies, or in generating a better understanding 
of the transm ission of shocks, bu t there is still ahead some work to do in order to make 
them  fully consistent with the empirical evidence21. This work may require modifying 
individuals’ preferences, introducing particular institutions or imperfections in the models, 
or enlarging the set of shocks, and in doing so it is possible th a t some of the rigour that 
characterised the  early DSGE models might be lost. However, the introduction of ad hoc 
modifications to  improve the m atch with the da ta  can be seen simply as an intermediate 
step, moreover, these modifications by themselves can generate a better knowledge of 
the DSGE methodology. By repeated adjustm ents, it will be possible to discern one day 
whether the  task  of explaining the da ta  can be accomplisher by either some modifications 
of existing theories, such as adding imperfections, or by some modifications of the key 
features of the  DSGE methodology itself. A lot of work will continue to be done in 
macroeconomics, and if the empirical and the theoretical literature do not lose sight of 
each other, its fruits will be long-lasting.
21 As highlighted on pages 75 and 157.
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Figure 4: Open Economy Model, 9  = 1, y = 0 : Technology Shock.
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Figure 5: Open Economy Model, 6 = 1, y -  0 : Interest Rate Shock.
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Figure 6: Open Economy Model, 6 = 1, y  = 0.5 : Technology Shock.
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Figure 7: Open Economy Model, 6 = 1, y = 0.5 : Interest Rate Shock.
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Figure 8: Open Economy Model, 6 — 1, y = 1: Technology Shock.
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Figure 9: Open Economy Model, 9 -  1, y  = 1: Interest Rate Shock.
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Figure 10: Labour Adjustment Cost Model, <9 = 2, y = 0 , <p = 1.
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Figure 11: The long-run demand and supply for relative output
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Chart 1: Responses of Home 
consumption to one percent government 
expenditure shocks*
Figure 13: Responses of Home 
consumption in the model 
without the choice of allocations
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Figures 14 and 15: Responses of Home consumption at t=l after a 
Home monetary shock, for different values of cr, (f) and 6 .*
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Figure 17: Responses of the real 
exchange rate in the model without 
the choice of allocations
Figure 18: Response of the real 
exchange rate at t= l after a shock in 
z TH, for different values of S  and S'
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Figures 19 and 20: Response of the real exchange rate and bond holdings
at t=l after a shock in n , for different values of 5 = l -  S' and e *
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Figures 21 and 22: Response o f the real exchange rate and bond holdings 





0 5  0.6 0.7 0.8 0.90 .t 02  0.3 0.40.1 0 2  0 3  0.4 0 5  0.6 0.7 0.8 0 9
8 = 1 -  S' 8 = 1-5*
* = All other parameters as in the baseline parametrisation. Response in percentages.
189
Figure 23: Responses of the nominal exchange rate to
one percent shocks*
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Figures 24 and 25: Response of the nominal exchange rate at t= l after a shock 
in n , for different v alues of y and 0 *
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Figures 26 and 27: Response o f the nominal exchange rate at t= l after a shock 
in n , for different values of 8 = l -  S' and o *
With the choice o f allocations
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Figure 28: Responses of Home real output to one percent shocks*
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* = Baseline parametrisation. Real output is the sum o f tradeable and nontradeable output at constant prices.
Figure 29: Responses of Home real 
output in the model without the choice of 
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Figures 30 and 31: Responses of Home real output to one percent shocks, for 
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Figures 32 and 33: Responses of Home real output to one percent shocks, for
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Figure 34: Responses of Home employment 
(total) to one percent shocks, for a  = 1 and
a <  1*
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